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Abstract
This paper compares two periods of crisis in Greece separated by 70 years, the crisis surrounding the national elections and the plebiscite on the return of the Greek monarchy in 1946, and the referendum on the terms contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) of July 2015, and the international involvement in and reaction to these referenda. The inspirations for the paper, were the ways in which external forces attempted to direct their outcome, and the similarities in the ways in which in both periods, external forces attempted to frame the definition of the referenda in favour of their wider strategic objectives. The pressure placed on the Greek government, both from within Greece and from without, was also noteworthy, as was the rhetoric that was used both during and after both events. The paper concludes that in these two cases, rather than providing resolution to an issue, the referenda served mainly as a vehicle of protest, extremely susceptible to manipulation, leading to a situation worse than that which had preceded them.
Résumé
Notre objectif dans cet article est de comparer deux périodes de crise qui ont eu lieu en Grèce à 70 ans d’intervalle. D’une part celle ouverte par les élections nationales et le plébiscite sur le retour de la monarchie, en 1946, d’autre part celle provoquée par le référendum sur le mémorandum d’entente de juillet 2015. Nous nous penchons en particulier sur les ingérences extérieures dans ces référendums ainsi que les réactions qu’ils ont suscités au niveau international. Ce qui est frappant, c’est que dans les deux cas des acteurs extérieures ont tenté d’orienter les résultats du référendum et de formuler, en fonction de leurs objectifs stratégiques, la question soumise aux électeurs. Nous abordons aussi les pressions intérieures et extérieures sur le gouvernement grec, ainsi que la rhétorique utilisée pendant et après les deux événements. L'article conclut que, dans les deux cas, les référendums n’avaient pas pour but de résoudre le problème initial mais de canaliser le mécontentement populaire. Ces deux opérations, particulièrement sujettes à manipulation, débouchèrent sur des situations pires que celles qui les avaient précédées.
Acknowledgements
The inspiration for this paper lies in a presentation I gave at the London School of Economics in 2015, and the comments I received form colleagues there, to whom I owe a great debt of gratitude. I would also very much like to thank Professor Mark Bevir of UC Berkeley for his helpful comments on the re-drafting of this article, Professors Jeroen Dewulf, John Connelly and Daniel Sargent for their comments and suggestions, and Professor Johan Van der Walt of the University of Luxembourg Law faculty for his insights. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer who also offered very helpful comments and revisions to an earlier draft.
Notes
1. Though ELAS had violated the Varkiza Accord by not surrendering all of their weapons as they had agreed, this article focuses on the British and Greek government violation of the Accord by reversing the order of the Elections and plebiscite. Additionally, in 1976’s ‘the Struggle for Greece’, C.M. Woodhouse, citing both British Ambassador Leeper and KKE central committee member Kosta Karagiorgis, states that EAM/ELAS’ hiding of weapons after Varkiza was an insignificant factor in the progression of the Civil War, since the British were able to uncover most of them shortly after Varkiza was signed (Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 137).
2. For a work that examines the sources of a state's political legitimacy, see: Barnard, Democratic Legitimacy.
3. Details about the contents of the treaty can be found in Richter, "British Intervention in Greece.”
4. British Embassy to Department of State (868.01/397) April 24, 1943, FRUS 1943 Vol. IV, The Near East and Africa, 137–8. Cited in: Paravantes, Britain, The United States and Greece after WWII, 28; Sfikas, The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War 1945 to 1949, 57–8.
5. Sfikas, The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War 1945 to 1949, 50.
6. Woodhouse, The Struggle for Greece, 153. Why were stable conditions for the plebiscite important to the British if not to secure the desired outcome of securing the return of the monarchy?
7. Ibid., 76–7.
8. “Greece: Government and Elections,” No. 442, Briefing Book Paper, Washington, June 29, 1945, in United States Department of State/Foreign Relations of the United States: diplomatic papers: the Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. I. http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=turn&entity=FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv01.p0784&id=FRUS.FRUS1945Berlinv01&isize=M. Though the Greek government officially requested support/approval for holding the elections first, it is clear from the archival records that such a request was made at the insistence of the British with the knowledge and support of the United States.
