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ABSTRACT
Stakeholder engagement is thought to increase the legitimacy of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). However, there is little research on how IRAs use the information that stakeholders contribute. We argue that the organizational reputation approach can explain different reactions to stakeholder engagement. IRAs usually rely on a reputation based on technical expertise. However, if IRAs have little capacities, they fall back on procedural or moral reputation. We analyze the consultations of the German Federal Network Agency (FNA) and the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) on planning electricity networks. Both have complex audience situations and an incentive to cultivate a technical reputation. However, their capacities differ. The FNA has capacities to cultivate a technical reputation, and selectively discusses technical contributions. ACER has less capacities. It selectively reacts to comments that criticize procedural aspects of network planning. Hence, we show how reputational concerns and capacities shape consultation procedures.
Acknowledgements
We thank Caelesta Braun, Madalina Busuioc, Bastiaan Reedert and the participants of the Panel ‘Stakeholder Engagement as Accountability or Autonomy?’ at the ECPR General Conference 2019 as well as the threeanonymous reviewers for their excellent feedback and comments.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 For example, the FNA regularly cites the legal definitions of and thresholds for electromagnetic pollution, cutting short any political discussion of the issues. Hence, its legal reputation is built on the one hand on the adherence to procedural regulations, but even more so on the detailed knowledge of the material regulations in fields such as power line construction.
2 See annual report 2018, https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Allgemeines/Bundesnetzagentur/Publikationen/Berichte/2019/JB2018.pdf;jsessionid=8695DDE7033BBC7FD28A0804CB6699CA?__blob=publicationFile&v=6
4 Inteview with Achim Zerres, head of the department Energy Regulation, available at: https://www.emw-online.com/artikel/193644/-die-wind-onshore--ausschreibungen-machen-uns-sorgen-
8 Available at https://acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Annual%20Activity%20Report%20for%20the%20year%202017.%20Designed%20version.pdf; https://acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Acts_of_the_Agency/Publication/ACER%20Annual%20Activity%20Report%20for%20the%20year%202016.pdf
9 ACER (2016) Taking stock of the regulators’ human resources, Summary of findings, available at: https://acer.europa.eu/Official_documents/Other%20documents/ACER%20Taking%20stock%20of%20the%20regulators%E2%80%99%20human%20resources%20Summary%20of%20findings.pdf
10 The FNA does not specify an exact number, but according to our own hand-coding, 35% of contributions to the TSO consultation criticize the information content of the documents.
11 Available at https://tyndp.entsoe.eu/documents/TYNDP%202016%20Consultation%20responses%20for%20publication.xlsx
12 One could argue that ACEŔs insisting on transparent procedures is part of a strategy to project a moral reputation. Following the correct procedures also holds a moral aspect. However, we should not conflate the two dimensions: ACER is not commenting on the content of the policies (e.g. protecting citizens from harm), but only on the formal procedures of policymaking.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Simon Fink
Simon Fink is Professor for the Political System of Germany at the University of Goettingen, Germany.
Eva Ruffing
Eva Ruffing is Professor for German Politics in Context of European Multi-Level Governance at the University Osnabrueck, Germany.