Democracy promotion in Africa: the institutional context

Abstract

Democracy is seen by many as a viable means to rebuild the legitimacy of African states. However, African democracy is often based on a particular set of institutions which tend to concentrate power in the executive. A powerful president operates in a context of a minimal separation of powers, with few possibilities to restrain the executive, and a highly majoritarian party-political landscape. Democratic reforms and democracy assistance policies were first directed primarily at multiparty elections and political parties. Later donors have shifted to a broader approach of good governance and human rights. However, both the narrow electoral and the broader good governance and human rights approaches do not address sufficiently the institutional context of multi-party competition, which is characterized by the fusion of powers and a powerful presidency. This is a serious flaw which also limits the impact of current democracy promotion policies. This contribution suggests that democracy promoters could address this institutional gap by advocating for institutional reforms through which accountability in Africa may be increased, notably through greater inclusion of parliament and interest groups and of civil society actors in policy-making. Moreover, donors can set an example by introducing such reforms in the donor–recipient policy dialogue process they themselves conduct.

Keywords:

• democracy promotion
• Africa
• institutions
• hybrid regimes
• presidentialism

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the anonymous referees and editors for their useful comments and suggestions.

Notes

See for Europe, Youngs, ‘What Has Europe Been Doing?’, 160.

See two comprehensive studies: Ottaway, Democracy Challenged; and Carothers, Confronting the Weakest Link.

See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A World of Difference.

See van Cranenburgh, ‘International Policies’, 95.

As argued by the present author, see note 4.

I am limiting my discussion to the political system at the national level, leaving aside the important issue of decentralizing power to lower levels of government. For a more broad theoretical discussion on institutional design from the perspective of power concentration versus dispersion, see MacIntyre, The Power of Institutions.

Lijphart, ‘Patterns of Democracy’, 1999, 301.

See Linz, ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’; Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies; Elgie, ‘The Classification of Regime Types’; and Elgie, ‘What is Semi-Presidentialism?’; O'Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability’; Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Choices’; Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa; and van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Man Rule’.

See Ottaway, Democracy Challenged, 134. The focus on agency is evident in studies on Latin American ‘pacted transitions’, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; and Huntington, The Third Wave.

Ottaway, Democracy Challenged, 134.

See Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments; Hyden, African Politics; van de Walle, ‘Presidentialism and Clientelism’.

See Barkan, ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’; and Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’.

See also van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Man Rule’.

Bratton, ‘Formal Versus Informal Institutions’, 98.

See Posner and Young, ‘The Institutionalization of Political Power’; and Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’.

O'Donnell, ‘Horizontal Accountability’.

A notable exception is the study of Barkan, ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’.

Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’.

For the concept ‘hyperpresidentialism’ as applied by some authors to Russia and France, (see Elgie 2007, ‘What is Semi-presidentialism’, 3 and 9). It denotes extremely powerful presidencies in semi-presidential systems.

See Elgie, ‘The Classification of Regime Types’; and Siaroff, ‘Comparative Presidencies’. For a fuller discussion see van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Man Rule’.

Thus, Shugart and Carey defined a new category applicable to many African systems called ‘president-parliamentary’, which they also called ‘the confused system’. See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.

See van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Man Rule’.

See Elgie, ‘What is Semi-presidentialism’, 10.

See Budge, ‘Great Britain and Ireland’; and Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

See Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.

See also Nijzink et al., ‘Can Parliaments Enhance the Quality of Democracy’; and Barkan, ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’.

Van Cranenburgh, ‘Restraining Executive Power’, 57.

See Barkan, ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’, 127.

Ibid., 127–9.

See also the conclusions in Mohamed Salih, African Parliaments, 250.

For dissolution power of presidents see van Cranenburgh, Restraining Executive Power, 53. For veto power, see van Cranenburgh and Bureo, ‘“Big Men” Rule: Presidential Power’.

See Barkan, ‘Legislatures on the Rise?’, 129–30.

For the comparative scheme see Siaroff, ‘Comparing Presidencies’.

For the application to Africa see van Cranenburgh, ‘Big Man Rule’, 964–5. Fully liberal democracies were those countries with Freedom House scores of 1 to 2.5.

That donors primarily target countries which are partial, mere electoral or pseudo-democracies is not only logical (since in fully liberal democracy such support is not necessary, whereas in fully authoritarian systems, such support is not possible), but may also be inferred empirically from the fact that Europe overwhelmingly targets Africa in democracy promotion (see Youngs, What Has Europe Been Doing?, 160) and the fact that most African countries belong in these categories. See Diamond, Developing Democracy, 280; and van Cranenburgh, Big Man Rule, 964.

See Elgie, ‘Variations on a Theme’; and ‘What is Semi-presidentialism’, 10–11.

This can be read in the table on powers in the semi-presidential regimes (type 5 regimes), see Siaroff, Comparing Presidencies, 300.

See for example Linz, ‘The Perils of Presidentialism’; and Lijphart, ‘Constitutional Choices’.

See Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies.

Van Cranenburgh, ‘Restraining Executive Power’, 56–60, and the tables on pp. 58 and 61.

These findings may seem paradoxical in light of Lindberg's findings on the proliferation of parties in African party systems (particularly in proportional electoral systems). However, this fragmentation is predominantly visible among the opposition and is combined with one-party dominance. See Lindberg, ‘Consequences of Electoral Systems’.

See also with regard to unchanged presidential powers Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’, 110.

See van Cranenburgh, ‘Restraining Executive Power’, 56.

Ibid.

See Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’, 110.

See IDEA, Democracy in Development, 29–30.

See also Youngs, ‘What Has Europe Been Doing?’.

This combination can be seen in Europe's approach. See Youngs, ‘What Has Europe Been Doing?’, 162, and also applies to the Dutch government's approach. See van Cranenburgh, ‘International Policies’.

See IDEA, Democracy in Development, 37.

Ottaway, Democracy Challenged, 206–12.

Burnell, ‘Political Parties, International Party Assistance and Globalisation’, 23.

See also Carothers' notion of ‘institutional modeling’ by democracy promoters in Aiding Democracy Abroad.

A good example on the systematic incorporation of political conditions in the aid relationships of the EU is visible in the Treaty of Cotonou, articles 8,3 and 11,3.

All state parties in 1993 agreed to the universality and indivisibility of human rights, and political rights inherent in democracy. See paragraph 8 and 10 of the Vienna Declaration, reprinted in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 11, no. 3 (1993), 346–69.

See Booth, ‘Missing Links’, 3–5. Booth argues that the PRSP policy process has been largely ‘technocratic’. The whole discussion about ‘participation’ in the PRSP policy process has focussed on the inclusion of civil society (mainly NGOs). It is rather astonishing that parliament or parliamentary committees are not systematically included in this process.

For a broader argument see MacIntyre's model to find an optimal balance between the decisiveness created by power concentration and the consensus and stability created by power dispersion. See MacIntyre, The Power of Institutions.

See also Prempeh, ‘Presidents Untamed’.