The impact of remittances on the receiving country: some evidence from Romania in European context

Figures & data

Figure 1. Net migration in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (the average values of five-year estimates).

Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)

Figure 2. Remittances received in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (the average values).

Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)

Table 1. Short synthesis of main studies regarding remittances with positive effects (PE) on the economy.

Authors	Objective	Country, Period	Main indicators	Results
Abbas et al. (2017)	The impact of macroeconomic, financial and political factors on remittances	Pakistan 1972–2012.	Income (GDPR) Inflation rate Interest differential Real effective exchange rate Financial liberalization index Foreign debt as % of GDP Government stability	PE of financial liberalization on remittances flow.
Alam, Wasim, and Ahmad (2017)	The economic determinants of workers’ remittances	Pakistan 1975–2016	Workers’ Remittances GDP Interest Rate, Exchange Rate Gold Prices, Development Expenditures Stock Market Performance Political Stability	PE with the increase in GDP, development expenditures, gold prices, depreciation of local currency and political stability
Batu (2017)	Temporary inflows of workers’ remittances positively affect GDP per capita, while a permanent increase of remittances does not	81 countries, 1970–2012	GDP, GNP Consumption Investment Trade balance/GDP Remittance Remittance/GDP	PE in investment and output.
Chirila and Chirila, (2017)	The impact of remittances have on the economic development, investments and exports	Romania, 1994–2015	GDP Remittances Investment Exports	PE in imports, an appreciation of the exchange rate, exports less competitive, economic growth
Cooray and Mallick (2013)	The fluctuations in remittance flows over the international business cycles	116 countries, 1970–2007	Remittance inflow/GDP Remittance outflow/GDP Remittance net flow/GDP Volatility of GDP growth Inflation volatility Exchange rate volatility Money supply /GDP Investment-GDP ratio	PE with the growth volatility in host countries
De Sousa and Duval (2010)	The role of geographic distance for bilateral remittances	Romania 2005–2009	Remittance GDP Exchange rate Unemployment Distance	Bilateral flows are positively influenced by both home and host countries’ economic size and geographical distance
Di Marco, Marzovilla, and Nieddu (2015)	The relationship between remittances and business cycle, the reason of sending remittances	Philippines, 1977–2013	Remittances GDP	PE on remittances depend on the positive fluctuations in the GDP, the existence of a pro-cyclic effect on GDP, the reasons of remittances can change over the time
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009)	The interaction of remittances and financial development	100 countries, 1975–2002	GDP per capita growth LogInGDP Remittances/GDP Dep/GDP Gov Fiscal Balance Inflation	PE on growth and investment
Jackman (2014)	Investigates the business cycle properties of remittances	Caribbean countries (Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago), 1970–2009	Remittances Real GDP	PE by the domestic business cycles in Barbados and Jamaica and for Dominica Trinidad and Tobago PE by US business cycle
Lartey (2017)	The impact of remittances on economic growth in beneficiary countries through exchange rate policy	135 developing and transition countries, 1970–2007	Remittances (% of GDP) Remittances GDP per capita growth Exchange rate regime Population growth Government spending Inflation Investment Domestic credit	PE under flexible exchange rate regimes, PE under a fixed exchange rate regime in less financially developed countries
Simionescu and Dumitrescu, (2017)	The impact of remittances on economic growth, private consumption, private investments and the government tax revenue	74 developing countries, 1989–2015	GDP per capita GDP Private consumption Private investment Remittances received Population annual growth Deposits’ interest rate Real interest rate Government Tax Revenue	PE with economic growth and private consumption expenditure.
Williams (2017)	The effect that remittances have on democratic institutions	Sub-Saharan Africa, 1975–2014:	Remittances per capita Trade Per capita GDP Population Urbanization Infant mortality Life expectancy	PE in increasing schooling and reducing poverty

Table 2. Short synthesis of main studies regarding remittances with negative effects (NE) on the economy.