9. Macveagh to Byrnes (886), August 11, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 136; MacVeagh to Byrnes (846), August 13, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 140; Byrnes to Harriman, USSR (1861), August 18, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 143.
10. C.M. Woodhouse, The Apple of Discord, 253.
11. King George to Byrnes (CFM Files – Lot M 88, Box 31) September 22, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 160–1. There is a counter view stating that King George protested because the Labour government was not enamoured with the idea of the king returning to Greece and wanted to delay it. This interpretation is not consistent with an in-depth reading of the cabinet papers of the time. It is important to note that Labour’s view of the Greek king was insignificant in terms of its effect on policy formulation. Atlee and Bevin, especially the latter, were determined to restore Britain to its pre-war status. Maintaining Greece in Britain’s sphere of influence at this time was a key part of that plan. Though they were socialists, they were British first and socialists second, and a reading of the cabinet papers of the time reveal this clearly. The reversal of the order of the plebiscite and elections was to give time to secure the outcome they desired. See: Kenneth Morgan, Labour in Power, 62–78, see also: Sfikas, The British Labour Government and the Greek Civil War 1945 to 1949, 55–7 (“Britain as a great power still”); 57–8 (“Labour’s position on King George II”).
12. Telegrams between Foreign Office and Department of State, August 13 to 18, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 141–3. MacVeagh also informed Secretary Byrnes that the few Communist and EAM representatives that had been part of the Greek government had begun to resign. This was possibly due to the Soviet government’s refusal to participate in the supervision of Greek elections and may have been interpreted as a sign that the Soviets would assist them, at least indirectly, by not supporting the current government or the Anglo-American plans for Greece.
13. Byrnes to Harriman, USSR (1861) August 18, 1945, FRUS 1945, Vol. VIII, The Near East and Africa, 143. Note: The Soviets did not adopt a 'friendly attitude’, and refused to participate.
14. This is not to argue against holding elections in these countries, just that in times of great instability, they can provoke even more instability if not held at the proper time with committed participation from all sides.
15. It is important to note that the KKE abstention did not alter the outcome of the elections themselves, but rather it indicated a greater level of support for the current system of government. The main point of the article here is to show that the type of manipulation in which the British and Americans engaged would not have affected the outcome of elections. The majority of the Greek population did not wish for the country to become a communist nation. However, their actions allowed the KKE to argue that the system was 'rigged' against them, further justifying a return to an armed struggle.
16. Paravantes, Britain, The United States and Greece, Chapter 4.
17. Economists trained in the Chicago School of liberal economic thought, made famous by economists like Milton Friedman, or the Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism, not only advocate less government intervention in the economy, but, some critics have said, associate morality with economic practices and performance.
18. The purpose of this section is not to reject the idea that reform is needed in Greece: indeed, the country is in desperate need of economic reform in a number of areas. However, the application of the reforms advocated by the 'market fundamentalists' have been disastrous for Greece, and this section will explain how the referendum of July 2015 provided justification for their ongoing application, in spite of their demonstrated lack of success.
19. The questions was to be answered ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. It read as follows: ‘Should the plan of agreement be accepted, which was submitted by the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, in the Eurogroup of 25.06.2015, and comprises two parts, which constitute their unified proposal? The first document is entitled “Reforms for the completion of the Current Program and Beyond’ and the second ‘Preliminary Debt Sustainability Analysis.’
20. Transcript of President Jean-Claude Juncker's press conference on Greece (Brussels, 29 June 2015). http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-5274_en.htm
21. Mark Deen and Helene Fouquet, ‘Hollande Says Greece’s Referendum Will Determine Euro Membership’, Bloomberg Online, June 29, 2015: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015–062015-06-29/hollande-says-greece-s-referendum-will-determine-euro-membership.
