Corruption in economics: a bibliometric analysis and research agenda

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Figure 1. Publications growth between 1968 (1^st paper) to 2019 of topic: Corruption in Economics

Figure 2. Citation network among journals generated by VOSviewer

Figure 3. Citation network among authors generated by VOSviwer

Figure 4. Keyword analysis to identify research areas in the literature through cartography analysis using VOSviwer

Figure 5. Research streams in the literature created by HistCite. *Top 70 influential articles with a minimum of 20 TLCs, resulting in the seven research streams listed in Table A3

Figure 6. Publication trends in the seven research streams between 1968 and 2019. *However, more extensive research started on the topic in the 1990 s

Table A1. Key methodological concepts and sample section process

(i)-Key bibliometric terms used in the method (Kim and McMillan 2008)
Terms	Explanation/Details
Co-Citation Analysis	This term means that the same content and topics in articles are citing each other.
Cartography Analysis	Also called keyword analysis, it is based on the repetition of keywords in articles.
HistCite Software	This programme is built to deal with the bibliometric data of ISI WOK. It accepts citation data as inputs and provides multiple outputs.
VOSviewer Software	Another program that accepts ISI WOK bibliometric data and gives multiple outputs.
(ii)-HistCite software key output patterns (HistCite Glossary 2018)
Pattern	Explanation/Details
PCREC	It shows the number of articles published on the topic: Corruption in Economics.
TLC	Total Local Citations: Denotes the number of times an article is cited by others in the sample literature.
TGC	Total Global Citations: Denotes the citations of an article based on the full ISI WOK count. An example is Becker (1968) in Table A3, which has the largest number of global citations in the ISI WOK).
TLC/t	Total Local Citations Per Year: Calculated as the TLC divided by time (i.e., Mauro 1995).
TGC/t	Total Global Citations Per Year: Represents the average citations per year (i.e., Becker 1968).
TLCe	Total Local Citations indicate the number of citations an article received during the last three years at the end of the period of the study. In our case, that was between January 2016 and December 2019.
TLCR	The total local cited references indicate how many times the references of the article or journal were cited by other articles in our sample of 4,488 articles.
(iii)- Sample selection process for bibliometric analysis (Bahoo, Alon, and Paltrinieri 2019)
Steps	Explanations/Details
Database for citation data	i. ISI Web of Knowledge (ISI WOK) ii. Available from 1945 and containing high-quality journals.
Keyword selection for literature in the database	i.18 keywords for corruption: ‘Corruption, Bribery, Bribe, Fraud, Crime, Criminal, Abuse, Manipulation, Extortion, Misconduct, Misrepresentation, Wrongdoing, Falsification, Criminal, Manipulating, Graft, Degradation, and Rent-Seeking.’ ii. Corruption keywords are searched in the database in combination with the words ‘Economics, Economic, and Economy.’
Keyword selection criteria	i. First step: Content analysis of several papers on corruption in economics to identify keywords. ii. Second step: Create synonyms for corruption. iii. Third step: Search ISI WOK using these synonyms combined with ‘Economics, Economic, and Economy.’
Key filters applied	(i) Article category: Economics. (ii) Search filters: Topic (Search keywords in title, abstract, or authors’ keywords). (iii) Paper type and language: Articles and English. (iv) Period of search: 1945 to December 2019 (1^st paper published in 1968).
Initial Sample	5,671
Final Sample for Bibliometric Analysis (Screening of irrelevant and overlapping articles by reading titles and abstracts).	4,488

Note: The table shows information about key bibliometric terms, HistCite software output patterns, and sample selection process for analysis.

