MILITARY CULTURE AND CHINESE EXPORT CONTROLS

Abstract

In recent years, the Chinese government, determined to burnish its reputation as a good international citizen, has striven to bring the nation's export control system up to international standards. It has issued a series of laws, regulations, and policy statements to that effect. The Bush administration has nevertheless found Chinese performance wanting in this area. The most likely explanation behind the incidents of proliferation that have continued to occur is not, as administration officials have intimated, deliberate policy or simple inattention. While policymaking and lawmaking in Beijing have improved, some intervening variables have remained more constant, imposing a drag on the effectiveness of China's export controls. The People's Liberation Army, which has both the incentive and the means to bypass the stringent regulations enacted since 1998, is one such variable. By remaking the military culture in keeping with national policy, China's top leadership can discourage exports that imperil regional security.

Keywords:

• China
• Export Control
• Military Culture

Notes

1. Jing-dong Yuan, Phillip C. Saunders, and Stephanie Lieggi, “Recent Developments in China's Export Controls: New Regulations and New Challenges,” Nonproliferation Review 9 (Fall–Winter 2002), pp. 153–67.

2. State Council Information Office, People's Republic of China, China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures, Dec. 3, 2003, <www.china.org.cn/english/2003/Dec/81312.htm>.

3. Beijing published a representative statement reaffirming its commitment to nonproliferation on the eve of the 2005 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. See “Zhongguo Wang on China's Contribution to Nuclear Disarmament, Nonproliferation,” Zhongguo Wang, May 13, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050513000122 (May 12, 2005).

4. U.S. Senate, Armed Services Committee, Worldwide Threat − Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World, testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, March 19, 2002, <www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2002/senate_select_hearing_03192002.html>.

5. Paula DeSutter, “‘China Should Tighten Missile Controls,” remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 24, 2003, <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/desutter_0724.htm>. DeSutter singled out the China North Industries Corporation and the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation as “serial proliferators” that persist in transferring missile-related components to Iran and Pakistan.

6. U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-term Challenges with a Long-term Strategy, testimony of Porter J. Goss, Feb. 16, 2005, <www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/speeches/2004/Goss_testimony_02162005.html>.

7. See, for instance Sean Lucas, “China Enters the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Positive Steps in the Global Campaign against Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” Nov. 2004, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website, <www.nti.org/e_research/e3_57a.html>.

8. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of Nonproliferation, Public Notice 4946, “Imposition of Nonproliferation Measures against Nine Foreign Entities, Including a Ban on U.S. Government Procurement, and Removal of Penalties from One Entity,” Federal Register 70 (Jan. 3, 2005), <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/FR010305.pdf>.

9. DeSutter, “China Should Tighten Missile Controls.”

10. See “US Nonproliferation Sanctions against China and/or Chinese Entities,” NTI website, <www.nti.org/db/china/sanclist.htm>.

11. See for instance Joby Warrick and Peter Slevin, “Libyan Arms Designs Traced Back to China: Pakistanis Resold Chinese-Provided Plans,” Washington Post, Feb. 15, 2004, <www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42692-2004Feb14.html>.

12. U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, Testimony of Gary Milhollin, June 6, 2002, <www.senate.gov/∼gov_affairs/060602milhollin.pdf>.

13. Gary Milhollin, “Testimony of Gary Milhollin before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,” March 10, 2005, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission website, <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_03_10wrtr/milhollin_gary_wrts.htm>.

14. Seema Gahlaut, “The PSI Will Parallel the Multilateral Export Control Regimes,” Monitor: International Perspectives on Nonproliferation 10 (Spring 2004), pp. 12–15.

15. Jonathan E. Davis and Anupam Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, 2005 (Athens, GA: Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, 2005), pp. 23–44.

16. On the history of China's military culture, see Andrew Scobell, China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 1–9.

17. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 1–2. See also Evan S. Medeiros, Chasing the Dragon: Assessing China's System of Export Controls for WMD-Related Goods and Technologies (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).

18. Center for International Trade and Security, Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global Evaluation, Center for International Trade and Security website, <www.uga.edu/cits/documents/html/nat_eval_execsumm.htm>.

19. Richard T. Cupitt and Yuzo Murayama, “Export Controls in the People's Republic of China,” Bulletin of Asia-Pacific Studies 9 (March 1999), pp. 29–72; Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 1–2.

20. Kathleen Walsh, “China's Export Controls: New Signs of Progress?” NIS Export Control Observer, June 2003, pp. 15–16. See also Jing-dong Yuan, “Strengthening China's Export Control System,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies website, <cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/jdmemo.pdf>.

21. Bush administration officials have been wary of Beijing's commitment to export controls. For instance, Under Secretary of Commerce Kenneth Juster pointed to exports of sensitive items by Chinese firms. Juster told industry representatives, “From a practical perspective, China's performance in the area of nonproliferation and export control has been less than satisfactory.” Of particular concern to the administration is Beijing's reluctance to admit U.S. representatives to the country for post-shipment verification. “China Must Improve Its Export Controls, BIS Chief Juster Says,” Export Practitioner, Oct. 2003, p. 15.

22. For instance, in 2002 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency reported to Congress that “Beijing continued to take a very narrow interpretation of its bilateral nonproliferation commitments with the United States.” The CIA complained in particular about sales of missile-related components and assistance to countries such as Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Feb. 1, 2002, <www.fas.org/news/china/2002/ciareport.htm>.

23. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 3–5.

24. Yuan, Saunders, and Lieggi, “Recent Developments,” pp. 154–55. See also Mingquan Zhu, “The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Winter 1997), pp. 40–48; Cong Fu, “An Introduction to China's Export Control System, The Monitor 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 17–19; and Richard Weixing Hu, “Play by International Rules: The Development of China's Nuclear Export Controls,” The Monitor 3 (Winter 1998), pp. 19–26.

25. U.S. Senate, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, China's Proliferation Practices and Role in the North Korea Crisis, statement by Daniel A. Pinkston, 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2005, p. 50, <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_03_10.pdf>.

26. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 5–7; Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, 2d ed., rev. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005); “China WMD Database,” NTI website, <www.nti.org/db/china/>.

27. People's Republic of China, “Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, Adopted at the Seventh Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on 12 May 1994, Promulgated By Order No. 22 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 12 May 1994, and Effective as of 1 July 1994,” <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/tradelaw.htm>.

28. “China's Nuclear Exports and Assistance to Pakistan,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Resources on India and Pakistan, CNS website, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm > ; Cirincione et al., Deadly Arsenals, p. 149.

29. State Council, People's Republic of China, China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, Nov. 1995), <www.china.org.cn/e-white/army/index.htm>.

30. People's Republic of China, “Regulations on Nuclear Export Control, 11 Sept. 1997,” <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/excon97.htm>; PRC, “Regulations on Export Control of Military Items, 22 Oct. 1997,” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/milexcon.htm>.

31. “Full Text of China's Regulations on Export Control of Missiles,” Xinhua News Agency, Aug. 25, 2002, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/export.html>; People's Republic of China, “Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, 14 Oct. 2002,” <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/bioregs_1002.htm>; and PRC, “Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies, 19 Oct. 2002,” <http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chemregs_1002.htm>.

32. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 7–12.

33. International Atomic Energy Authority, “Statute of the IAEA,” IAEA website, <www.iaea.org/About/statute_text.html>.

34. For details about the regime, see Missile Technology Control Regime website, <www.mtcr.info/english/index.html>.

35. “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” July 1, 1968, TIAS no. 6839, <www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/.ht text/npt2htm>; “Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction,” Jan. 13, 1992, 1974 UNTS no. 45, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website, <www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc.html>; “Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” Sept. 10, 1996, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty website, <www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/ctdocs.htm>. For a detailed look at these developments, see Yuan et al., “Recent Developments,” and Jing-Dong Yuan, “Strengthening China's Export Control System,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Oct. 4, 2002.

36. For details see the Nuclear Suppliers Group website, <www.nsg-online.org/>, and the Australia Group website, <www.australiagroup.net/>.

37. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 13–15.

38. People's Republic of China, “Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, 14 Oct. 2002,” <www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/bioregs_1002.htm>.

39. State Council Information Office, China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures.

40. Robert A. Goldwin, From Parchment to Power: How James Madison Used the Bill of Rights to Save the Constitution (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 1997).

41. Yuan et al., “Recent Developments,” p. 154.

42. Shirley A. Kan, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Aug. 8, 2003), <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/23375.pdf>.

43. Jennifer C. Bulkeley, “Making the System Work: Challenges for China's Export Control System,” Nonproliferation Review 11 (Spring 2004), pp. 145–69.

44. David Shambaugh, “China's New High Command,” in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti, The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2003), pp. 43–65. The classic account of U.S. civil-military relations is Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957). Eliot Cohen more recently argued that Huntington had drawn too sharp a distinction between the civil and military spheres. Statesmen, said Cohen, should intervene even at the tactical level if politics required it. Even so, the argument among Western scholars surrounds the extent to which civil authority should impinge on military affairs; Huntington and Cohen would agree that military officers should remain aloof from politics. Eliot Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York: Free Press, 2002).

45. Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 2nd ed. (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1992), pp. 3–5, 47, 211–53.

46. Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” in Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1977), p. 224.

47. Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, p. 5.

48. Bates Gill, “Chinese Leadership Transition,” in Flanagan and Marti, The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition, pp. 27–42.

49. Victor C. Falkenheim, ed., Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1987). See also Solomon M. Karmel, China and the People's Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developing State? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), and Kenneth Allen, “Introduction to the PLA's Administrative and Operational Structure,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang, The People's Liberation Army as Organization: Reference Volume v1.0 (Washington, DC: RAND, 2002), pp. 1–44.

50. To be sure, the PLA's political influence has waxed and waned since the inception of the PRC. The army actually administered China in the early 1950s, the period immediately following the Chinese Civil War, through temporary leadership of military and administrative committees. The PLA saw its influence decline with the creation of civilian administrations in the provinces, only to return during the Cultural Revolution, when military officers held more than 70 percent of government offices. The pendulum swung the other way after the Cultural Revolution, when more than 80 percent of these offices were lost to civilian officials. During the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping sought to consolidate civilian control of the military. Despite his efforts, the PLA regained its privileged position in the wake of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. The struggle between civil and military authorities became more pronounced during the 1990s as large-scale government restructuring was instituted. Jeremy T. Paltiel, “PLA Allegiance on Parade: Civil-Military Relations in Transition,” China Quarterly 143 (Sept. 1995), pp. 784–800.

51. David Shambaugh, “The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People's Liberation Army,” China Quarterly 127 (Sept. 1991), pp. 527–68.

52. Falkenheim, Citizens and Groups in Contemporary China.

53. Jing-Dong Yuan, “Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament,” Contemporary Security Policy 19 (April 1998), pp. 85–128.

54. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 13–21.

55. Andrew Scobell, “China's Evolving Civil-Military Relations: Creeping Guojiahua,” Armed Forces & Society 31 (Winter 2005), p. 227.

56. Andrew Scobell, “Seventy-five Years of Civil-Military Relations: Lessons Learned,” in Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry Wortzel, eds., The PLA at 75: The Lessons of History (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2003), pp. 434–37; Paltiel, “PLA Allegiance on Parade,” pp. 784–800; Monte R. Bullard and Edward C. Dowd, “Defining the Role of the PLA in the Post-Mao Era,” Asian Survey 26 (June 1986), pp. 706–20.

57. Ellis Joffe, “Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect,” China Quarterly 146 (June 1996), p. 299.

58. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” pp. 228–30.

59. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” pp. 228–30, p. 233.

60. See for instance James C. Mulvenon, “Party-Army Relations since the 16th Party Congress: The Battle of the ‘Two Centers’?” in Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzel, eds., Civil-Military Change in China: Elites, Institutes, and Ideas (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), pp. 11–12, and “China: Conditional Compliance,” in Muthia Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 317–19.

61. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” p. 233.

62. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,”; Andrew Scobell, “Seventy-five Years of Civil-Military Relations,” pp. 437–41. Also useful is Shen Zhenhuan, “Reform of China's Defense Industry,” in Michael Pillsbury, ed. Chinese Views of Future Warfare (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1998), <www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/Chinese%20Views%20of%20Future%20Warfare%20-%20Sept%2098/chinapt3.html#9>. See also Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2000), esp. Chapter 6, “Forecasting Future Wars,” <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2000/part09.htm>.

63. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, China after Deng: The Power Struggle in Beijing since Tiananmen (Hong Kong: P.A. Professional Consultants, 1995), p. 232; Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” pp. 231–32.

64. James C. Mulvenon, “Conditional Compliance,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 317.

65. For more on China's view of the security environment, see People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2004, China Military Online website, <http://english.chinamil.com.cn/special/cnd2004/contents_02.htm>.

66. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2005), p. 21.

67. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, p. 34.

68. “China North Industries Group (NORINCO),” Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/china/norinco.htm>.

69. Harlan Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” pp. 278, 280.

70. For a detailed analysis of the Chinese arms export process, see Evan S. Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Players, and Process (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Aug. 2000), <http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/armymil/www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00065.pdf>. Also useful are Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” pp. 273–308, and John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).

71. See, for example, Rodney W. Jones, “China's Proliferation Record,” Proliferation Brief 3 (July 25, 2000), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website, <www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/Publications.asp?p = 8&PublicationID = 367>.

72. John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, “Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma,” International Security 15 (Spring 1991), pp. 87–109.

73. One scholar noted ruefully that “the PLA's role is often either downplayed greatly or ignored altogether” in discussions of Chinese foreign policy. Most studies “rarely, if ever, include analysis of [PLA] policy interactions with civilian foreign affairs officials or organizations.” Michael D. Swaine, “The PLA and Chinese National Security Policy: Leaderships, Structures, Processes,” China Quarterly 146 (June 1996), p. 361.

74. Lewis et al., “Beijing's Defense Establishment,” pp. 87–109.

75. Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” p. 274.

76. Evan S. Medeiros, “Analyzing China's Defense Industries and the Implications for Chinese Military Modernization,” statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Feb. 6, 2004, <www.rand.org/publications/CT/CT217/CT217.pdf>.

77. Harlan W. Jencks, “COSTIND Is Dead, Long Live COSTIND! Restructuring China's Defense Scientific, Technical, and Industrial Sector,” in James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang, eds., People's Liberation Army in the Information Age (Washington, DC: RAND, 1999), pp. 59–77.

78. Medeiros, “Analyzing China's Defense Industries.”

79. Gao Jiquan, “Shoulder Heavy Responsibilities, Accept New Challenges − Interview with Liu Jibin, Newly Appointed State Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense Minister,” Jiefangjun bao, April 9, 1998, p. 5, in FBIS-CHI-98-119, April 29, 1998; Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” p. 278.

80. Medeiros and Gill, Chinese Arms Exports.

81. Medeiros, “Analyzing China's Defense Industries.”

82. Jencks, “COSTIND Is Dead, Long Live COSTIND!” pp. 59–77.

83. “Cao Gangchuan,” People's Daily Online, <http://english.people.com.cn/data/people/caogangchuan.shtml>.

84. Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, June 27, 2003, <www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring062703.html>.

85. Jencks, “The General Armament Department,” p. 276.

86. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 33–35.

87. U.S. Senate, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, prepared statement by Daniel A. Pinkston, 109th Cong., 1st sess., March 10, 2005, p. 55, <www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/transcripts/05_03_10.pdf>.

88. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 33–34.

89. Pinkston, prepared statement to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, p. 57. See also “New Era (Xinshidai) Corporation,” China Profiles, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/china/newera.htm>.

90. Mike Nartker, “United States Imposes Sanctions against Chinese Firm,” Global Security Newswire, Sept. 22, 2004, <http://204.71.60.35/d_newswire/issues/2004_9_22.html>.

