Esse servitutis omnis impatientem/Man is impatient of all servitude: Human Dignity as a Path to Modernity in Ficino and Pico della Mirandola?

Abstract

The notion of human dignity stands at the core of contemporary debates on rights, politics, and ethics. Many scholars consider the Renaissance discourse on dignity as one of its main contributions to the transition from the Middle Ages to modernity. This article examines the role of human dignity in the philosophies of Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. In their works human dignity relates both to freedom and to a Neo-Platonic ontology, which raises the question of how they reconcile these two possibly contradictory elements. I show that starting from the insight that human beings are “naturally” free and able to make right choices, Ficino and Pico argue that human dignity consists in the ability of humans to understand what is good and to act accordingly. I thus defend the thesis that their conception of human dignity is not modern because it liberates human beings from the “history of being” but rather because it paves the way for their liberation to become rational beings.

Notes

1. One can find the exact same formulation in the Preambles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and other UN documents. Further UN declarations refer to the “dignity and worth of the human person” (e.g., the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women).

2. Cf. Ernst Benda, “The Protection of Human Dignity (Article 1 of the Basic Law),” SMU Law Review 53 (2000): 443–56; Izhak Englard, “Human Dignity: From Antiquity to Modern Israel’s Constitutional Framework,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (2000): 1903–27. Even the U.S. Supreme Court has referred to “human dignity” especially with regard to free choices concerning one’s life and freedom of expression. Cf. The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values, ed. Michael J. Meyer, William A. Parent (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), and Maxine D. Goodman, “Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence,” Nebraska Law Review 84 (2005–6): 740–94.

3. Cf. for example Humanbiotechnology as Social Challenge, ed. Nikolaus Knoepffler, Dagmar Schipanski, and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007).

4. General bibliographies on human dignity are provided by Björn Haferkamp, “The Concept of Human Dignity: An Annotated Bibliography,” in Sanctity of Life and Human Dignity, ed. Kurt Bayertz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), 275–91, and George Kateb, Human Dignity (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011).

5. Cf. Christopher McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,” European Journal of International Law 19 (2008): 655–724. For a defense of the “metaphysical” aspect of human dignity, see Michael Rosen, Dignity: Its History and Meaning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 144–56.

6. As an alternative view one could also consider Ancient Rome, the Jewish tradition, or medieval Christian thought as the origin of a legal concept of dignity. Cf. Teresa Iglesias, “Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual,” Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 4 (2001): 111–34, and Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, “A Human dignitas? Remnants of the Ancient Legal Concept in Contemporary Dignity Jurisprudence,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011): 32–57. On this Roman and Christian background, see also Jeremy Waldron, “Dignity and Rank,” European Journal of Sociology 48 (2007): 201–37, and Jürgen Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia for Human Rights,” Metaphilosophy 41 (2010): 464–80.

7. Cf. for example Oliver Sensen, “Human Dignity in Historical Perspective: The Contemporary and Traditional Paradigms,” European Journal of Political Theory 10 (2011): 71–91.

8. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia University Press 1979), 175.

9. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, 180–81.

10. Cf. for example Amos Edelheit, “Human Will, Human Dignity, and Freedom: A Study of Giorgio Benigno Salviati’s Early Discussion of the Will, Urbino 1474–1482,” Vivarium 46 (2008): 82–114.

11. This implies that there will be no direct discussion of the texts defending human dignity against Pope Innocent III’s suggestion of the miseria hominis. The most notorious example of this discussion is Giannozzo Manetti’s De Dignitate et excellentia hominis. Implicit references to this discussion can be found in the idea of human dignity as the result of the studia humanitatis.

12. The use of dignitas in a quotation from Plato is interesting in itself, since the term does not have a clear corresponding term in Greek. But dignitas served as the translation for the Greek word ‘αξίωμα’ (axioma). Cf. on the history of the translation of Greek words with the Latin term dignitas Ramsay MacMullen, “The Power of the Roman Empire,” Historia. Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 55 (2006): 471–81.