Table A2. Influential aspects of the literature

Influential Journals					Influential Countries		Influential Institutions		Influential and Trending Articles				Influential Authors
Rank	Name of Journal^1	PCREC	Name of Journal^2	TLCR	Country^3	PCREC	Institution^4	PCREC	Articles^5	TLC/t	Articles^6	TGC/t	Authors^7	TGC
1	Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization	233	Journal of Economic Behaviour & Organization	638	USA	1626	NBER^8	175	(Mauro 1995)	17.92	(Becker 1968)	191.46	Gary S Becker^a	18,748
2	Applied Economics	171	Journal of Public Economics	565	UK	492	Harvard Univ	105	(Shleifer and Vishny 1993)	12.41	(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2012)	171.95	Susan Rose-Ackerman^b	8,032
3	Journal of Public Economics	169	Applied Economics	405	Germany	376	World Bank	85	(Treisman 2000)	10.7	(Mauro 1995)	100.8	Andrei Shleifer^c	5,296
4	Applied Economics Letters	134	Journal of Development Economics	367	Italy	334	University of Chicago	83	(Bardhan, 1997)	8.83	(Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004)	100.8	Simon Johnson^d	4,153
5	Economics Letters	131	Journal of Comparative Economics	320	Australia	204	MIT^9	65	(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2012)	7.79	(Faccio 2006)	68.14	Daron Acemoglu^e	4,024
6	American Economic Review	113	Economic Inquiry	316	Peoples R China	203	University of Pennsylvania	53	(Olken 2007)	6.31	(Djankov et al. 2003)	66.72	James. A Robinson^f	3,289
7	Journal of Development Economics	100	Economic Modelling	285	Canada	198	University of California Berkeley	52	(Ades & Tella)	6.1	(Treisman 2000)	62.65	Paolo Mauro^g	2,930
8	Economic Inquiry	95	American Economic Review	258	France	193	IZA-institute of labour Eco	51	(Olken and Pande 2012)	5.63	(Shleifer and Vishny 1993)	57.7	Robert W. Vishny^h	2,548
9	Journal of Comparative Economics	90	European Economic Review	258	Spain	187	Stanford University	48	(Svensson 2003)	5.29	(Van der Ploeg 2011)	52.89	Simeon Djankov^i	2,233
10	Economic Journal	83	Economic Journal	233	Netherland	150	CEPR^10	47	(SimeonDjankov et al. 2003)	5	(Engel 2011)	48.33	Steven D. Levitt^j	2,227
11	Games and Economic Behaviour	83	Applied Economics Letters	204	Ukraine	110	University of Michigan	45	(Ferraz and Finan 2008)	4.83	(Mian and Khwaja 2004)	41.27	Edward L. Glaeser^k	2,023

Note: The table identifies the most influential journals, countries, institutions, key articles/topics, and authors. *1,3 and 4 = sorted based P_CREC; 7 sorted based on TGC; 5 &6 are sorted based on TLC/t and TGL/t. 2 = sorted based on TLCR = Total local cited references denote the number of cited references of a journal in our sample of study 4488). ⁸NBER = National Bureau of Economic Research, ⁹CEPR = Centre of Economic Policy Research, ¹⁰MIT = Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *Influential authors affiliations: a = Colombia University, b = Yale University, c = Harvard University, d = MIT, e = MIT, f = University of Chicago, g = IMF, h = University of Chicago, i = World Bank Group, j = University of Chicago, k = Harvard University

Table A3. Key papers that create a citation map of the literature

Stream	Stream title	Key articles in each stream
1^st	The economic framework of crime and corruption	(Becker 1968), (Rose-Ackerman 1975), (Andvig and Moene 1990), (Sah 1991), (Basu, Bhattacharya, and Mishra 1992), (Levitt 1995a), (Levitt 1995b), (Ehrlich 1996), (Saha and Poole 2000), (Machin and Meghir 2004), (Imai, Katayama, and Krishna 2006), (Baltagi 2006), (Fisman and Miguel 2007), (Olken 2009), (Barr and Serra 2010), (Xu and Veld 2019), (Shleifer and Vishny 1993).
2^nd	The legal institutions and corruption	(Andvig and Moene 1990), (Grogger 1995), (Tirole 1996), (Keefer and Knack 1997) (Banerjee 1997), (Polinsky and Shavell 2001), (Devaraj and Patel 2017), (Li and Long 2017), (Li, Alon, and Wu 2017).
3^rd	The effect of corruption of aspects of national economics	(Macrae 1982), (Mauro 1995), (Mauro 1998), (Acemoglu and Verdier 1998), (Witt, Clarke, and Fielding 1998), (Friedman et al. 1999), (Mo 2001), (Lambsdorff 2003), (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004), (Olken 2006), (Fisman and Svensson 2007), (Olken and Pande 2012), (Franses and Groot 2015), (Alon, Li, and Wu 2016),
4^th	The combating and monitoring of corruption	(Lui 1986), (Besley and Mclaren 1993), (Mookherjee and Png 1995), (Harel and Segal 1999), (Rauch and Evans 2000), (May, Pyle, and Sommers 2002), (Olken 2007), (Ferraz and Finan 2008), (Olken 2009), (Meghir, Palme, and Schnabel 2012), (Bardhan 2017).
5^th	The determinants of corruption	(Cadot 1987), (Dey 1989), (Des and Tella 1997), (Bliss and Tella 1997), (Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999), (Ades and Di Tella 1999), (Treisman 2000), (Svensson, 2000), (Polinsky and Shavell 2001), (Swamy et al. 2001), (Knack 2001), (Donohue and Levitt 2001), (Duggan 2001), (Levitt 2004), (Trawick and Howsen 2006), (Lee and Holoviak 2006), (Glaeser and Saks 2006).
6^th	Political institutions and corruption	(Alam 1989), (Aidt, Dutta, and Sena 2008), (Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009), (Ferraz and Finan 2011), (Goel and Saunoris 2017), (Jiménez and Alon 2018), (Alon and Herbert 2009), (Jimenez et al. 2017).
7^th	The effect of corruption on firms	(Shleifer and Vishny 1994), (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000), (SimeonDjankov et al. 2003), (Svensson 2003), (Faccio 2006), (Goel, Budak, and Rajh 2014), (Beltrán 2015), (Dove 2017).

