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Abstract
Addressing the challenge of proliferation cannot be successful unless the theoretical underpinnings that rationalize acquisition or renunciation of nuclear weapons are understood. Just as theories explain the phenomenon of conflict and cooperation in international affairs, similarly theories must also explain the phenomenon of nuclear proliferation or restraint. Again, just as sound theory helped policymakers in understanding deterrence politics, a theoretical understanding of the dynamics of proliferation that addresses both the effects of nuclear proliferation and its fundamental causes should benefit nonproliferation policymakers. Long-term idealist goals of a nuclear-weapons-free world need to be theoretically reconciled with realist considerations of the obvious power and prestige that is associated with nuclear weapons. Thinking proliferation theoretically must begin with identifying the stakeholders and spoilers of the contemporary nonproliferation bargain. This article proposes a theory without presenting case studies and reserves policy prescriptions based on these theoretical considerations for a subsequent discussion, keeping in mind Nye's observation that “parsimony suggests that we start with the simple causes, see how much they explain, and go on to more complexity as needed.” Some simple causes are stated and the catalysts that spur proliferation reactions are probed in the hopes of provoking “thinking proliferation theoretically.”
Notes
1. Rebecca Johnson, “Day 26: Spineless NPT Conference Papers Over Cracks and Ends with a Whimper,” NPT Review Conference 2005: Acronym Special Coverage, May 27, 2005, <www.acronym.org.uk/npt/05rep12.htm>. Johnson writes, “Delegates from 153 countries at the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to build on past agreements and adopt any kind of decisions or recommendations for furthering progress in the vital security issues of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. From start to finish, this conference did little more than go through the motions and was one of the most shameful exhibitions of cynical time-wasting seen outside the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.”
2. Round three of the six-party talks were held in late June 2004. On Feb. 10, 2005, the North Korean Foreign Ministry released a statement saying that it had determined that “the true intention of the Bush administration was to seek a regime change in North Korea.” The statement also announced North Korea's withdrawal from the talks and that it had manufactured nuclear weapons. See Charles L. Pritchard, “The Korean Peninsula and the Role of Multilateral Talks,” Disarmament Forum No. 2 (2005), pp. 31–33, <www.unidir.org>. However, on July 10, 2005, North Korea agreed to return to the six-party talks.
3. “EU3-Iran nuclear talks doomed to fail,” WEBINDIA.com, May 25, 2005, <http://news.webindia123.com/news>. The news article states, "Prospects that the current negotiations between the EU3 and Iran will produce a lasting resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue are not encouraging … .John Chipman, director of the International Institute of [for] Strategic Studies, said while launching the institute's annual report here Tuesday.” “Iran will resume uranium enrichment if the EU does not recognize its right to do so.” New York Times Service, “Iran warns EU of nuclear revival,” The Asian Age, July 14, 2005, p. 8, <www.asianage.com>.
4. On June 27, 2002, the G8 (the seven major industrial countries: France, the US, Britain, Germany, Japan, Italy, and Canada, also known as the G7 plus Russia) issued a statement outlining a new initiative, entitled the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. It committed the G7 to raising up to $20 billion over the next ten years to fund nonproliferation projects, principally in Russia but also in other nations. At the G8 summit, held in June 2003 at Evian, France, the G8 leaders issued a declaration describing WMD proliferation as “the pre-eminent threat to international security.” Subsequent G8 summits have been silent on nonproliferation concerns. The G8 Sea Island Summit 2004 (Georgia, U.S.) mentioned stabilization of the “Broader” Mid East, HIV vaccines, eradication of polio, Africa, and debt relief, but not proliferation in its final declaration. In the 2005 Gleneagles summit (Scotland), African poverty, Palestine, trade liberalization, terrorism, and global warming—but not nuclear proliferation—were subjects of immediate concern.