13. This article will obviously not present a general study on the whole work of Ficino but concentrate on the narrow question of his understanding of human dignity. Important publications on Ficino’s philosophy include Michael J. B. Allen, Plato’s Third Eye: Studies in Marsilio Ficino’s Metaphysics and its Sources (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1995); Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, and Martin Davies, eds., Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002); Matthias Bloch and Burkhard Mojsisch, eds., Potentiale des menschlichen Geistes: Freiheit und Kreativität, praktische Aspekte der Philosophie Marsilio Ficinos (1433–1499) (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2003); Stephen Clucas, Peter J. Forshaw, and Valery Rees, eds., Laus Platonici Philosophi: Marsilio Ficino and his Influence (Leiden: Brill, 2011); Paul Oskar Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Ficino (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943); Maria Christine Leitgeb, Stéphane Toussaint and Herbert Bannert, eds., Platon, Plotin, und Marsilio Ficino: Studien zu den Vorläufern und zur Rezeption des Florentiner Neuplatonismus (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009). In a more general study one would also have to discuss how revelation and philosophical theology are related in Ficino’s work. Cf. on this issue Michael J. B. Allen, “At Variance: Marsilio Ficino, Platonism, and Heresy,” in Platonism at the Origins of Modernity: Studies on Platonism and Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Douglas Hedley and Sarah Hutton (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 31–44; Ardis B. Collins, The Secular Is Sacred: Platonism and Thomism in Ficino’s Platonic Theology (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974); Amos Edelheit, Ficino, Pico, and Savonarola: The Evolution of Humanist Theology 1461/2–1498 (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

14. “Diximus etiam hominem semper contendere ut et sibi ipsi ceteris cunctis tum hominibus tum bestiis dominetur. Esse servitutis omnis impatientem. Qui etiam si servire cogatur, odit dominum, utpote qui serviat contra naturam. Superare autem obnixe qualibet in re contendit, pudetque vel in rebus minimis ludisque levissimis superari, tamquam id sit contra naturalem hominis dignitatem. ... Ita nec superiorem vult homo nec parem, neque patitur superesse aliquid ab imperio eius exclusum. Solius dei hic status est. Statum igitur quaerit divinum. … Denique omnes idem affectant, et si successurum sperarent, aggrederentur quasi iure suo vindicent sibi divinitatem.” Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology, Vol. 4., Books XII–XIV (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 249/51 viz. 248/50 (bk. 14, chap. 4).

15. “And all Platonists support the view that, in the contemplation of rational principles, the divine reason is ‘touched’ by a substantial, not just by an imaginary, touching of the mind; and that the unity proper to the mind is joined to God, the unity of all things, in a manner beyond our conception. Plato often confirms this in the Phaedrus and the Epinomis and elsewhere, and particularly when he says in the Phaedrus that the contemplator of things divine is set apart from other men and totally purified, and that he cleaves to God and is filled with God; and in the Epinomis, that the rational soul, made perfect by contemplation, emerges wholly unified in the presence of the divine unity.” “Et Platonici omnes probant in rationibus contemplandis divinam rationem tactu quodam mentis substantiali potius quam imaginario tangi, unitatemque mentis propriam deo rerum omnium unitati modo quodam inaestimabili copulari. Quod Plato in Phaedro et in Epinomide et alibi saepe confirmat, praesertim quando in Phaedro divinorum ait contemplatorem a reliquis segregari, purgari prorsus, haerere deo, impleri deo et in Epinomide animum contemplatione perfectum penes divinam unitatem unum prorsus evadere” (4.28/29; bk. 12, chap. 2).

16. Marsilio Ficino, De amore / Über die Liebe oder Platons Gastmahl (Hamburg: Meiner, 2004). Similarly, in his discussion of justice Ficino argues that human virtue is only a small contribution compared to God’s justice. Justice, here, seems to depend on contemplating “that whatever happens eventually leads to the good” (ut quaecumque contingunt, in bonum denique perducatur) (4.324/25; bk. 14, chap. 10).

