Alternative consequences and asymmetry of results: their importance for policy decision making

ABSTRACT

In policy implementation, the knowledge that leads to its success is as necessary as the knowledge of its possible alternative paths. Cartwright and Hardie’s approach [(2012). Evidence-Based policy. A practical guide to doing it better. Oxford University Press.] accounts for the first but ignores the chance that a policy may ‘deviate’ from the desired outcome. The problem lies in whether these deviations lead to substantially negative consequences. The present paper offers a conceptual account meant to complement Cartwright and Hardie’s approach. It is argued that a policy maker’s decision should not be based exclusively on a policy’s chances of success, but also on the consequences of potential alternative results, that is, on what there is to gain or to lose if a policy succeeds or fails.

KEYWORDS:

• Policy implementation
• intervention
• asymmetry of results
• evidence-based policy

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Leonardo Ivarola has a BA in Economics and a Ph.D. in Philosophy, both at the University of Buenos Aires. He is currently assistant professor of “epistemology of the economy” at the University of Buenos Aires. He is assistant researcher at the Interdisciplinary Institute of Political Economy of Buenos Aires (University of Buenos Aires/CONICET).

Notes

1 In this regard, it is necessary to clarify that the inflationary record of the USA is quite different from that of Argentina. Since the 1990s, the USA’s inflation has not exceeded 4% annually, while in the last years in Argentina there have been periods with inflation approached 4% per month. Likewise, the cumulative inflation between 2000 and 2015 was 10.12% in the USA, while in recent years in Argentina the inflation rate of one semester is higher than this percentage.

2 It should be mentioned, however, that the decision to implement or not to implement a policy based on the asymmetry of results is associated with what in the philosophy of science is called ‘inductive risk’. According to Hempel (1965), there is an inductive risk when there is the chance of accepting a false hypothesis or of rejecting a true hypothesis. Something similar occurs here. On the one hand, there is the possibility of implementing a policy that does not accomplish the expected goals. On the other hand, there is the chance of not implementing a policy that could have been successful in the target system. Now, very often, such inductive risk is associated with the risk of non-epistemic consequences. And since non-epistemic consequences involve non-epistemic values, it is expected that non-epistemic values end up being a required part of the internal aspects of the policy and decision-making (see for instance Douglas, 2000). For reasons of space, this issue will not be addressed in the present paper.