5. The founder of the Pakistani nuclear program, Mr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, publicly confessed, on Feb. 5, 2004, to giving nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Although Mr. Khan denied complicity by the Pakistan government, other sources close to the scientist have said that the technology transfer was “with the full knowledge of top army officials, including President Musharraf.” Considering the secrecy and the organizational problems that transfer of nuclear weapons technology entails, it is difficult to believe that there has been no complicity of the Pakistan government in this murky endeavor. The point is that Mr. Khan was rich and well connected and an eminently respected national hero of Pakistan, and yet the scientist sold state secrets for pecuniary motives. See “Pakistan Leaks prompt Western resolve,” BBC News Online, Feb. 05, 2004. There are similar scientists, across many countries of the world, who could be persuaded by money or force or other enticements to spill the secrets of this damning technology. They thus constitute a potential pathway for nuclear proliferation. See also “Pakistan's explosive secrets,” Editorial: Japan Times, Feb. 5, 2004.
6. Kurt M. Campbell, “Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues,” Washington Quarterly 26 (Winter 2002–2003), pp. 7–17.
7. “Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear weapons may be reconsidering their political decisions to do so. Recently, some Brazilian and Japanese political leaders, for example, have openly suggested that their countries should reweigh their nuclear weapon options.” George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 16.
8. For an extract of the practical steps agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, see MCIS CNS NPT Briefing Book (April 2005 Edition), p. C-7, <http://cns.miis.edu.reserach/npt/briefingbook-2005>.
9. Just as the Partial Test Ban Treaty moved explosive nuclear testing from air and surface to underground testing, the CTBT is driving technology toward non-explosive synthetic nuclear testing in laboratories. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, San Francisco, California, is a facility that would use a mega-laser to blast a radioactive fuel pellet with 192 laser beams in order to create a thermonuclear explosion inside a reactor vessel. France has begun work on a $2.2 billion laser facility for use in simulating nuclear weapons tests. This Megajoule laser complex, being constructed at Bordeaux, is set to become operational in 2010. It should then be possible to still observe the CTBT in letter but violate its spirit by refining or developing new nuclear weapons through non-explosive laboratory testing, which is not explicitly prohibited in the CTBT. This apprehension was first elucidated by India's Ambassador, Arundhati Ghose, addressing the Conference on Disarmament in the final discussions when she urged, “the start of negotiations on a time bound program for the elimination of nuclear weapons … to make the CTBT a step to the road to nuclear disarmament rather than into a cul-de-sac … the CTBT must be an integral step in the process of nuclear disarmament … .[and] developing new warheads or refining existing ones after the CTBT is in place, using innovative technologies would be as contrary to the spirit of the CTBT as the NPT is to the spirit of nonproliferation.” For the full statement on India's position on the CTBT during the negotiations, see Embassy of India, Policy Statements, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, <www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/ctbt_index.htm>.
10. Campbell, “Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues,” p. 15.
11. A recent study to solve the nuclear proliferation challenge espouses that “… the new strategic aim of nonproliferation policy should be to achieve universal compliance with the norms and rules of a toughened nuclear proliferation regime.” For the strategy to succeed, all actors (state and non-state) would need to comply irreversibly with a set of six obligations. The study offers several constructive recommendations to “solve the nuclear proliferation challenge,” but these recommendations have not been theoretically substantiated. See, Perkovich et al., Universal Compliance.
12. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, “Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: Theory and Policies,” in Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread (and What Results) (London: Frank Cass, 1993), p. 1.
13. Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1999), pp. 3–5.
14. Stephen N. Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy (Spring 1998), pp. 29–30.
15. Joseph S. Nye (Jr.), Understanding International Conflicts (New York: Longman, 2000), p. 65.
16. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory. The images of international relations theory in this article are based upon this text.
17. Walt, “International Relations”, p. 31.
18. T.V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations forgo Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGills Queens University Press, 2000), p. 12.
19. James N. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), pp. 19–31.
20. Article IX (3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/pdfs/aptnpt.pdf>.
21. Annex 2 To CTBT, List of States Pursuant To Article XIV reads, “List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's April 1996 edition of 'Nuclear Power Reactors in the World,' and of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Dec. 1995 edition of ‘Nuclear Research Reactors in the World’: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, U.S. of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.”