17. Cf. on this also the following passage: “Yet why are we not aware of the wondrous spectacle of that divine mind which is ours? Perhaps it is either because, given that we are continually used to seeing it, we have lost the habit of admiring and noticing it, or because the intermediary faculties of the soul, the reason, and the phantasy, being for the most part more involved in life’s daily affairs, do not clearly view the works of the divine mind.” “Verum cur non animadvertimus tam mirabile nostrae illius divinae mentis spectaculum? Forsitan quia propter continuam spectandi consuetudinem admirari et animadvertere desuevimus, aut quia mediae vires animae, ratio videlicet et phantasia, cum sint ut plurimum ad negotia vitae procliviores, mentis illius opera non clare persentiunt” (4.50/52 viz. 51; bk. 12, chap. 4).

18. “humanus animus tanta est dignitate donatus ut concessa sibi fuerit infinita quodammodo virtus intellegendi ac volendi.” Ficino, Platonic Theology, Vol. 2, Books V–VIII (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 368/69; bk. 8, chap. 15.

19. “Contra homines artium innumerabilium inventores sunt, quas suo exsequuntur arbitrio. Quod significatur ex eo quod singuli multas exercent artes, mutant, et diuturno usu fiunt solertiores, et quod mirabile est, humanae artes fabricant per se ipsas quaecumque fabricat ipsa natura, quasi non servi simus naturae, sed aemuli. ... Similis ergo ferme vis hominis est naturae divinae, quandoquidem homo per se ipsum, id est per suum consilium atque artem, regit se ipsum a corporalis naturae limitibus minime circumscriptum, et singula naturae altioris opera aemulatur. Et tanto minus quam bruta naturae inferioris eget subsidio, quanto pauciora corporis munimenta sortitus est a natura quam bruta, sed ipsemet illa sua copia construit alimenta, vestes, stramenta, habitacula, suppellectilia, arma. Ideo cum ipse sua facultate se fulciat, fulcit uberius quam bestias ipsa natura” (4.169/71 viz. 168/70; bk. 13, chap. 3).

20. This is an unspecific use of “rationality,” which includes both the sense of “instrumental rationality” (choosing the right/best means for given ends) and of a broader concept of reason, which also relates to final ends. Obviously this second meaning of rationality is more important in many passages of the Platonic Theology, but in the preceding quotation Ficino also seems to have in view a narrower concept of instrumental rationality.

21. Relevant authors here are, among others, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.

22. For a comprehensive list of publications on Pico cf. Leonardo Quaquarelli and Zita Zanardi, Pichiana: Bibliografia delle edizioni e degli studi (Florence: Olschki, 2005). See also the documentation of English publications at http://www.mvdougherty.com/pico.htm (accessed on 28 September 2013).

23. Cf. with many references to other important research on Pico, Oliver W. Lembcke, “Die Würde des Menschen, frei zu sein. Zum Vermächtnis der Oratio de hominis dignitate Picos della Mirandola,” in Des Menschen Würde – entdeckt und erfunden im Humanismus der italienischen Renaissance, ed. Rolf Gröschner, Stephan Kirste, and Oliver W. Lembcke (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 159–86.

24. On the relationship between unity and peace in Pico, cf. Paul Richard Blum, “Eintracht und Religion bei Giovanni Pico della Mirandola,” in Suche nach Frieden: Politische Ethik in der frühen Neuzeit II, ed. Norbert Brieskorn, Markus Riedenauer (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2002), 29–46.