Authors	Objective	Country, Period	Main indicators	Results
Abbas et al. (2017)	The impact of macroeconomic, financial and political factors on remittances	Pakistan, 1972–2012	Income (GDPR) Inflation rate Interest differential Real effective exchange rate Financial liberalization index Foreign debt as % of GDP Government stability	NE of inflation, government debt and foreign debt
Bettin et al. (2017)	The effect of structural characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and adverse shocks in recipient economies upon international remittances	103 Italian provinces and 79 developing countries, 2005–2011	Remittances GDP Population Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP Official aid per capita External debt Growth rate of the migrant stock	NE in business cycle in recipient countries
Chami et al. (2003)	Cross-country study of workers’ remittances	83 countries, 1970–1998	Remittances Real GDP per capita Investment rate Rate of inflation, The ratio of net private capital flows to GDP.	NE of remittances on economic growth
Chami et al. (2008)	Identify the macroeconomic consequences of remittances and empirical examination of the macroeconomic effects of remittances	108 countries, 1970–2004	GDP Growth per capita Remittances	NE of remittances on economic growth, even in the most underdeveloped financial system
De et al. (2016)	The behavior of remittances over the business cycle	109 countries, 1980–2012	GDP constant GDP per capita GDP deflator Remittances Private household consumption Foreign direct investment Exchange rate regime	NE on country-specific consumption and output growth, but the remittances are a more stable financial input like foreign direct investments.
Frankel (2011)	Remittances can be equated with capital flows to some countries.	64 pairs of countries 1979–2005	Remittances Difference in Cyclical position GDP per capita unemployment Product Population	NE with output fluctuations (NE to the cyclical position in the receiving country)

Figure 3. Real GDP per capita in CEE Countries, in the period 1996–2017 (constant millions USD, the average values).

Source: World Bank database (http://www.worldbank.org/)

Table 3. Descriptive statistics.

Country	Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	DF unit root test (for 1^st diff)
BGR	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.03	0.037	0.94	1.08	−7.34***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	3.39	2.27	0.31	8.19	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	8.17	7.51	1.07	31.24	−2.95**
	Investment rate (%)	22	23.19	7.43	5.93	37.86	−2.92**
	Export (%GDP)	22	50.38	11.07	33.90	66.32	−3.67***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	82.52	4.47	74.48	88.45	−5.07***
CZE	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.022	0.028	0.94	1.06	−4.90***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	0.76	0.43	0.11	1.66	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	5.06	2.82	0.90	10.37	−6.87***
	Investment rate (%)	22	30.00	1.13	28.17	32.07	−4.93***
	Export (%GDP)	22	60.87	14.81	38.31	82.54	−3.49***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	68.96	1.93	65.48	72.16	−4.64***
EST	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.04	0.060	0.85	1.13	−5.00***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	1.27	0.89	0.034	2.36	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	7.87	5.24	−3.20	22.32	−8.46***
	Investment rate (%)	22	28.91	4.91	20.32	38.48	−3.05**
	Export (%GDP)	22	70.28	9.59	57.39	86.53	−3.80***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	73.11	3.04	69.16	80.01	−3.76***
HRV	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.02	0.033	0.92	1.067	−6.24***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	3.43	0.633	2.26	4.53	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	4.06	1.977	0.32	7.60	−6.84***
	Investment rate (%)	22	24.87	3.002	19.43	31.20	−3.44***
	Export (%GDP)	22	39.10	5.85	29.48	51.26	−3.61***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	80.29	3.19	76.60	87.27	−4.50***
HUN	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.02	0.026	093	1.05	−6.36***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	1.66	1.22	0.291	3.70	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	10.17	18.14	−15.9	55.48	−5.65***
	Investment rate (%)	22	25.36	1.63	22.15	27.06	−3.95***
	Export (%GDP)	22	71.34	15.28	41.84	90.21	−3.73***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	71.01	2.55	69.20	79.18	−4.54***
LTU	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.05	0.054	0.86	1.12	−5.27***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	2.35	1.67	0.02	4.50	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	3.21	1.95	0.04	8.23	−5.42***
	Investment rate (%)	22	21.07	2.77	15.99	27.98	−3.58***
	Export (%GDP)	22	57.70	16.53	32.41	84.06	−3.82***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	83.72	3.22	78.89	89.30	−4.59***
LVA	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.05	0.58	0.87	1.12	−3.85***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	3.21	1.93	0.64	6.05	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	4.04	2.27	−0.12	8.78	−3.77***
	Investment rate (%)	22	25.37	5.43	15.17	36.90	−3.42**
	Export (%GDP)	22	46.34	10.32	35.03	61.30	−3.01**
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	81.59	3.45	77.48	89.84	−5.67***
POL	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.038	0.018	1	1.07	−6.62***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	1.35	0.599	0.48	2.46	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	3.37	1.48	.151	6.22	−5.17***
	Investment rate (%)	22	22.29	2.01	18.72	25.27	−3.12**
	Export (%GDP)	22	36.75	9.60	22.09	53.39	−5.38***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	80.07	2.27	76.05	84.96	−3.52***
ROU	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.03	0.044	0.94	1.10	−5.51***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	.72	.669	.044	2.02	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	3.57	2.252	.707	8.909	−5.76***
	Investment rate (%)	22	25.85	6.31	17.88	41.47	−4.06***
	Export (%GDP)	22	33.35	5.67	22.86	41.44	−3.66***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	81.79	4.36	75.21	89.25	−4.00***
SVK	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.035	0.033	0.944	1.107	−5.82***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	1.341	0.947	0.061	2.44	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	3.975	3.085	−0.35	12.00	−8.30***
	Investment rate (%)	22	27.87	3.741	23.25	24.64	−4.90***
	Export (%GDP)	22	73.09	16.91	46.65	96.30	−3.68***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	75.25	1.591	72.63	80.35	−5.02***
SVN	Real GDP/cap growth	22	1.023	0.333	0.913	1.063	−5.06***
	Remittances (%GDP)	22	0.838	0.182	0.545	1.282	−1.801**
	FDI (%GDP)	22	1.930	1.785	−0.68	7.85	−5.62***
	Investment rate (%)	22	27.037	4.374	19.73	33.966	−2.92**
	Export (%GDP)	22	61.611	11.97	44.14	82.210	−4.09***
	Consumption (%GDP)	22	73.627	2.429	68.42	77.075	−2.82*

