Intellectual property rights and law enforcement in developing countries

Figures & data

Table 2. The equilibrium outcomes at $\varphi =3.19.$

Under the condition of that the level of law enforcement is zero:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500020$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.012598$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.256309$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.248425$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.003169$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.025194$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.496831$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.251585$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063686$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.060920-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.000394$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.064080$
Under the condition of maximum level of law enforcement:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500014$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.011308$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.255661$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.248115$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.001913$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.022248$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.496216$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.334601$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.064070$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.060615-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.065011$

Source: Simulation values for this model.

Table 3. The equilibrium outcomes at $\varphi =3.52.$

Under the condition of that the level of law enforcement is zero:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500013$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.010275$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.255144$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.248716$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.002582$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.020549$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.497418$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.251291$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063467$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.061212-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.000321$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063788$
Under the condition of maximum level of law enforcement:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500009$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.009207$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.254608$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.248465$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.001553$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.018168$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.496922$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.334364$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063778$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.060965-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.064545$

Source: Simulation values for this model.

Table 4. The equilibrium outcomes at $\varphi =4.19.$

Under the condition of that the level of law enforcement is zero:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500007$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.007224$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.253616$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.249097$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.001812$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.014447$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.498188$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.250906$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063179$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.061595-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.000226$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063405$
Under the condition of maximum level of law enforcement:
$s_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.500005$	$s_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.006458$	${\overline{s}}^{\mathit{IPR}}=0.253232$
$p_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.248924$	$p_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.001086$	${\omega }^{\mathrm{*}}=0.012794$
$x_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.497843$	$x_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.334055$	${CS}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063397$
${\pi }_h^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0.061424-F$	${\pi }_l^{{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}}=0$	${TW}_{\mathit{IPR}}^{\mathrm{*}}=0.063934$

Source: Simulation values for this model.

Figure 1. The IPR, adjusted IPR andlaw enforcement of China.

Source: The calculations of this model with the methods of Qi et al (2008) and Han and Li (2005).

Table 1. The relevant intervals of a given IPR index.

$\varphi =3.19$	$0.022\le \omega \le 0.025$
$\varphi =3.52$	$0.018\le \omega \le 0.021$
$\varphi =4.19$	$0.013\le \omega \le 0.014$

Source: Simulation values for this model.

Figure 2. The profits of foreign firm with the strength of law enforcement.

Figure 3. The total welfareand law enforcement of China (developing country).

Qi, J. Y., Yang, L. G., & Feng, T. (2008). The investigations on the impact of intellectual property protection for FDI in China. Inquiry into Economic Issues, 1, 89–94.

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Han, Y. X., & Li, H. Z. (2005). Quantitative analysis for intellectual property protection level of China. Studies in Science of Science, 23(3), 377–382.

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