22. Right after the referendum results were known Deijsselbloem made this statement. He also hinted at harsher conditions to come, ‘for recovery of the Greek economy, difficult measures and reforms are inevitable.’ At the emergency Eurozone summit from 12 July to 13 July 2015, these predictions were born out, after reaching a preliminary agreement. Deijsselbloem stated that the Greek Parliament had to ratify the preliminary conditions of the agreement by Wednesday, 15 July 2015. He then stated that the rest of the Eurozone member parliaments would also vote, but that each member was sovereign and has its own timetable to pass such legislation. For a partial transcript of Deijsselbloem’s statements see: ‘Greek Deal Reached after Marathon Talks’, Sigmalive (13 July 2015). http://www.sigmalive.com/en/news/greece/132071/greek-deal-reached-after-marathon-talks#. see also Jean-Claude Junker’s speech: cited earlier, note 21.
23. With a 62% voter turnout, the results were decisively for the ‘no’ side at about 61.32%. This was a major difference from what the polls and media were predicting, and went against the wishes of Greece’s external creditors.
24. Stiglitz, The Euro, 124.
25. ‘Though they would most certainly deny it, the ECB’s decision to shut off funds to the Greek banking system in the summer of 2015 was an intensely political act.’ Stiglitz, The Euro, 59.
26. Valentina Za, “Varoufakis says Greece Committed to Reforms, Rules out More Austerity,” Reuters.com, May 26, 2015. Available from: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/26/us-greece-austerity-varoufakis-idUSKBN0OB0FZ20150526?mod=related&channelName=ousivMolt.
27. http://www.heritage.org/index/country/greece. This site lists Greece as a mostly un-free market. The reforms that are said to be needed include ‘openness, freedom, competitiveness’. However, these terms are subjective, and often used by Market fundamentalists to describe economies that are based on a different model. The rankings support a particular economic school of thought to which I do not subscribe as a historian. I do not feel that the solutions they propose are supported by historical evidence. Furthermore, by calling for the Greek economy to become more 'competitive' they have also called for lower wages, which in turn they argue will lower prices, thereby restoring competitiveness. This has not occurred. Since 2014, though wages in Greece have declined over 16%, and pensions on the average are below the poverty line, prices have remained consistent, which, when combined with lowering wages, means that they have increased relatively. For a detailed explanation of how and why this occurs, see: Stiglitz, The Euro, 347–9. For a list of Greek economists in favour of continuing Greek membership in the Eurozone, and certain reforms, see: George-Marios Angeletos, MIT; Costas Azariadis, Washington University in St. Louis; Costas Arkolakis, Yale University; George Constantinides, University of Chicago; Harris Dellas, University of Bern; Nicholas Economides, New York University; Michalis Haliassos, Goethe University Frankfurt; Yannis Ioannides, Tufts University; Costas Meghir, Yale University; Stylianos Perrakis, Concordia University; Emmanuel Petrakis, University of Crete; Christopher Pissarides, London School of Economics, Nobel Prize in Economics; Vasiliki Skreta, University College London; Thanasis Stengos, University of Guelph. Statement on Grexit, Final, English Version. http://greekeconomistsforreform.com/wp-content/uploads/Statement-on-Grexit-2017-English-Final.pdf. Although these economists argue for Greece to remain in the Eurozone, they also state that by doing so, there may be 'the possibility to continue negotiating with our European partners for better terms, for growth-friendly policies, and for debt restructuring’. (p. 2) They also stated that Greece's European partners have focused primarily on fiscal issues, rather than the deep structural reforms the economy needs in order to be truly free and competitive, and that such policies have until the present ensured that 'the country has been trapped in the “black hole” of endless austerity without an expectation of growth. The eight-year crisis has subjected people and institutions to unbearable strain. The reduction of the standard of living is merciless and unprecedented. We need to exit from this black hole. This requires a change of course and reforms inside the Euro' (2); see also http://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/production_model_research_dianeosis_final.pdf.
