Notes
1. ‘Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are heterogeneous’ (Rawls Citation1971, p. 554). Compare: ‘Human beings are thoroughly diverse’ (Sen Citation1992, p. 1).
2. Here, Sen parts ways with Rawls who in A Theory of Justice, Sen notes, supposes ‘there will be a unanimous choice of a unique set of “two principles of justice” in a hypothetical situation of primordial equality (he calls it “the original position”), where people's vested interests are not known to the people themselves. This presumes that there is basically only one kind of impartial argument satisfying the demands of fairness, shorn of vested interests. This, I would argue, may be a mistake’ (10).
3. See, for example, Peter on the idea of deliberative democracy (Citation2009).
4. To develop this conception, I have argued that having a personal identity (indeed a changing one) which one needs to manage is a central human functioning and a capability that people may be more or less successful in developing in the process of developing their many other capabilities (Davis Citation2009, Citation2011).
5. As reflected in related doubts about Sen's earlier concept of commitment, see e.g. Hausman (Citation2007) and Pettit (Citation2007), as well as Sen's reply (Citation2007, pp. 349–354).