Note: ***and ** represent 1% and 5% significance level.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

Table 4. The correlations between GDP cycle and Remittances cycle in Central and Eastern European (CEE) Countries (1996–2017).

	Remit (t-1)	FDI (t-1)	Remit (t)	FDI (t)	Remit (t + 1)	FDI (t + 1)	Nature of the Remit flow co-movement	Nature of the FDI flow co-movement
Whole sample	−0.0293	0.016	−0.0132	0.1579	0.0118	0.1268	Acyclical	Acyclical
BGR	0.0693	−0.024	0.1046	0.360*	0.0106	0.573***	Acyclical	Procyclical
CZE	−0.44**	−0.121	−0.051	0.011	0.686***	0.306	Procyclical	Acyclical
EST	−0.181	−0.235	0.2107	0.072	0.788***	0.282	Procyclical	Acyclical
HRV	−0.49**	0.317	−0.206	0.2637	0.063	0.028	Countercyclical	Acyclical
HUN	0.0515	0.410*	0.3498	0.3411	0.457**	0.019	Procyclical	Procyclical
LTU	−0.38*	−0.123	0.0240	0.525**	0.3844*	0.356	Procyclical	Procyclical
LVA	0.1953	−0.164	−0.312	0.665***	−0.57***	0.761***	Countercyclical	Procyclical
POL	−0.171	−0.255	0.1360	0.417*	0.2172	0.350	Acyclical	Acyclical
ROU	−0.036	−0.026	0.2607	0.192	0.3488	0.1007	Acyclical	Acyclical
SVK	0.0820	−0.215	0.1527	0.085	0.2120	0.1520	Acyclical	Acyclical
SVN	−0.167	−0.196	0.1854	0.141	0.0608	0.1522	Acyclical	Acyclical

Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

Figure 4. The procyclical movement of the GDP and Remittances cycles in CEE countries (1996–2017).

Figure 5. The countercyclical movement of the GDP Remittances and Foreign Direct Investment cycles in CEE countries (1996–2017).

Figure 6. The acyclical movement of the GDP and Remittances cycles in CEE countries (1996–2017).

Table 5. The correlation matrix at panel level for CEE countries.

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
(1)	Real GDP/cap growth	1
(2)	Remittances (%GDP)	0.0569 (0.3779)	1
(3)	FDI (%GDP)	0.1431 (0.0260)	0.0773 (0.2312)	1
(4)	Investment rate (%)	0.1527 (0.0174)	−0.0148 (0.8187)	0.1741 (0.0066)	1
(5)	Export (%GDP)	−0.0297 (0.6455)	0.0924 (.1520)	0.0807 (0.2112)	0.1266 (0.0492)	1
(6)	Consumption (%GDP)	0.0659 (0.3071)	0.2220 (0.0005)	−0.0319 (0.6218)	−0.5436 (0.0000)	−0.6070 (0.0000)	1

Note: p-values are reported in parenthesis.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

Table 6. The estimates of OLS regression.

