Abstract
In light of the global prevalence of secessionist movements, some have proposed “remedial secession” as a last resort solution where a “people” is either denied internal self-determination or is faced with massive human rights violations by a repressive regime. The debate was renewed by the 2008 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Kosovo's declaration of independence, and advocates and critics of remedial secession may point to renewed evidence of both international support and opposition as a result of this case. Such developments raise a hitherto largely unexamined question: would the adoption and enforcement of remedial secession in international law likely be a positive force for the prevention and reduction of armed conflict? This paper finds the arguments in favour of remedial secession to be lacking, and finds the theoretical and empirical case against remedial secession to be more persuasive when measured by this metric. International legal decision-makers and conflict managers should therefore give greater consideration to international peace and security when considering remedial secession.
Notes
It should be noted at the outset that this article will address “secessionism stricto sensu”, which pertains to groups that move unilaterally to make a formal act or declaration of independence that is opposed by the central government. Secessionism stricto sensu can be contrasted with separatism or “incremental secession”, which pertains to groups engaging in ongoing and gradually increasing political and military activity aimed at independence or some form of autonomy (see Heraclides Citation1991, pp. 1–2).
It should be further noted that while declarations of independence do not violate international law per se, declarations of independence are sometimes conjoined with other events or actions that are serious violations of international law, as evidenced by the practice of the UNSC in condemning the declarations of independence of southern Rhodesia (1965), northern Cyprus (1983), and the Republika Srpska (1992).
Canada did not make a submission to the ICJ in this case, though it should be noted that the Canadian Quebec Secession Reference case was arguably the most frequently cited legal authority in the submissions of other states.
The seven secessionist movements in the study were DRC/Katanga, Nigeria/Biafra, Sudan/South Sudan, Pakistan/Bangladesh, Iraq/Kurdistan, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and Philippines/Moros.