Interregionalism's impact on regional integration in developing countries: the case of Mercosur

ABSTRACT

This article examines the impact of interregionalism on deepening regional integration processes in non-European Union (EU) regions, specifically the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). It considers whether ‘capacity-building’ functions of interregionalism are present in EU–Mercosur relations. It argues that although negotiations for an association agreement might have helped Mercosur survive periods of severe crisis in the past, the terms of the agreement under negotiation were not sufficiently attractive to encourage deeper integration in Mercosur. Moreover, interregionalism cannot be expected to compensate for low institutionalization, nor substitute for weak political willingness to deepen integration. Ultimately, Mercosur alone can decide how far it wants to take its regional integration.

KEY WORDS:

• EU
• interregionalism
• Mercosur
• regionalism

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the JEPP referees for their helpful comments. Also, special thanks to Felix Peña for his comments and help during my visit to Argentina in 2010.

Notes

1 There are some exceptions, such as Gilson (2002) .

2 The author would like to thank all interviewees for their time and insights (some 18 individuals were interviewed in 2008 and 2010). Interviewees included top government officials and diplomats/negotiators from the ministries of foreign relations and industry in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, representatives and directors of the Brazilian National Confederation of Industry (CNI), the Argentine Industrial Union (UIA), Brazilian Association of Industrial Development (ABDI), Mercosur-European Union Business Forum (MEBF), researchers/staff at relevant think-tanks and other business organizations.

3 While both the EU and Andean Community built in some supranational elements from inception of their regionalism projects, it is only the more advanced regionalism (i.e., the EU) that developed additional supranational structures and decision-making powers as regionalism deepened.

4 For example, see the various EU–Mercosur Regional Strategy papers (European Commission 2007).

5 From a Mercosur integration perspective, the two worst crises were the Brazilian currency devaluation in 1999 and the political and economic collapse in Argentina in 2001-2 with its knock-on effects on Uruguay and Paraguay.

6 The Report makes special note of Mercosur barriers related to government procurement, maritime transportation, export of raw materials (agriculture as well as hides for leather), and non-automatic import licences.

7 For example, EU agreements with Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (ACP) countries put huge strains on the regional relations of states in Africa and the Caribbean. Thus, successful EU agreements are often with single countries (e.g., Mexico, not North American Free Trade Agreement [NAFTA]; South Africa, not Southern African Development Community [SADC]; Chile).

8 See the chapters by Andrés Serbin and Marcelo Saguier in Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012) for an interesting discussion on related themes and the role of civil society actors.

9 See SIA (2009). The reports discuss economic implications of an agreement on various sectors, although less is said about implications for Mercosur institutionalization.

10 Note the divergent responses of Brazil and Argentina to the ‘Lamy package’ after the WTO ministerial meetings in Geneva in July 2008, as well as Paraguay and Uruguay's disagreement with the position of other developing countries with respect to the special safeguard mechanism to protect from import surges of sensitive and special products.

11 This impression is based on discussions with Uruguayan academics during a brief visit to the country in October 2014. I dare say interviews with business people would yield a very different picture (as portrayed in the Uruguayan media).

Additional information

Biographical note

Mahrukh Doctor is Senior Lecturer in Political Economy at the University of Hull.