Country	R-squared	F	Remittances	Investment rate	Remit*Inv
Whole sample	0.58	338.21***	0.32***
	0.98	3984.78***	0.35***	0.039***	−0.013***
BGR	0.71	53.72***	0.21***
	0.96	163.30***	0.31***	0.051***	−0.014***
CZE	0.77	71.60***	1.03***
	0.99	9800.68***	0.52**	0.032***	−0.015**
EST	0.66	42.08***	0.55***
	0.99	716.36***	0.37***	0.041***	−0.016***
HRV	0.97	702.91***	0.28***
	0.99	5380.84***	0.32***	0.040***	−0.012***
HUN	0.65	40.21***	0.40***
	0.99	3727.8***	0.37***	0.040***	−0.014***
LTU	0.67	42.66***	0.30***
	0.99	1856.82***	0.23***	0.054***	−0.012***
LVA	0.71	52.27***	0.23***
	0.98	432.92***	0.30***	0.045***	−0.012***
POL	0.84	115.55***	0.64***
	0.99	5457.42***	0.64***	0.046***	−0.028***
ROU	0.56	27.72***	0.79***
	0.98	467.53***	1.54***	0.042***	−0.058***
SVK	0.68	44.64***	0.52***
	0.99	1949.32***	0.32***	0.032***	−0.008**
SVN	0.95	495.59***	1.16***
	0.99	4786.30***	1.18***	0.036***	−0.042***

Note: ***and ** represent 1% and 5% significance level.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

Table 7. The estimates of VECM.

Country	R-sq	Chi2	Short-run parameters					Cointegration equations
			Remit	FDI	Inv	Exp	Cons
BGR	0.90	94.36***	–	0.1	0.01	–	–	ΔGDP = 0.22 − 0.012ΔRemit – 0.002Trend
CZE	0.92	131.96***	0.1	–	0.05	0.01	0.05	ΔGDP = −0.051 − 0.089ΔRemit + 0.003Trend
EST	0.90.	92.43***	–	–	–	–	0.5	ΔGDP = −0.077ΔRemit
HRV	0.93	153.64***	–	–	0.05	0.01	–	–
HUN	0.61	15.93*	–	–	–	–	–	ΔGDP = −0.061ΔRemit
LTU	0.95	234.01**	0.1	–	–	–	0.01	ΔGDP = −0.021 + 0.03ΔRemit +0.002
LVA	0.80	40.51***	–	0.01	0.05	0.05	–	ΔGDP = 0.017 + 0.032ΔRemit − 0.022Trend
POL	0.90	100.83***	–	0.05	0.05	–	–	–
ROU	0.89	87.77***	–	0.05	0.01	0.01	–	–
SVK	0.94	173.10***	–	–	0.05	–	0.1	–
SVN	0.95	232.60***	–	–	0.01	0.05	–	–

Note: 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 show the level of significance.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

Figure 7. The impulse response function for CEE countries.

Table 8. Granger causality Wald tests results.

Country	Null Hypothesis	Chi2	Decision
BGR	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	7.236**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	2.223	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	5.130*	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	3.113	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	3.857	Accept
CZE	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	41.42***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	5.12*	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	34.73***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	7.46**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	30.19***	Reject
EST	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	8.923**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	71.334***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	6.19**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	12.83***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	7.03**	Reject
HRV	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	3.688	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	3.484	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	4.151	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	0.239	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	0.125	Accept
HUN	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	14.242***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	0.591	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	2.959	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	27.808***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	15.996***	Reject
LTU	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	0.669	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	6.455**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	0.147	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	4.484	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	2.204	Accept
LVA	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	4.993*	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	1.694	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	4.076	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	7.306**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	11.735***	Reject
POL	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	16.659***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	1.939	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	22.493***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	1.597	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	0.516	Accept
ROU	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	0.812	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	4.352	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	8.365**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	5.152*	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	0.440	Accept
SVK	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	4.623*	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	8.322**	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	2.944	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	10.145***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	0.401	Accept
SVN	Remittances does not Granger cause GDP/cap growth	3.679	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause FDI	4.215	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Investment rate	29.367***	Reject
	Remittances does not Granger cause Export	0.104	Accept
	Remittances does not Granger cause Consumption	3.579	Accept

Note: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.

Source: Own computation using Stata 13 software.

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