Can EU judicial intervention increase polity scepticism? Quasi-experimental evidence from Spain

Figures & data

Figure 1. Treatment assignment and covariate balance.

Figure 2. Popular salience of treatment event.

Figure 3. Effect on euroscepticism.

Figure 4. Effect on dissatisfaction with democracy.

Figure 8. Testing for spurious time trends.

Table 1. Partisan moderation models.

	(1)	(2)
Variables	Euroscepticism	Dissat. w/ democracy
Treatment	0.40**	0.32**
	(0.17)	(0.16)
‘Constitutional’ voter	0.47**	−0.19
	(0.19)	(0.17)
Treatment *‘Constitutional’ voter	0.41	0.01
	(0.37)	(0.34)
Constant	3.55***	5.17***
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Observations	1481	1584
R-squared	0.02	0.00

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure 5. Placebo test (i): ITT if ECJ ruling on alternative outcomes.

Figure 6. Placebo test (ii): ITT of ECJ ruling in different member states.

Figure 7. Permutations on main outcomes and placebo.