Correspondence

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Notes

1 Quoted in John Krige, Sharing Knowledge, Shaping Europe: U.S. Technological Collaboration and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016), p. 83.

2 “IAEA Safeguards Glossary,” 2001, International Nuclear Verification Series, No. 3, <www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/iaea_safeguards_glossary.pdf>.

3 Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, Jeffrey Lewis, and Miles Pomper, “Significantly Wrong on Significant Quantities,” ArmsControlWonk.com, March 1, 2012, <www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/205028/significantly-wrong-about-significant-quantities/>.

4 Matthew Bunn, “What Types of Nuclear Material Require What Levels of Security?” presentation delivered at the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management Workshop on Risk-Informing Security, February 11–12, 2014, <www.inmm.org/INMM/media/Documents/Presenations/Risk%20Informing%20Security%20Workshop%202014/7-materials-attractivenessBunn.pdf>.

5 Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher E. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: National Resources Defense Council, 1995), p. 1.

6 Thomas B. Cochran, Technological Issues Related to the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: National Resources Defense Council, 1998), pp. 18–19.

7 A simple approximation of the separative work S(X_f, X_w) in SWU to produce 1 SQ of 93% enriched uranium as a function of feed enrichment 2%<X_f <20% and the tails enrichment 0.15%<X_w < 0.35% is S(X_f, X_w) = A X_f^α, where α = −0.333 X_w² + 0.4377 X_w−0.8334, and A = −7289.6 X_w + 6723 where the enrichments are expressed as a percentage.