Deliberation in negotiations

Abstract

The past decade witnessed a growing interest in theories of deliberation and their application at the international level. This article takes stock of the state of the art. It argues that the ‘deliberative turn’ has forced both rationalist and constructivist scholars to refine their arguments and reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new research frontier for constructivists is in assessing under which circumstances arguments affect negotiating actors' preferences and subsequently lead to outcomes that are not easily explained in pure bargaining terms.

Keywords:

• Arguing
• bargaining
• European Convention
• intergovernmental conferences
• negotiations

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The empirical findings are based on research carried out in the framework of the Integrated Project ‘New Modes of European Governance’ (NEWGOV), funded in the EU's 6th Framework Programme on Socio-Economic Research (Contract No CIT1-CT-2004-506392). For comments on this article, we thank Andreas Dür, Gemma Mateo and Daniel Thomas, as well as participants at the workshop on Negotiation Theory and the EU at University College Dublin, 14–15 November 2008.

Notes

The literature is vast and growing fast. See, for example, Albert et al. (2008); Crawford (2002); Deitelhoff (2006); Deitelhoff and Mueller (2005); Diez and Steans (2005); Holzscheiter (2006); Lynch (2002); Mitzen (2005); Müller (2004); Niesen and Herborth (2007); Risse (2000); Ulbert and Risse (2005); Wessler (2008); special issue of Acta Politica 40(3) (2005). In addition, there is a growing literature on the subject matter in comparative politics and political psychology. Thompson (2008) provides a critical review of the normative and empirical literature. A collection of essays that brings theorists and empiricists together can be found in Rosenberg (2007). For a review of game-theoretic approaches, emphasizing the problem of sincerity, see Landa and Meirowitz (2009). For a review of social psychology and experimental literature, see, for example, Mendelberg (2002). We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this literature, which complements rather than differs from the respective studies in International Relations.

For an argument that transaction costs tend to be very low in international negotiations, see Moravcsik (1999).

A fourth contribution to the study of discourse focuses on the ‘power of discourse’ and is heavily influenced by the works of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. See, for example, Fierke and Wiener (1999). See also ‘critical discourse analysis’ as developed by Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak (1997), which has also been applied to the EU recently (e.g., Oberhuber et al. 2005; Wodak 2004). In the following, however, we focus on arguing and reason-giving in the Habermasian meaning of discourse, which is more suitable for a special issue devoted to negotiation theory.

We thank an anonymous reviewer for alerting us to this possibility. However, we still insist that arguing speech acts essentially consist of giving reasons or justifications. Whether arguing leads to ‘reasoning’ in the sense of exchanging arguments and transforming the nature of negotiations is a different question which we address below.

The following summarizes Risse (2000, 2004).

At a conference in Frankfurt/Main in June 2006. See Habermas (2007); also Deitelhoff (2007).

To be sure, both interaction modes need not result in a settlement: negotiations sometimes break down or lead to an informed agreement to disagree.

In International Relations theory, this phenomenon has led researchers to study ‘audience costs’ that accrue to leaders who act contrary to initial statements. See, for example, Fearon (1994).

Interview, Giuliano Amato, 4 November 2005.

This and the following information is taken from interviews with Giuliano Amato, 4 November 2005; Ricardo Passos, 26 January 2006; and Hervé Bribosia, 4 May 2005.

Note that an agreement on the single legal personality had to precede any drafting of treaty documents. Had any of the conventioneers used this issue as a bargaining chip to extract other concessions later on, the whole exercise of drafting a single treaty would have failed. We owe this insight to a meeting with Dr Meyer-Landrut.