22. Israel, India, North Korea, and Pakistan have nuclear weapons programs. Iran is a possible fifth. The six states that renounced nuclear weapons after having possessed them are Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine. Libya, for instance, disarmed voluntarily.
23. “Almost 60 States currently operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and technical infrastructure which would enable them, if they choose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty no longer apply.” See, “‘A more secured world: Our shared responsibility’; the Report of the UN Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change” in MCIS CNS NPT Briefing Book (April 2005 Edition), p. T-31, <http://cns.miis.edu.reserach/npt/briefingbook-2005>.
24. Paul, Power versus Prudence, p. 14.
25. Campbell, “Nuclear Proliferation beyond Rogues.”
26. See “Pakistan's Nuclear Commerce,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 2003; “Bush Makes War on Nuclear Black Market,” China Daily, Feb. 12, 2004; “Pakistan Leaks Prompt Western Resolve,” BBC News, Feb. 5, 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/3461855.stm>.
27. Iran's nuclear program is shrouded in mystery. Iran signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, and it signed the Additional Protocol in 2003. The overall circumstantial evidence, particularly the fact that Iran clandestinely imported the P-1 and P-2 centrifuge design and components from Pakistan, concealed its enrichment program, and tested the Shahab III intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)—a look-alike North Korean No Dong missile—is perhaps indicative of the less-than-honorable character of its nuclear program. See Rajesh Kumar Mishra, “Iran and the NPT,” in C. Uday Bhaskar and C. Raja Mohan, eds., Emerging Nuclear Proliferation Challenges, IDSA-Pugwash Conference, 2005 (New Delhi: IDSA, 2005), pp. 163–92. See also, U.S. Department of State Briefing, “Questioning Iran's Pursuit of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle – Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: A Pattern of Peaceful Intent,” presented to foreign diplomats in Vienna, Sept. 2005, <www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2005/iran-fuel-cycle-brief_dos_2005.pdf>. The briefing concludes by observing that “Iran's past history of concealment and deception and nuclear fuel cycle infrastructure are most consistent with intent to acquire nuclear weapons.” Pakistan has been included in this group due to the clandestine nature of its nuclear program. Though Pakistan is not a signatory to the NPT, it is well documented that China supported its clandestine nuclear program. See David Albright and Mark Hibbs, “Pakistan's Bomb: Out of the Closet,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Sept. 1992), pp. 27–31.
28. “According to this logic, the most hostile of adversaries will be dissuaded from initiating military conflict if each can threaten the other with unacceptable damage, even after absorbing a first nuclear strike.” See Devin T. Hagerty, “The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms Competition,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 257.
29. Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60.
30. Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60.
31. Tanya Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation? An Analysis of the Contemporary Debate,” Nonproliferation Review 4 (Fall 1996), pp. 43–60.
32. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84 (Fall 1990).
33. Zachary S. Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 82.
34. Zachary S. Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 81 and p. 86.
35. Joel S. Wit, who served as the State Department coordinator for the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, writes, “North Korea's plutonium-based program started as a serious effort to develop nuclear weapons in the 1960s. But by the late 1980s, after the disintegration of North Korea's closest ally, the Soviet Union, it may have been subordinated to a broader North Korean objective: to ensure regime survival through developing better relations with the United States on terms advantageous to Pyongyang. That was one of North Korea's goals in negotiating the Agreed Framework, which not only provided the North with fuel and light-water reactors but also called for Washington and Pyongyang to move toward normalizing relations.” Joel S. Wit, “Strategy for Defusing: The North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” Arms Control Today 33 (Jan.–Feb. 2003), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01-02/wit_janfeb03.asp>. Also, more recently, Paul Kerr, commenting on the six-nation joint statement of principles to guide future negotiations issued on Sept. 19, 2005, writes, “The product of several weeks of tough diplomacy, the statement commits the participants to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner … .Washington has demanded that Pyongyang quickly and verifiably eliminate its nuclear programs. North Korea has sought economic and energy assistance, as well as an end to what it has repeatedly characterized as Washington's ‘hostile policy’ of regime change.” Paul Kerr, “North Korea talks achieve breakthrough,” Arms Control Today 35 (Oct. 2005), <www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCT-NKBreakthrough.asp>.
36. Richard K. Betts, “Paranoids, Pygmies, Pariahs, and Nonproliferation Revisited,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, pp. 100–24.
37. Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 60.
38. Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?” Ogilvie-White gives a lucid background on the approaches to nuclear proliferation. The interested reader could refer to this article for a complete picture. In this paper I do not intend to recount all the approaches, but instead I have chosen a few representative schools of thought on the subject from Ogilvie-White's work.
39. Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nonproliferation,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, pp. 128 ff.
40. Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nonproliferation,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 128.
41. Glenn Chafetz, “The End of the Cold War and the Future of Nonproliferation,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 139.
42. Ogilvie-White, “Is There a Theory of Nuclear Proliferation?” p. 49.
43. It is difficult to fathom the true intentions behind North Korea's nuclear program. Several motivations have been hypothesized. Phillip C. Saunders hypothesizes that these drivers could be (1) North Korean leaders have decided that nuclear weapons are essential to their security; (2) North Korean leaders are willing to negotiate their nuclear and missile programs away for a deal that guarantees their security and sovereignty; (3) North Korean leaders want both nuclear weapons (as an ultimate security guarantee) and better relations with the United States, Japan, and South Korea, and; (4) North Korean leaders/factions disagree about whether nuclear weapons or a negotiated agreement with the United States is the best way to achieve security.” See Phillip C. Saunders, “Assessing North Korea's Nuclear Intentions,” CNS North Korea Special Collection, Jan. 14, 2003, <cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nucint.htm>.
44. Lewis A. Dunn and William H. Overholt, “The Next Phase in Nuclear Proliferation Research,” Orbis 20 (Summer 1976) pp. 505–07, 509–16.
45. John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 2 (1950). The term "security dilemma" describes the self-defeating aspect of the quest for national security whereby a state's means of self-protection simultaneously menaces other states, causing them to respond by arming and thereby triggering an arms race, pp. 157–80.
46. Scott D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” Current History (April 1997), pp. 151–56.
47. Kenneth Waltz and Scott D. Sagan, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Revisited (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), pp. 44–46.
48. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997), pp. 54–86.
49. Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 55.
50. While India may have taken a lead in nuclear weaponization by its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, the Pakistan nuclear weapons program began in earnest in the mid-1970s just after the 1971 India–Pakistan war. Pakistan developed a nuclear weapon quite possibly prior to the Indian bomb. General Mirza Aslam Beg was quoted as admitting that Pakistan had “… carried out the test in cold laboratory conditions, and it was very successful.” See William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Super Weapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.77. Stephen Philip Cohen states, “In early 1988 a U.S. official stated that Pakistan has acquired the technical capabilities needed to possess a nuclear explosive device.” See Stephen Philip Cohen, “Nuclear Neighbors,” in Stephen Philip Cohen, ed., Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: the Prospects for Arms Control (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), pp. 1–22. See also A.Z. Hilali, “Pakistan's Nuclear Deterrence: Political and Strategic Dimensions,” Perceptions (Dec. 2002–Feb. 2003), pp. 126–33, and Sreedhar, Pakistan's Bomb: A Documentary Study (New Delhi: ABC Publishing House, 1986). “In March [1988], Indian intelligence Agencies conclude Pakistan has at least three nuclear devices of 15–20 kiloton yield,” Wilson John, Pakistan's Nuclear Underworld (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2005), p. 82. There is therefore substantial evidence to suggest that Pakistan had in fact weaponized before India.
51. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” p. 61.
52. The example that immediately comes to mind is the doctrine of strategic bombing that was promoted by interested elites to justify the existence of the Royal Air Force as an independent armed force of the state. This doctrine held that air power would be able to interdict enemy industrial war potential and thereby deprive the enemy of the means of war. This did not happen. At the height of these operations, in 1943, when some 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped on German industry, production actually rose by 50 percent. Similarly, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused fewer casualties than the fire bomb raids on Tokyo. But, now that the nuclear bomb exists, strategists and political elites are rationalizing its existence on one pretext or the other, including its tactical utility as a “bunker buster.”
