Figures & data
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Table 1. Influencing factors.
Table 2. Payment matrix of tripartite game.
Table 3. Conditions of stability at equilibrium points.
Table 4. Interviewees.
Figure 2. Evolution of government, owner, and company at , Scenario I: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25,
.
![Figure 2. Evolution of government, owner, and company at D10,0,0, Scenario I: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/9ad7ca8e-765f-47cf-a2e8-4dc2390c6c5a/tabe_a_1971681_f0002_oc.jpg)
Figure 3. Evolution of government, owner, and company at , Scenario II: C = 0.05, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25,
.
![Figure 3. Evolution of government, owner, and company at D21,0,0, Scenario II: C = 0.05, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/572060fd-326a-4a09-85d8-4d16337b9b59/tabe_a_1971681_f0003_oc.jpg)
Figure 4. Evolution of government, owner, and company at , Scenario III: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.5, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 1.5,
.
![Figure 4. Evolution of government, owner, and company at D30,1,0, Scenario III: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.5, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 1.5, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/645f8b8d-d050-479d-9fe7-0a19b3e8346b/tabe_a_1971681_f0004_oc.jpg)
Figure 5. Evolutionary of government, owner, and company at , Scenario IV: C = 0.15, T = 0.3, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 1.5,
.
![Figure 5. Evolutionary of government, owner, and company at D51,1,0, Scenario IV: C = 0.15, T = 0.3, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 1.5, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/a144632d-408f-4ede-a2e2-251fd1a5e417/tabe_a_1971681_f0005_oc.jpg)
Figure 6. Evolution of government, owner, and company at , Scenario V: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.5, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25,
.
![Figure 6. Evolution of government, owner, and company at D70,1,1, Scenario V: C = 0.15, T = 0.1, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.5, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/b8ee59c0-c426-4106-bde9-c38b5cf2ffd4/tabe_a_1971681_f0006_oc.jpg)
Figure 7. Evolution of government, owner, and company at , Scenario VI: C = 0.15, T = 0.3, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25,
.
![Figure 7. Evolution of government, owner, and company at D81,1,1, Scenario VI: C = 0.15, T = 0.3, D1 = 0.05, D2 = 0.05, R1 = 25, R2 = 25.1, P1 = 21, P2 = 22, Q1 = 1.2, Q2 = 0.5, M1 = 0.1, M2 = 0.25, α=3.5%,β=5%,γ=0.98.](/cms/asset/91cb062b-e207-46f5-a5fc-3f89923d1bbd/tabe_a_1971681_f0007_oc.jpg)