Abstract
As Quebec prepared for a province-wide referendum vote on sovereignty in 1995, the United States had a satisfactory status quo with Canada and it was interested in maintaining open, business-friendly trade and investment relations. Facing the prospect of the separation of Quebec from Canada, issues such as negotiating the continuation of treaty obligations and managing the disruption of financial markets were of paramount importance to Canadians and Americans. Because Quebec leaders did not appear to be addressing these issues in a way that would build a foundation for post-referendum bilateral economic relations with the United States, it was difficult for US officials to consider the separation project credible.
Notes
The reference section includes direct references to some of the literature that was available at the time on the consequences of Quebec sovereignty. The references to Grady Citation(1991), Freeman and Grady Citation(1995) and Carment et al. Citation(2001) provide more complete lists of relevant sources.
For more discussion of Quebec independence scenarios, see (Brower and Smutny Citation1997).
Lui Hebron, in Carment et al. Citation(2001), argues that in the “primordial model”, “one's ethnic-based consciousness is far stronger than that created by political or economic interests… Threat perception and not rationality appears to be the appropriate guide to understanding this longstanding ethnic conflict”.
A counter-opinion was commissioned by the opposition Quebec Liberal Party: C.N. Brower, Advisory Memorandum of same title (legal opinion prepared by White and Case, Washington, DC, 21 March 1995).
For more on Quebec secession in international perspective, see Carment and Stack Citation(2001).