53. The example that immediately comes to mind is the doctrine of strategic bombing that was promoted by interested elites to justify the existence of the Royal Air Force as an independent armed force of the state. This doctrine held that air power would be able to interdict enemy industrial war potential and thereby deprive the enemy of the means of war. This did not happen. At the height of these operations, in 1943, when some 200,000 tons of bombs were dropped on German industry, production actually rose by 50 percent. Similarly, the two nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused fewer casualties than the fire bomb raids on Tokyo. But, now that the nuclear bomb exists, strategists and political elites are rationalizing its existence on one pretext or the other, including its tactical utility as a “bunker buster.” p. 65.
54. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 153.
55. Jaswant Singh, Defending India (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1998), p. 46. Jaswant Singh has quoted K. Subrahmanyam thus: “October 16, 1964 was a turning point for India. On that day when China became a nuclear power, Dr. Bhabha talked of India being in a position to go nuclear in 18 months at a cost of Rs. 1.8 million.”
56. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton was published in the New York Times, May 12, 1998. An excerpt reads, "We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962 … .Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distress persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distress that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapons state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last fifty years." Identical letters were sent to three other members of the UN Security Council—Russia, France, and the United Kingdom. China was the only exception, for obvious reasons. Indian Express, May 14, 1998. George Perkovich states, “The strategic enclave of scientists/technologists has driven India's quest for nuclear weapons,” George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), p. 447. For an alternative rationale, see Ashley J. Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 9–15.
57. Sagan, “Why Do States build nuclear weapons?” p. 73.
58. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in 1996, rendered a historical “Advisory Opinion” on the "Legality of the Threat or Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict" in response to UNGA Resolution 49/75K. The ICJ advised that the threat or use of force by means of nuclear weapons was contrary to Paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter and also did not meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The ICJ held that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was unlawful and incompatible with international laws that are applicable in armed conflict and also contrary to rules of humanitarian law. The ICJ could not, however, conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in the extreme circumstance of the need for defending the very existence of a sovereign state in self-defense.
59. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, “The Economic and Political Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons,” in Davis and Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 301.
60. Some examples are the Middle Powers Initiative, <www.middlepowers.org>, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, <www.nti.org>, Acronym Institute, <www.acronym.org.uk>, Federation of American Scientists, <www.fas.org>, Pugwash, <www.pugwash.org>, and Greenpeace <www.greenpeace.org>.
61. Entropy means a process in which order deteriorates with the passage of time.
62. The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement to address climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, caused primarily by burning oil, gas, and coal. The protocol encourages countries around the world to move to more environmentally responsible ways of producing and using energy by agreeing to cut their greenhouse gases to specific targets by 2012. In order for the Kyoto Protocol to come into force, 55 countries that produce 55 percent of the developed world's 1990 carbon dioxide emissions must ratify it. The European Union, Japan, and Russia have signed the protocol. On March 28, 2001, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that the United States would not implement the Kyoto Protocol unless the treaty was good for business or would otherwise benefit America. The United States produces 30.3 percent of the world's carbon dioxide. China and India together produce only one-third the carbon dioxide the U.S. produces. This example shows that a treaty with roots in environment has spillover effects on economics and domestic political constituencies. President Bush reiterated his resolve not to accede to the Kyoto Protocol in a Danish television interview aired on June 30, 2005, stating it would have “wrecked” the U.S. economy. See “Bush: Kyoto would hurt economy,” CNN.com, June 30, 2005, <http://cnn.worldnews>. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is an international treaty that prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, and acquisition of biological weapons. The United States withdrew from further discussions in 2002, ending six years of negotiations and leaving future efforts to improve the effectiveness of the BWC uncertain. John Bolton stated “ … the draft Protocol would have been singularly ineffective. The United States rejected the draft protocol for three reasons: first, it was based on a traditional arms control approach that will not work on biological weapons; second, it would have compromised national security and confidential business information; and third, it would have been used by proliferates to undermine other effective international export control regimes.” See “The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: Combating the BW Threat,” John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Remarks at Tokyo America Center, Tokyo, Japan, Aug. 26, 2002.
