The institutional position of national parliaments in the European Union: developments, explanations, effects

Figures & data

Table 1. Key parliamentary oversight institutions in EU affairs.

Oversight institution	Definition and coding
European Affairs Committee (EAC)	Parliaments can have dedicated EACs or combine EU affairs and other responsibilities (mostly foreign affairs). Coding: 1=EAC. 0.5=Shared responsibility. 0=No committee.
Involving sectoral committees (Seccom)	Parliaments can create strong mechanisms for the involvement of sectoral committees in scrutinizing EU affairs. Rules might invite but not require their involvement or leave their role vague or open. Coding: 1=Strong mechanisms. 0.5=Optional or occasional involvement. 0=Vague or no mechanisms.
Explanatory memorandum (Memo)	Parliaments can require that governments routinely detail the background and their intended position on EU documents. They might do so only in rare circumstances or not at all. Coding: 1=Memorandum generally required. 0=Memorandum not or rarely required.
Scrutiny reserve (Reserve)	Parliaments can impose a reserve to prevent the government from taking a position for a substantial period or until scrutiny is concluded. Coding: 1=Scrutiny reserve. 0=No reserve.
Mandating rights (Mandate)	Parliaments can approve or mandate positions of the government, which has to comply. Parliaments might allow the government to deviate if it gives reasons, and valid reasons are not restricted significantly. Coding: 1=Binding mandates with no or few exceptions. 0.5=Justified deviation routinely possible. 0=No mandating.
Aggregating oversight institutions	A standardized count of (types of) institutions is used here to describe oversight institutions: Information-related institutions: (EAC + Seccom + Memo)/3. Constraining institutions: (Reserve + Mandate)/2. Overall strength: (Information-related institutions + Constraining institutions)/2.

Note: The selection of institutions builds on Winzen (2012). Appendix 1 offers further information on the data collection. Table A1 in the appendix shows examples from domestic laws and parliamentary rules of procedure.

Figure 1. Variation in parliamentary oversight institutions.

Note: Panel (a) charts the strength of oversight institutions over all member states (±one standard deviation). Panel (b) shows countries along dimensions of oversight institutions in 2019. Close dots have been separated for legibility but are identical. See the last row of Table 1 for measurement details.

Table 2. Parliamentary rights in the ESM and European Semester.

	ESM: Approval	ESM: Information	European Semester
0	No	No or minor (e.g., quarterly reports)	No reforms
0.5	Selective The parliament approves a sub-set of key decisions or has otherwise minor participation rights (e.g., the government has to present its voting intentions).	General reporting The government is required to report on ESM affairs without clarification of the scope or timing of information or has to provide further information only on parliament’s own initiative.	Moderate reforms Rights in some steps of the European Semester. Typically, parliament receives the Stability/Convergence and Reform Programmes at the same time as the EU.
1	Yes The parliament approves voting intentions on key decisions.	Extensive The government is obliged to inform parliament broadly and immediately.	Strong reforms Parliamentary rights cover extensive reporting obligations or participation in decisions on important documents.

Note: Adapted from Rittberger and Winzen (2015). Key decisions: Decisions on aid programs, memorandums of understanding, the authorization of aid tranches within programs, the choice and changes of instruments in aid programs, and the authorization of callable capital. We do not consider approval of ESM treaty changes (e.g., if ESM lending volume or country contributions change).

Figure 2. Variation of parliamentary rights in economic governance in 2019.

Note: Updated from Rittberger and Winzen (2015). The color scheme encodes the values in Table 2: Dark blue=1. Light blue=0.5. Red=0. Countries outside of the Euro area are listed separately starting with Denmark (DK).

Table 3. New interparliamentary conferences.

Conference	Characteristics
Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy	Mandate: Legal basis: First meeting: Composition:	Debate/information exchange to strengthen parliaments’ information when carrying out their respective roles. Decision of the EU Speakers Conference, Rules of Procedure. September 2012, Cyprus. Biannual meetings. Parliamentary delegations (6 members, 16 from the EP).
Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance in the European Union	Mandate: Legal basis: First meeting: Composition:	Debate and information exchange to strengthen inter-parliamentary cooperation and democratic accountability. Article 13 of the Fiscal Compact, Rules of Procedure. October 2013, Lithuania. Biannual meetings. Parliamentary delegations (flexible size).
Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol (JPSG)	Mandate: Legal basis: First meeting: Composition:	To monitor Europol’s activities, including the impact on fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons. Article 12 TEU, Article 88 TFEU, Regulation 2016/794, Rules of Procedure. October 2017, European Parliament. Biannual meetings. Parliamentary delegations (4 members, 16 from the EP).

Note: In addition to the legal bases listed in the table, the articles 9 and 10 of the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union allow national parliaments and the EP to organize interparliamentary cooperation.

Winzen, T. (2012). National parliamentary control of European Union affairs: A cross-national and longitudinal comparison. West European Politics, 35(3), 657–672. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.665745

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Rittberger, B., & Winzen, T. (2015). Parlamentarismus nach der Krise: Die Vertiefung parlamentarischer Asymmetrie in der reformierten Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 56(3), 430–456. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2015-3-430

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