Bounded rationality and the Brexit negotiations: why Britain failed to understand the EU

ABSTRACT

Research on the Brexit negotiations has linked the problems faced by Britain to flawed assumptions in the UK’s perception of EU interests. These include the idea that the EU would be open to compromise on key principles, that it would offer the UK a bespoke relationship, that national capitals would respond favourably to bilateral initiatives, and that EU unity would not hold. Yet the origins of these assumptions have been subject to little systematic scrutiny. How did such wrong-headed assumptions about the EU’s interests emerge? Drawing on insights from bounded rationality we identify three aspects of the decision-making environment linked with biased thinking: (1) ill-fitting routines and lessons, (2) a lack of decision-making openness, and (3) a lack of EU expertize and contact. We demonstrate our argument using data obtained from interviews in Brussels and London in 2017–18 and accounts of those involved in the decisions.

KEYWORDS:

• Bounded rationality
• Brexit negotiations
• bureaucratic politics
• cognitive biases
• negotiation theory
• Theresa May

Acknowledgements

We would to thank Monika Brusenbauch Meislová, David Phinnemore, Claudio Radaelli, Pauline Schnapper, Uta Staiger and Nick Wright, and as well as the Editors of JEPP and two anonymous reviewers, for their helpful comments on the manuscript. We would also like to thank those we spoke to in our interviews, funding for which was kindly provided by the Laidlaw Research and Leadership Programme at UCL. We are grateful to José Feio and Anton Gromóczki at for their excellent research assistance.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Interview 3

2 Interview 4

3 Interview 2

4 Interview 8

5 Interview 10

6 Interview 9

7 Interview 5

8 Interview 7

9 Interview 5

10 Interview 3

11 Interview 8

12 Interview 6

13 Interview 1

14 Interview 11

15 Interview 2

16 This attitude ultimately led to Rogers’ unceremonious resignation in January 2017.

17 Interview 3

18 Interview 5

19 Interview 3

20 Interview 2

21 Interview 7

22 Interview 3

23 Support among Leavers for a no deal Brexit stood at 7% in July 2016 but by January 2017 this would climb to 82% (Kettell & Kerr, 2020).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Laidlaw Research and Leadership Programme at UCL.

Notes on contributors

Filipa Figueira

Filipa Figueira is Senior Teaching Fellow at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London

Benjamin Martill

Benjamin Martill is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Edinburgh