THE SLIPPERY SLOPE OF RATIONAL INACTION

Abstract

This article explores the challenges of implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 through the prism of the “tragedy of the commons.” Because implementing 1540 requires a significant investment of time and resources, the decision by states not to implement the resolution is a rational inaction for each individual state driven by self-interest to maximize private gains. However, this ultimately leads to collective irrationality and the destruction of the public good, i.e., common security, leaving every state worse off.

Keywords:

• United Nations
• Resolution 1540
• nonproliferation
• nuclear weapons
• weapons of mass destruction

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Lawrence Scheinman for encouraging the progress of this article. Elena McGovern also provided helpful criticism and comments, as did Stephen Schwartz and two anonymous reviewers.

Notes

1. UN Security Council Resolution 1540, S/Res/1540, April 28, 2004. The resolution is not only legally binding, but also potentially enforceable through the punitive powers vested in the Security Council through Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

2. On RDDs: in 2007, the U.S. Government Accountability Office set up a sting operation and “with disturbing ease” was able to illicitly buy material necessary to manufacture a so-called dirty bomb. See “Investigators Easily Ran ‘Dirty Bomb’ Sting,” Global Security Newswire, July 24, 2007, <www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_24.html#5BF912AF>. On terrorist use: a July 2007 U.S. intelligence report stated that Al Qaeda “will continue attempts to acquire and deploy unconventional weapons.” Jon Fox, “Al-Qaeda Main Threat to U.S., Intel Report Says,” Global Security Newswire, July 17, 2007, <204.71.60.35/d_newswire/issues/2007_7_17.html#2DC3028A>.

3. See Heather Rosoff and Detlof von Winterfeldt, “A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach,” Risk Analysis 27 (2007), pp. 533–546. The economic impact of a dirty bomb attack could be as high as $252 billion: see also endnote 25 for a case in point on the global consequences of terrorism.

4. Paragraph four of Resolution 1540 established the 1540 Committee (which reports to the Security Council on implementation progress) and asked states to submit national reports to the committee. However, according to the 1540 Committee's website, as of March 2008, only 137 states have done so; see, <www.un.org/sc/1540>. The submitted reports also vary widely in terms of quality. Some are fewer than 500 words; others, 25,000. A majority of states have also failed to submit additional information on implementation status as required by UN Security Council Resolution 1673.

5. Remarks by Richard Cupitt, 2007 International Export Control Conference, Conference Summary, <www.exportcontrol.org/library/conferences/1379/Bucharest_Export_Control_Conference_Report_2007.pdf>.

6. These states are: states that possess or possessed WMD or WMD programs; states with nuclear, biological, or chemical facilities that pose a significant proliferation risk; and states where there is a high risk of WMD and related materials being transferred through them. Operative paragraph two contains provisions on criminalization; and operative paragraph three is on accounting and security provisions as well as border and export controls provisions. Peter Crail, “Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach,” Nonproliferation Review 13 (July 2006), p. 356.

7. Categorization as “developed” based on the list of developed nations provided by the Central Intelligence Agency, 2008 World Factbook, <www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/>.

8. See Wade Boese, “Progress on UN WMD Measure Mixed,” Arms Control Today 37 (May 2007), p. 33. Also see Miles A. Pomper and Peter Crail, “Keeping WMD from Terrorists: An Interview with 1540 Committee Chairman Ambassador Peter Burian,” Arms Control Today 37 (November 2007), pp. 21–24.

9. The quote used for the section heading is from Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (December 13, 1968), pp. 1243–1248.

10. Aristotle (translation by Benjamin Jowett), Politics, Book II, Part III (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 1999), p. 24. Thucydides (translation by Richard Crawley), History of the Peloponnesian War, Book I, Sec. 141 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1910).

11. Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” endnote 9.

12. In 1945, the United Nations decided to adhere in its charter to the idea that all states are sovereign and legally equal. Thus, a basic norm of international law is nonintervention in another state's internal affairs unless approved by the UN Security Council or in self-defense. It is then troublesome for any country, international organization, or regime to enforce rules and regulations on states without violating states’ sovereignty.

13. Andreas Persbo, “UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and Its Relevance for Global Export Controls,” paper presented at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute's Conference on Strengthened Export Controls: Pakistan's Export Control Experience Current and Future Challenges and Options, Brussels, Belgium, November 16–17, 2006.

14. Dumisani S. Kumalo, permanent representative of South Africa, remarks to the UN Security Council on April 22, 2004; “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo of South Africa to the United Nations Security Council on Co-Operation Between the Security Council and International Organisations in the Implementation of Resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006),” February 23, 2007.