63. “Utility is the power or capacity of a commodity to satisfy a human want.” The origin of utility analysis can be traced back to the works of Gossen in the 19th century. However, the real credit for its development goes to Dr. Alfred Marshall. For a description of Utility Theory, see John B. Taylor, Economics (New Delhi: AITBS Publishers, 1997), pp. 132–47.
64. Historically, the political utility of nuclear weapons is seen in its core ability to exercise deterrence or compellence. Deterrence is a process by which an actor induces another actor to maintain the status quo by not taking action. Compellence is a process by which one actor attempts to force another actor either to take action or to cease an action already being taken, thus altering the status quo. Both deterrence and compellence are accomplished in two ways: either by threat, where an actor refrains from action because of the expectation of punishment, or denial, where one actor actually denies another's ability to take an action. Strategic nuclear weapons have a historic utility in exercising both compellence and deterrence policies. Thomas Schelling was one of the first writers to draw out this distinction. See Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–91. Tactical nuclear weapons supplement conventional capabilities of target destruction well above the capabilities of current conventional weapons. This neo-utility of nuclear weapons, which is at the cutting edge of nuclear weapons technology, though still technically infeasible for neo-proliferates, is an attractive incentive to contemplate proliferation.
65. Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, p. 14. The concept of levels of analysis in imagining international relations is attributed to J. David Singer. The levels of analysis include the individual (represented by the groups of bureaucratic institutions), the state as a unified actor, and finally the international system.
66. Daniel Bernoulli, the Swiss 18th century mathematician, is credited with introducing risk and uncertainty in economic theory. He introduced two concepts that revolutionized economics. First, that people's utility from wealth is not linearly related to wealth but rather increases only at a decreasing rate—the famous idea of diminishing marginal utility. Second, a person's valuation of a risky venture is not the expected return of that venture, but rather the expected utility from that venture.
67. Even after more than 60 years following World War II, a peace treaty eludes Russia and Japan. As far as China is concerned, territorial disputes, ideological differences, rising and divergent forms of nationalism, and the Taiwan question remain matters of security concern for Japan.
68. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Making under Risk,” Econometrica 47 (1980) , pp. 263–91.
69. “Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to integrate cognitive patterns into an alternative theory of risky choice. They distinguish two phases in the choice process. In the editing phase the actor identifies the reference point, the available options the possible outcomes, and the value and probability of each of these outcomes. In the evaluation phase, the actor combines the values of possible outcomes (as reflected in an S-shaped value function, which is characterized by concavity above the reference point, convexity below it, and a steeper slope on the loss side) with their weighted probabilities (as reflected in the probability weighting function) and then maximizes over the product. Attitudes toward risk are determined by the combination of the S-shaped value function and the probability weighting function and not by the value function alone. Although this combination usually generates risk aversion for gains and risk acceptance for losses, it can also produce (depending on the precise shape of the two functions) risk acceptance for gains and risk aversion for losses when probabilities are small, as illustrated by gambling and insurance behavior, respectively.” Jack S. Levy, “Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality.” <www.apsanet.org/mtgs/kahneman.cfm>.
70. “Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to integrate cognitive patterns into an alternative theory of risky choice. They distinguish two phases in the choice process. In the editing phase the actor identifies the reference point, the available options the possible outcomes, and the value and probability of each of these outcomes. In the evaluation phase, the actor combines the values of possible outcomes (as reflected in an S-shaped value function, which is characterized by concavity above the reference point, convexity below it, and a steeper slope on the loss side) with their weighted probabilities (as reflected in the probability weighting function) and then maximizes over the product. Attitudes toward risk are determined by the combination of the S-shaped value function and the probability weighting function and not by the value function alone. Although this combination usually generates risk aversion for gains and risk acceptance for losses, it can also produce (depending on the precise shape of the two functions) risk acceptance for gains and risk aversion for losses when probabilities are small, as illustrated by gambling and insurance behavior, respectively.” Jack S. Levy, “Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality.” <www.apsanet.org/mtgs/kahneman.cfm>.
