ABSTRACT
This paper argues that a policy regime based on a paradigm mix may be resilient when challenged by changing power balances and new agendas. Controversies between the actors can be contained within the paradigm mix as it enables them to legitimize different ideational positions. Rather than engaging in conflict over the foundation of the regime, they are more likely to rebalance the paradigm blend. We show that despite being a mixture of two contradictory paradigms, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Agriculture has proven resilient when the power balance within the WTO and the policy context changed. The paradigm mix proved sufficiently flexible to accommodate food security concerns and at the same time continue to take steps toward further liberalization. Indeed, the main players have not challenged the paradigm mix.
Acknowledgements
An earlier version was presented at the International Conference on Public Policy (ICPP), Milan 1–4 July 2015. We would in particular like to thank the four anonymous reviewers and the editors of this journal for constructive comments on earlier versions.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Carsten Daugbjerg is a professor in the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, Australia; and a professor in the Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark,
Arild Aurvåg Farsund is a professor of political science, University of Stavanger, Norway.
Oluf Langhelle is a professor of political science, University of Stavanger, Norway.
Notes
1. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
2. Also phrased the dependent agriculture paradigm (Moyer and Josling [Citation2002]).
3. Moyer and Josling (Citation2002) use the term competitive agriculture paradigm.
4. GATT 1994 is substantially identical to GATT 1947 but legally distinct.
5. It states that ‘The provisions of GATT 1994 and other Multilateral Trade Agreements in Annex 1A to the WTO Agreement shall apply subject to the provisions of this Agreement [on Agriculture]’.
6. The most important negotiating outcome relating to food security in the Uruguay Round according to Margulis’ analyses was the side agreement addressing the concerns of net-food importers in Article 16 of the AoA, known as the Marrakech Decision. For an overview of the food security provisions in the Uruguay Round, see Margulis (Citation2017: 50).
7. A third coalition, the G10, also emerged in Cancún. It consisted of developed food-importing countries advocating that non-trade concerns should be taken into account by the trade regime.
8. In the Agriculture Agreement: Annex 2's articles 3 and 4 and footnotes 5 and 6.
9. The idea was originally proposed by the African Group in 2002. See WTO (Citation2014): https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/agric_e/factsheet_agng_e.htm
10. End of 2020 for processed products, dairy products and pork.
11. End of 2022 for already-notified export subsidies.