‘Soft’ co-ordination meets ‘hard’ politics: the European Union and pension reform in Greece

Abstract

The paper examines the process of pension reform in Greece in the context of the ‘soft’ policy constraint (on structural reform) emanating from the European Union. It argues that the EU stimulus to reform complemented a set of domestic pressures. However, the domestic system of interest mediation has largely thwarted reform. The reform process is marked by a strong configuration of institutional conditions undermining the will and capability to adapt. Negotiation reflects a game of ‘non-cooperation’, with those currently privileged fearing zero-sum outcomes and constituting powerful veto-players. Strategies of concertation have proved unsustainable, whilst unilateral approaches by government have failed to build coalitions and offer sufficient incentives. An acute problem of governance prevails, threatening Greek interests in the EU and the Union's ability to co-ordinate economic reform across an increasingly diverse membership.

Keywords:

• Europeanization
• Greece
• interest mediation
• pension reform

Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to Dimitris Papadimitriou (Manchester), Waltraud Schelkle (LSE) and the anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier draft. Any errors remain mine alone. The paper was originally prepared for the Conference of the Modern Greek Studies Association, Toronto, 16–18 October 2003. The panel title was: ‘Adapting to Europe – The Politics of Structural Reform in Greece’. I am grateful for the comments received.

Notes

1 Comment made by senior member of Greek Government in personal interview, January 2003.

2 An exception is ELIAMEP (Elliniko Idryma Europaikis and Eksoterikis Politikis/The Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), sustained by an informed academic community. There are several bodies in Greece functioning as research institutes: for example, EKKE (Ethniko Kendro Ereunon/National Centre for Social Research) and KEPE (Kendro Programmatismou kai Oikonomikon Ereunon/Centre of Planning and Economic Research). These have a different academic focus and remit, however: they do not have a primary role of producing public policy analysis. A number of political centres, foundations or committees are sometimes cited as ‘think-tanks’ (for example, OPEK (Omilos Provlimatismou yia ton Eksigxronismo tis Koinonias mas/Research Association for Modernizing Our Society), promoting Simitis' social democratic ‘modernization’ agenda), but they lack independence and longevity, whilst their policy research function is often limited. This pattern contrasts with recent experience in Italy, for example (Lucarelli and Radaelli 2003).

3 The following paragraphs draw upon Featherstone et al. (2001).