Note: The table shows the 70 top-cited papers that create the citation map in Figure 5. *Complete reference details of cited papers are provided in Appendix B.

Table A4. Summary of data sources, methods, and theoretical frameworks

Measurement of Corruption	Date Source	References
(i)-Data Sources
Corruption index	Business International (BI)-The Economist Intelligence Unit	(Mauro 1995), (Ades and Di Tella 1999), (Rauch and Evans 2000), (Treisman 2000).
Corruption index	Peter Neumann Collections in 1994.	Des and Tella 1997
Corruption Perception Index	Transparency International (TI)	(Treisman 2000), (Swamy et al., 2001), (Mo 2001), (SimeonDjankov et al. 2003), (Lambsdorff 2003), (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004), (Aidt, Dutta, and Sena 2008).
Corruption Index	International Country Risk Guide	(Mauro 1998), (Rauch and Evans 2000), (Friedman et al. 1999), (Swamy et al., 2001), (Faccio 2006), (Knack 2001).
Red Tape Index	Business and Environmental Risk Intelligence	(Rauch and Evans 2000)
Corruption Index	From Country Risk	(Keefer and Knack 1997)
Corruption Index	World Competitiveness Report	(Des and Tella 1997), (Ades and Di Tella 1999)
Corruption Index	World Bank Governance Indices	(Swamy et al., 2001), (Faccio 2006)
German Survey of Corruption	Survey	(Faccio 2006)
Bribe Payment survey of Firms	Ugandan Industrial Enterprise Survey	(Fisman and Svensson 2007)
Bribe Payment by Firms	World Business Environment Survey (WBES)	(Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009)
ii-Methods
Method		References
Qualitative Analysis		(Andvig and Moene 1990), (Basu, Bhattacharya, and Mishra 1992), (Besley and Mclaren 1993), (Shleifer and Vishny 1993), (Shleifer and Vishny 1994), (Mookherjee and Png 1995), (Ehrlich 1996), (Tirole 1996), (Bliss and Tella 1997), (Banerjee 1997), (Acemoglu and Verdier 1998), (Acemoglu and Verdier 1998), (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000), (Polinsky and Shavell 2001), (Glaeser and Saks 2006), (Sah 1991), (Saha and Poole 2000), (Xu and Veld 2019), (Harel and Segal 1999), (Horovitz and Segal 2007).
Ordinary Least Square-Regression		(Mauro 1995), (Keefer and Knack 1997), (Mauro 1998), (Ades and Di Tella 1999), (Des and Tella 1997), (Rauch and Evans 2000), (Treisman 2000), (Friedman et al. 1999), (Swamy et al. 2001), (Mo 2001), (SimeonDjankov et al. 2003), (Lambsdorff 2003), (Svensson 2003), (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004), (Olken 2006), (Fisman and Svensson 2007), (Fisman and Miguel 2007), (Ferraz and Finan 2008), (Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009), (Olken 2009), (Ferraz and Finan 2011), (Machin and Meghir 2004), (Imai, Katayama, and Krishna 2006), (Grogger 1995), (Knack 2001), (Donohue and Levitt 2001).
Randomized Field Experiment		(Olken 2007)
Literature Review		(Bardhan 2017)
Panel Regression		(Ades and Di Tella 1999), (Baltagi 2006), (Li and Long 2017), (Aidt, Dutta, and Sena 2008).
Jarque-Bera Measure		(Lambsdorff 2003)
Probit Regression		(Svensson 2003)
Economic Experiment		(Barr and Serra 2010)
iii-Theoretical Frameworks
Theory		References
Theory of Collective Reputations		(Tirole 1996)
Theory of Misgovernance		(Banerjee 1997)
Principal-Agent Theory		(Hindriks, Keen, and Muthoo 1999)
Schumpeter’s Theory of Economic Development		(Mo 2001)
Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement		(Polinsky and Shavell 2001)
Public Interest Theories of Regulation		(SimeonDjankov et al. 2003)
Public Choice View Theory		(SimeonDjankov et al. 2003)
Corporate Governance Theory		(Aidt, Dutta, and Sena 2008), (Knack 2001)
Political Agency Framework of Besley		(Ferraz and Finan 2011)
Economic Theory of Corruption		(Glaeser and Saks 2006)
Standard Economic Incentive Theory		(Olken and Pande 2012)