28. Stiglitz, The Euro, 24–6.
29. For example: Paul Krugman, "Europe’s Impossible Dream" NY Times Op-Ed, July 20, 2015). http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/opinion/paul-krugman-europes-impossible-dream.html?rref==collection%2Fcolumn%2Fpaul-krugman&action==click&contentCollection==opinion®ion==stream&module==stream_unit&contentPlacement==7&pgtype==collection&_r==0; and Joseph Stiglitz, "Europe Must Back Away from Greek Austerity Cliff," USA Today Opinion, July 7, 2015, http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/07/07/greece-crisis-referendum-eu-austerity-column/29763347/. see also: http://greekeconomistsforreform.com/. As stated in n. 21, many of these economists differ from Krugman and Stiglitz only in their stance on the referendum (arguing for a 'yes' vote). Many here call for similar reforms to the Euro and to Greece's economy, as outlined by the former, deriding the catastrophe that austerity-related policies have wrought thus far. See also: “Greece Debt Crisis: Varoufakis says Bailout 'Won't Work’,” August 12, 2015, partial transcript of an interview with BBC One: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-33880217.
30. Georges Siotis, “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose.” http://greekeconomistsforreform.com/wp-content/uploads/Plus-c%CC%A7a-change.pdf.
31. Gikas A. Hardouvelis (University of Piraeus), Keynote Address entitled: "Greece & Europe: Beyond the Financial Crisis," Harvard University Center for European Studies in the 2nd Annual Summit on the Future of Europe (September 22–23, 2015), http://greekeconomistsforreform.com/wp-content/uploads/Hardouvelis_Summary_ENG_Harvard-lecture.pdf.
32. After winning the referendum, SYRIZA did something inexplicable if they had truly desired to win it in the first place, and signed an even harsher agreement than the one they had asked the Greek people to vote on. This shows how in the summer of 2015, the referendum was used both within Greece and outside, for different political purposes. Within Greece, it was, at least officially, supposed to present SYRIZA with a stronger mandate for the negotiations with the foreign creditors. For an alternative /contentious explanation of events immediately preceding and following the referendum see: Varoufakis, Adults in the Room, 443–74. With this work, he has gone on record stating that he never intended to pull Greece out of the Eurozone, and that the 'no' vote for which he campaigned was one which had as its objective achieving a manageable compromise with Greece's creditors.
33. Four months before the referendum SYRIZA planned to take funds from pension funds to pay creditors. Since the referendum, Greek pensioners have experienced long delays in collecting them; see: Luke Hurst, “Greece Likely to Raid Pensions and EU Subsidies to Meet IMF Payments,” Newsweek online, March 3, 2015, available from http://www.newsweek.com/greece-likely-raid-pensions-and-eu-subsidies-meet-imf-payments-311080; “SYRIZA Built Surplus By Delaying Pensions, Curbing Investments,” October 9, 2017, available from https://www.thenationalherald.com/177604/syriza-built-surplus-delaying-pensions-curbing-investments/.
34. This policy has been labelled by Joseph Stiglitz as “Market Fundamentalism;” Stiglitz, The Euro, 24–6.
35. For example, former Italian PM Mario Monti stated that in Germany, economics was perceived as a subfield of moral philosophy. See: “Germany and Economics: Of Rules and Order. German Ordoliberalism has had a Big Influence on Policy during the Euro Crisis,” The Economist, May 9, 2015; available from https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21650565-german-ordoliberalism-has-had-big-influence-policy-during-euro-crisis-rules-and-order.
36. The fact that a neo-Nazi party is represented in the Greek Parliament today, after the legacy of the Wehrmacht in Greece is well known, is a testament to the instability created by such crises.
37. Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy;” Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination; Green, The Authority of the State; and Heywood, A. “Political Ideologies: an Introduction.”