Transgovernmental networks in the European Union: improving compliance effectively?

Abstract

The application of European Union (EU) rules is, in general, the responsibility of national executives. This key intergovernmental aspect of the EU's administrative order makes compliance with supranational law vulnerable to distortion. However, the European executive has added important fire-alarm oversight mechanisms by means of transgovernmental networks (TGNs) to its toolbox. This article examines the work mode, horizontalness and effectiveness of such networks as newer governance tools to oversee and monitor the compliance with EU law. It draws on a unique dataset on the Solvit network, enabling us to examine effectiveness and variation of a transgovernmental network in operation. The article substantiates the relevance of TGNs in identifying and solving manifold and complex problems of misapplied EU law, finds that the Commission constitutes a focal point in this type of multilevel executive and points out that learning in part explains why effectiveness varies across member states.

Keywords:

• Compliance
• effectiveness
• internal market
• multilevel executive
• transgovernmental networks

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We would like to thank Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Jens Blom-Hansen, Gerda Falkner, Morten Kallestrup, Martin Marcussen, Ben Rosamond, Gabriel Pons Rotger, Jarle Trondal and Rikke Wagner, as well as our three anonymous reviewers, for most constructive comments.

Notes

1 A similar work mechanism can also be found in the ‘EU pilot’ project (European Commission 2011b), as well as the Tress (social security) and Impel (environment) networks.

2 Before sending out the survey we conducted semi-structured pilot interviews with members of the Danish and British Solvit centres (cf. Couper 2000: 475f).

3 The full survey is available upon request.

4 Solvit survey 2011, question 4: ‘How often is your Solvit centre in contact with the European Commission?’

5 Solvit survey 2011, question 7: ‘Since your Solvit centre was established the amount of contact with the European Commission has in general:’. The replies to question 7 also contained one ‘do not know’ and one ‘missing’.

6 Solvit survey 2011, question 5: ‘What is the purpose of the contact with the European Commission?’

7 Solvit Survey 2011, question 15: ‘To what extent, if at all, do you agree with the following statements about the role of the European Commission in the case handling process?’

8 Solvit Survey 2011, question 17: ‘If the European Commission recommends a case solution different from the one preferred by your national public authority, what do you do?’

9 Solvit survey 2011, question 10: ‘Of the Solvit cases handled as “lead” in 2010, what was the outcome?’

10 We tested the effect and statistical significance of case load relative to a set of other factors (administrative capacity, public support for the EU, adherence to the rule of law, federalism, country voting weight, Gross domestic product [GDP] and Solvit staffing levels) in a panel data analysis. These result confirmed the effect and significance of case load when controlling for other factors, which were not significant. The statistical readouts are available upon request.

Additional information

Biographical notes:

Mogens Hobolth holds a PhD in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Dorte Sindbjerg Martinsen is Professor (MSO) at the Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen.