Foreign and Security Policy Diversification in Eurasia: Issue Splitting, Co-alignment, and Relational Power

Abstract

The foreign policies of the Central Asian republics are widely qualified as “multivector.” Yet this concept remains vague in terms of both its underlying causal mechanism and the goals this policy can serve. Departing from received wisdom, this article recasts the notion both conceptually, in terms of co-alignment, and theoretically, by integrating it into a neoclassical realist framework that emphasizes how the geopolitical characteristics of the Eurasian region interact with the nature of the domestic political regimes to explain multivector foreign policy as a form of statecraft beyond the popular catchphrase.

Notes

1. The terms multivector foreign policy, multivectorism, and multivector diplomacy are employed interchangeably in this article.

2. As Efegil (2009, 56) argues, autonomy was always an underlying concern for Central Asian states while engaging external great powers.

3. For clarification, alignments should be seen as different from alliances, the latter being a subclass of the former. Modelski further defines alignments as a do ut des, where specific and particularistic cooperation is undertaken on “any political issues that may arise in the international system” even in absence of militarized disputes or the threat thereof (1963, 774– 75). For a further discussion of the term see Snyder (1990, 105), including his differing definition of alignment as “a set of mutual expectations between two or more states that they will have each other’s support in disputes or wars with particular other states.”

4. Parent and Baron (2011, 206) have underscored the continuity between neoclassical and classical realisms.

5. By this token, a certain degree of eclecticism is ingrained in neoclassical realism due to its sensitivity to innenpolitik factors. See Schweller (2003, 316), as well as Kitchen (2010).

6. Labels such as “pseudodemocracy” (Diamond 2002, 24) or “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2010) have been attached to qualify regimes of this type, indicating the conflation of democratic and authoritarian templates in their form of government. Moreover, both traditional and legal-rational forms of authority coexist (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009, 130).

7. Granted certain differences, Central Asian states largely share these features of statehood and the resulting interests they inform.

8. Although Lake focuses on the United States, it is argued that this applies to great powers more broadly. For example, Russia’s use of “asymmetrical offensives” (Bugajski 2008, 7) to preserve its role as the system-forming power in Central Asia (Sakwa 2010, 196) highlights this in particular. On another note, Russia and the United States have both been active in establishing military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with documented involvement in the domestic politics of the respective countries as a result. The strategic issues and implications of foreign military bases in Central Asia have been treated at length elsewhere. For the gist of that debate see for example: Cooley (2008); Huskey (2008), Indeo (2010).

9. As foreign policy is a dynamic, reflexive and interactive process, the classification here presented is not necessarily exhaustive of all possible goals the multivector foreign policy posture can serve.

10. From this perspective, what may appear to be an occurrence of what is commonly termed selection on the dependent variable, is an accepted practice in the social sciences when the research goal is to explain a particular outcome (George and Bennett 2005, 23).

11. The fact that Armenia’s and Georgia’s policies are generally regarded as univectoral, though in opposite directions, militated against the inclusion of these two countries.

12. Though this was already envisaged in the 1992 Collective Security Treaty, the decision was taken at the Fifth CSTO Summit, which took place in Dushanbe (Tajikistan), in October 2007. As a matter of interest, this agreement rests on different arrangements tailored to each country’s ability to pay. However, it also fosters a dependency of Central Asian states on Russia for maintaining their security. For example, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan lack the resources to pay and, hence, they reciprocate by giving Russia use of former Soviet production facilities or military basing rights. See ICG (2013, 21).

13. However, recent reports indicate that Azerbaijan may reconsider this approach, see Kucera (2015).

14. Since then, the SCO has dispatched observers to Kyrgyzstan for the July 2005 presidential elections and the 2010 constitutional referendum, to Kazakhstan again for the 2007 parliamentary elections, and to Tajikistan for the 2010 parliamentary and 2013 presidential elections.

15. The country has historically played an important role in TRACECA and hosts its permanent Secretariat. In September 1998, at the initiative of President Heydar Aliyev, Baku hosted the conference that resulted in the Basic Multilateral Agreement on International Transport for Development of the Corridor Europe–the Caucasus–Asia.

Additional information

Funding

Research for this article was partly supported by Fonds québécois de recherche sur la société et la culture.