71. “Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to integrate cognitive patterns into an alternative theory of risky choice. They distinguish two phases in the choice process. In the editing phase the actor identifies the reference point, the available options the possible outcomes, and the value and probability of each of these outcomes. In the evaluation phase, the actor combines the values of possible outcomes (as reflected in an S-shaped value function, which is characterized by concavity above the reference point, convexity below it, and a steeper slope on the loss side) with their weighted probabilities (as reflected in the probability weighting function) and then maximizes over the product. Attitudes toward risk are determined by the combination of the S-shaped value function and the probability weighting function and not by the value function alone. Although this combination usually generates risk aversion for gains and risk acceptance for losses, it can also produce (depending on the precise shape of the two functions) risk acceptance for gains and risk aversion for losses when probabilities are small, as illustrated by gambling and insurance behavior, respectively.” Jack S. Levy, “Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality.” <www.apsanet.org/mtgs/kahneman.cfm>.
72. “Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to integrate cognitive patterns into an alternative theory of risky choice. They distinguish two phases in the choice process. In the editing phase the actor identifies the reference point, the available options the possible outcomes, and the value and probability of each of these outcomes. In the evaluation phase, the actor combines the values of possible outcomes (as reflected in an S-shaped value function, which is characterized by concavity above the reference point, convexity below it, and a steeper slope on the loss side) with their weighted probabilities (as reflected in the probability weighting function) and then maximizes over the product. Attitudes toward risk are determined by the combination of the S-shaped value function and the probability weighting function and not by the value function alone. Although this combination usually generates risk aversion for gains and risk acceptance for losses, it can also produce (depending on the precise shape of the two functions) risk acceptance for gains and risk aversion for losses when probabilities are small, as illustrated by gambling and insurance behavior, respectively.” Jack S. Levy, “Daniel Kahneman: Judgment, Decision, and Rationality.” <www.apsanet.org/mtgs/kahneman.cfm>.
73. Argentina and the United Kingdom dispute the ownership of the Falkland Islands. Argentina forcefully seized these islands on April 2, 1982. The United Kingdom dispatched a military force across 8,000 km of ocean space and fought a bloody battle to repossess these islands at an estimated cost of £5 billion. See G.M. Dillon, The Falkland, Politics and War (London: Macmillan Press, 1989), p.237. Takeshima (Bamboo Island in Japanese) is called Tokdo (Lonely Islands in Korean) and the Liancourt Rocks in English. The volcanic isles are situated some 90 miles away from Japan and South Korea. Both countries claim the islands because their sailors and fishermen used them as rest stops centuries ago. Presently, South Korea is in physical possession of the islands. Both countries want sovereignty over the isles in order to maximize the fishing and mineral rights they can claim. In this case, prospect theory would suggest that Japan can be more easily dissuaded from using force to invade Takashima, but once invaded it would be more difficult to persuade South Korea from using military force to oust the occupying forces. In the case of the Kurile Islands (currently held by Russia, but claimed by Japan), one could imagine that Russia could use military force to retain possession.
74. Jeffrey D. Berejikian, “A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence,” Journal of Peace Research 39 (2002), pp. 165-183.
75. Gitty Madeline Amini, “Sanctions and Reinforcement in Strategic Relationships: Carrots and Sticks, Compellence and Deterrence,” CSA website, <www.csa2.com/hottopics/prolif/key/gen06.html>.
76. Barbara Farnham, Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict (Ann Arbor,: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
77. For an explanation of the concept, see Taylor, Economics, pp. 448–50.
78. See, for example, Stephen D. Krasner, “Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier,” World Politics 43 (April 1991), pp. 336–66.
79. See, for example, Zvi Safra and Dov Samet, “An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players,” <http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/seminaire/semincertain/ordinal-solutions.pdf>.
80. See, for example, Zvi Safra and Dov Samet, “An ordinal solution to bargaining problems with many players,” <http://eurequa.univ-paris1.fr/seminaire/semincertain/ordinal-solutions.pdf>. p.3.
81. Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, pp. 19–31.
82. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts, p. 65.