15. In the Security Council, India has criticized the body's “increasing tendency, in recent years, to assume new and wider powers of legislation on behalf of the international community” in trying to “short-circuit the process of creating an international consensus.” See Vijay K. Nambiar, India's permanent representative to the United Nations, remarks to the UN Security Council, April 22, 2004. Also see Anna Langenbach and Jean du Preez, “UN General Assembly Tackles Nonproliferation and Disarmament After Disappointing Summit,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, December 2005.

16. Munir Akram, “Statement by Ambassador Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan in the Security Council on ‘Cooperation between the Security Council and International Organizations in the Implementation of Resolutions 1540 and 1673,’” February 23, 2007.

17. Khalid Hasan, “Pakistan Decries Nuclear Proliferation on False Pretence,” Daily Times, February 25, 2007.

18. Jonathan Granoff, closing remarks made at the seminar, “The NPT and the 2005 Review Conference,” The Hague, March 2, 2005.

19. It must be noted that some states, for example Libya in 2003, have concluded that nuclear weapons decrease their national security. However, diplomatic sticks and carrots were used to help Libya come to that conclusion.

20. Mission of Uganda, “Note Verbale Dated 14 September 2005 from the Permanent Mission of Uganda to the United Nations Addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” S/AC.44/2004/(02)/125, October 7, 2005.

21. “Issues concerning WMD are currently a lower priority in Africa than [small arms and light weapons] and other issues such as the AIDS epidemic, poverty, and civil wars, all of which have a more immediate impact on the social order and correspondingly greater political relevance at the state and regional levels. It is not that there is indifference to the WMD issue, but that political energy and scarce resources are focused on matters imperative to maintaining viable civil society.” See Johan Bergenäs, “The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations in Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Preliminary Assessment of the African Continent,” UNIDIR Highlights, Number 5, 2007.

22. Peter Crail, nonproliferation analyst, Arms Control Association, e-mail to author, December 7, 2007.

23. 2007 International Export Control Conference, Conference Summary.

24. Henry L. Stimson Center, Issue Brief on UN Security Council Resolution 1540, <www.stimson.org/print.cfm?SN=CT200705111253>.

25. Some might argue that some states have more to lose than others by not implementing Resolution 1540. For example, some states believe that the threat of WMD terrorism, and the impact of such an attack, is only a problem for the Western world. But it is important to remember that the consequences of a major terrorist attack would certainly be of a global nature and have an impact on most, if not all, countries. For example, before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Botswana embarked on an ambitious, very expensive mission to provide AIDS medication to its population. The program was needed, as 40 percent of its adult population is infected with HIV. Program financing would come from selling diamonds, a commodity that fuels Botswana's economy. However, after 9/11 U.S. consumer confidence and diamond sales declined, weakening Botswana's ability to fight the disease. See Christy Feig, “Botswana Sees 9/11 Impact on AIDS Program,” CNN, July 11, 2002.

26. Fewer than 8 percent of UN member states—the fifteen countries on the Security Council at the time of 1540's adoption—legislated for the rest of the global community.

27. It is safe to say that Iran, South Africa, and Indonesia (among others) will reject any treaty that does not contain strong language on disarmament, while the NPT nuclear weapon states would be hesitant to join a treaty including such articles. For example, during an August 2007 ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, Indonesia stopped a U.S. proposal that aimed to hinder the spread of nuclear weapons because it “did not include efforts toward disarmament.” See Abdul Khalik, “Indonesia Blocks US Initiative on Nuclear Weapons at ARF,” Jakarta Post, August 3, 2007.

28. Draft resolution, “Support for Implementation at the Hemispheric Level of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004),” presented by the delegation of Argentina to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, May 22, 2007. The resolution was cosponsored by the delegations of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay and passed in the OAS General Assembly on June 5.

29. Nana Effah-Apenteng, UN Security Council 5635th meeting, February 23, 2007.

30. Lawrence Scheinman, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, remarks at the “Colloquium on Proliferation Challenges: Assessing the Implementation of Resolution 1540 in South East Asia,” Jakarta, Indonesia, May 28–29, 2007.

31. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations & Regimes,” <www.cns.miis.edu/pubs/inven/index.htm>.

32. The convention had 155 state parties as of June 2005, <www.opbw.org/>.

33. Daniel Feakes, “Getting Down to the Hard Cases: Prospects for CWC Universality,” Arms Control Today 38 (March 2008), pp. 12–17.

34. For example, more than “1,300 distinct nuclear or radioactive sources have been recovered since 1992, according to IAEA figures.” See Chris Schneidmiller, “Answers on Nuclear Smuggling Remain Elusive,” Global Security Newswire, February 19, 2008, <204.71.60.36/d_newswire/issues/2008_2_19.html>.

35. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, “The A.Q. Khan Illicit Nuclear Trade Network and Implications for Nonproliferation Efforts,” Strategic Insights 5 (July 2006).

36. Kofi Annan, remarks at the Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, December 11, 2006, <www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_full.asp?statID=40>.