Distorted promotion of undistorted competition? Commission decisions after formal investigations in the EU state aid regime

Figures & data

Figure 1. Outcomes for FIs opened between 2004 and 2018 per member state. Source: Register (2019).

Table 1. Multilevel logistic models of the effects of variables on outcome of FIs (2004–2018).

Model	1		2
	B (SE)	Odds ratio	B (SE)	Odds ratio
Intercept	−0.62	0.54	0.79	2.21
	(0.67)		(1.11)
State aid case level
Rescue and restructuring objective	−0.03	0.97	−0.09	0.92
	(0.29)		(0.29)
Tax measure (instrument)	0.75*	2.11	0.77*	2.16
	(0.30)		(0.31)
Unlawful aid (origin)	0.89**	2.44	0.88**	2.42
	(0.26)		(0.26)
Member state level
Intervention position government			−0.06	0.94
			(0.14)
Member state power			−0.01	1.00
			(0.04)
EU position government			0.13	1.14
			(0.11)
Public trust in the Commission			−0.91	0.40
			(1.43)
Administrative capacity			−0.74*	0.48
			(0.28)
Control
DG Competition	−0.31	0.73	−0.30	0.74
	(0.61)		(0.62)
Barosso II Commission^a	−0.20	0.82	−0.22	0.80
	(0.32)		(0.35)
Juncker Commission	0.84	2.32	0.90	2.46
	(0.51)		(0.52)
Post SAM reform	−0.41	0.66	−0.64	0.53
	(0.41)		(0.43)
N L1/L2	358/27		358/27

^a Reference category is Barosso I Commission.

Standard errors in parentheses, *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; two-tailed (t-test).

Source: Register (2019).

Register. (2019). State aid register. https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/register/

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