ABSTRACT
Estimating two-step selection models, we find that more democratic governments are more likely to conclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and to agree to stricter investment provisions related to pre-establishment national treatment and investor–state dispute settlement in PTAs. This is surprising when considering the potentially high costs of litigation.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 Neumayer, Nunnenkamp, and Roy (Citationforthcoming) provide an exception, but they focus on BITs and do not cover the recent past when voter perceptions appear to have changed remarkably.
2 For details, see the Working Paper version. https://www.ifw-members.ifw-kiel.de/publications/democracies-cooperate-more-2013-even-where-it-threatens-to-bite/kwp_2004.pdf (accessed 3 November 2015).
3 Note that each pair of partner countries enters twice to obtain unbiased estimates for variables that are not defined pairwise.
4 http://mgmt5.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/_vti_bin/shtml.dll/POLCON/ContactInfo.html (accessed July 2015). Specifically, we draw on the variable POLCON which ranges from ‘0’ (no executive constraints) to ‘1’.
5 For the sake of brevity, the results for the selection equation are not shown here.
6 At the same time, close neighbours with a common border are less likely to conclude a PTA. A common religion and GATT/WTO membership are associated with a higher probability of a PTA.
7 The results in are based on annual estimations of the selection equation. We obtained similar results with pooled estimation of the selection equation (not shown).
8 In addition, the validity of Dist as one of our exclusion variables is affected when focusing on ISDS.
9 Note that this increase is almost exclusively due to particularly strict ISDS provisions. The flat and largely overlapping curves in reveal that few PTAs include weaker ISDS provisions.