Note: The table shows the data sources, methods, and theoretical frameworks applied in the 70 papers that create the citation map (Figure 5).

Table A5. Future research questions

Stream	Sr. No	Reference	Research Questions/Explanation
1^st. The economic framework of crime and corruption	1	(Ehrlich 1996)	Is there any need to extend the market model of crime by analysing the hypothesis of positive and negative incentives empirically and the effect of punishment on the offenders in developing, emerging and developed economies in this era of digitalization?
2^nd The legal institutions and corruption	2	(Horovitz and Segal 2007)	How does ambiguity affect a person’s decision to commit a crime, and what is the role of ambiguity in the legal framework to combat crime?
	3	(Harel and Segal 1999)	How does the public perceive the certainty in criminal law and the efficiency of the criminal legal system in developing, emerging, and developed countries in the 21^st century?
3^rd the effect of corruption on aspects of national economics	4	(Bliss and Tella 1997)	Is corruption having any effect on the welfare of the economy and society in developing and emerging countries?
	5	(Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000)	What forms of corruption are most harmful and cost the most for the economy – bureaucratic corruption or private corruption?
4^th the combating and monitoring of corruption	6	(Fan, Lin, and Treisman 2009)	Are decentralization, centralization, and the appointment of honest officials useful measures to combat corruption?
	7	(Imai, Katayama, and Krishna 2006)	Is there a racial bias in arrests and convictions? Are habitual criminals indeed able to better evade arrest?
	8	(Zhong 2016)	How can we measure corruption in China? What is the relationship between corruption and the shadow economy in China?
5^th the determinants of corruption	9	(Acemoglu and Verdier 1998)	Does the concept of a free lunch exist in developing and emerging countries such as China? Are developing and emerging countries tolerant of corruption, and what are the costs and benefits of corruption and the enforcement of property rights?
	10	(Treisman 2000)	Do the cultural and religious traditions of countries cause high-level corruption?
	11	(Berdiev, Kim, and Chang 2013)	What is the effect of foreign remittances on the level of corruption, and what types of remittances have the most impact?
6^th the political institutions and corruption	12	(Ferraz and Finan 2008)	What is the effect of the public dissemination of audits about the corruption activities of politicians on the improvement of corporate governance and the reduction of corruption?
	13	(Ferraz and Finan 2011)	What is the impact of electoral accountability on governance and the voters’ welfare?
	14	(Strîmbu and González 2017).	What is the effect of transparency (the monitoring of public officials) on political corruption?
	15	(Okunlola 2018)	How do political regimes moderate the relationship between corruption and economic development?
7^th the effect of corruption on firms	16	(Tirole 1996)	Does the theory of collective reputations work as the aggregate of an individual’s (firm’s) reputation (level of corruption) in developing, emerging, and developed countries?
	17	(Bai et al. 2017)	Do firm growth and mobility help reduce the level of corruption at the country level internationally?
	18	(Thanh 2017)	What is the effect of country-level corruption on the firm’s capital structure?
	19	(Yu et al. 2019)	What is the effect of the political connections of a firm’s leadership on the level of corruption at the country level?
	20	(Yu et al. 2019)	Do anti-corruption efforts moderate the relationship between a firm’s political connections and R&D investments?

Note: The table shows 20 thought-provoking future research questions on the topics

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