91. See Thomas J. Bickford, “The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations: The PLA as Entrepreneur,” Asian Survey 34 (May 1994), pp. 460–74; Deba R. Mohanty, “The PLA Industries: Issues and Implications,” Strategic Analysis 23 (June 2000), pp. 509–23; and David Shambaugh and Richard H. Yang, eds., China's Military in Transition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

92. Kevin F. Donovan, “The Economics of Proliferation in the People's Republic of China,” Report No. AU/AWC/RWP075/96-04, Air War College, Montgomery, AL, 1996, <www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/donovan_kf.pdf>. See also China Statistical Yearbook 1992 (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 1992).

93. Wang Fang, “Fighting at Wartime and Pursuing Business at Peacetime,” China Daily, Aug. 6–12, 1995.

94. R. Scott Buan, “China's PLA: A Sleeping Dragon or Asian Goliath?” GlobalSecurity.org website, <www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1997/Buran.htm>.

95. Joseph P. Gallagher, “China's Military-Industrial Complex: Its Approach to the Acquisition of Modern Military Technology,” Asian Survey 27 (Sept. 1987), pp. 991–1002.

96. Jiang's announcement set off a flurry of discussion in military circles. See, for example, “Promote Military Changes with Chinese Characteristics,” PLA Daily, Sept. 18, 2003, <http://english.pladaily.com.cn/english/pladaily/2003/09/18/20030918001009_TodayHeadlines.html>.

97. Bickford, “The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations,” pp. 460–74; Tai Ming Cheung, “Serve the People,” Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct. 14, 1993, pp. 64–66; Donovan, “Economics of Proliferation.”

98. “Poly Technologies Corporation,” China Profiles, Nuclear Threat Initiative website, <www.nti.org/db/china/baoli.htm>.

99. Eric Hyer, “China's Arms Merchants: Profits in Command,” China Quarterly 132 (Dec. 1992), pp. 1101–18; Lewis et al., “Beijing's Defense Establishment,” pp. 87–89.

100. China Statistical Information and Consultancy Service Center, China's Leading Companies: 1994 (Hong Kong, 1994), <www.friedlnet.com/index.php>.

101. Mohanty, “The PLA Industries,” pp. 509–23.

102. James C. Mulvenon, Soldiers of Fortune: The Rise and Fall of the Chinese Military-Business Complex, 1978–1998 (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), pp. 193–94.

103. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” p. 235. See also Andrew Scobell, Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of Asia's Socialist Soldiers (Honolulu: East-West Center, Jan. 2000).

104. Scobell, “Creeping Guojiahua,” p. 235. See also Andrew Scobell, Going Out of Business: Divesting the Commercial Interests of Asia's Socialist Soldiers (Honolulu: East-West Center, Jan. 2000).

105. For a good summary, see John Frankenstein, “China's Defense Industries: A New Course?” in Mulvenon and Yang, People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, pp. 187–216.

106. Barry Naughton, “The Third Front: Defense Industrialization in the Chinese Interior,” China Quarterly 115 (Sept. 1988), pp. 351–86, and Frankenstein, “China's Defense Industries,” pp. 187–216.

107. Paul H. Folta, From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992).

108. Jiansheng Pei, “Market Solution Eludes Remote Military-Industrial Complex,” China Daily Business Weekly, Nov. 6–12, 1994, p. 7.

109. Joseph P. Gallagher, “China's Military-Industrial Complex: Its Approach to the Acquisition of Modern Military Technology,” Asian Survey 27 (Sept. 1987), pp. 991–1002.

110. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security 28 (Spring 2004), pp. 161–96.

111. Davis and Srivastava, Export Controls in the People's Republic of China, pp. 24, 26, 33.

112. The claims in this paragraph derive from interviews of Chinese experts conducted by staff members from the Center for International Trade and Security from mid-2002 through early 2003. The experts who supplied this information wished to remain anonymous.

113. Medeiros and Gill, Chinese Arms Exports, p. 5.

114. Keith Crane et al., Modernizing China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005).