25. Pico della Mirandola, On the Dignity of Man, in On the Dignity of Man / On Being and the One / Heptaplus (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1998), 6: “Id est homo, variae ac multiformis et desultoriae naturae animal.” Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate / Über die Würde des Menschen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2009), 12. Cf. also the new English translation and commentary of the Oratio in Pico della Mirandola – Oration on the Dignity of Man: A New Translation and Commentary, ed. Francesco Borghesi, Michael Papio, and Massimo Riva (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

26. Pico, On the Dignity, 6. “Si quem enim videris deditum ventri humi serpentem hominem, frutex est, non homo, quem vides; si quem in phantasiae quasi Calypsus vanis praestigiis caecutientem et subscalpenti delinitum illecebra sensibus mancipatum, brutum est, non homo, quem vides; si recta philosophum ratione omnia discernentem, hunc venereris: caeleste est animal, non terrenum; si purum contemplatorem corporis nescium, in penetralia mentis relegatum: hic non terrenum, non caeleste animal, hic augustius est numen humana carne circumvestitum” (De hominis, 10–12).

27. This part of Pico’s thought has led many to consider him as a major precursor of modern idealism (especially Hegel) and its conception of dialectics.

28. “Philosophy herself has taught me to weigh things rather by my own conscience than by the judgments of others, and to consider not so much whether I should be badly spoken of as whether I myself should say or do anything bad” (On the Dignity, 18); “Docuit me ipsa philosophia a propria potius conscientia quam ab externis pendere iudiciis cogitareque semper non tam ne male audiam quam ne quid male vel dicam ipse vel agam” (De hominis, 40).

29. “Indeed, fathers, there is multiple discord in us, and we have severe, intestine, and more than civil wars at home: if we are unwilling to have these wars, if we will strive for that peace which so lifts us up to the heights that we are made to stand among the exalted of the lord, moral philosophy alone will still those wars in us, will bring calm successfully” (On the Dignity, 10–11); “Multiplex profecto, patres, in nobis discordia; gravia et intestina domi habemus et plus quam civilia bella. Quae si noluerimus, si illam affectaverimus pacem, quae in sublime ita nos tollat, ut inter excelsos domini statuamur, sola in nobis compescet prorsus et sedabit philosophia moralis” (De hominis, 22).

30. Cf. Pico, On the Dignity, 11–12; De hominis, 22–24.

31. Cf. on this reading of Pico Eckhard Keßler, “Menschenwürde in der Renaissance,” in Menschenwürde im interkulturellen Dialog, ed. Anne Siegetsleitner/Nikolaus Knoepffler (Freiburg: Alber, 2005), 41–66.

32. Cf. this interpretation with Lembcke, “Die Würde des Menschen,” 177.

33. Cf. on the distinction between “positive” and “negative” freedom the crucial and highly problematic essay by Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 118–72. On the understanding of “non-domination” as a third (or different negative) concept of freedom, see Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), and in a more historical perspective Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

34. Cf. for example the following passage from Pico’s On the Dignity: “But why all this? In order for us to understand that, after having been born in this state so that we may be what we will to be, then, since we are held in honor, we ought to take particular care that no one may say against us that we do not have knowledge, similar to brutes and mindless beasts of burden” (7; translation modified). “Sed quorsum haec? ut intellegamus, postquam hac nati sumus condicione, ut id sumus, quod esse volumus, curare hoc potissimum debere nos, ut illud quidem in nos non dicatur, cum in honore essemus, non cognovisse similes factos brutis et iumentis insipientibus” (De hominis, 12).

35. Cf. on this reconstruction of late medieval metaphysics Ludger Honnefelder, “Der zweite Anfang der Metaphysik. Voraussetzungen, Ansätze und Folgen der Wiederbegründung der Metaphysik im 13./14. Jahrhundert,” in Philosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, ed. Jan P. Beckmann et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), 165–86.

36. “Pico’s oration might seem to open a relatively clear path toward the use of dignity we find in modern human rights documents. ‘Dignity’ goes from being a matter of the elevated status of a few persons in a particular society to being a feature of human beings in general, closely connected with their capacity for self-determination” (Rosen, Dignity, 15).

37. Benjamin Constant, “De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes,” in Écrits politiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 589–619.

38. Cf. on such views of human dignity in the contemporary philosophical debate Peter Schaber, Instrumentalisierung und Würde (Paderborn, Germany: Mentis, 2010).