Of inequality and irritation: new agendas and activism in Malaysia and Singapore

Abstract

Democratization may best be understood in terms of movement towards fair representation and empowerment across all society. Electoral authoritarian, or “hybrid”, regimes fall far short of this mark, but not identically so. Malaysia and Singapore, quintessential hybrid regimes, demonstrate well how specific institutional configurations matter. As socio-economic grievances meet with new space for articulation, both these states have seen efforts to press liberalization from the grassroots up, by opening access to policy agendas or bringing new voices to the table. Those efforts span both institutional and non-institutional domains, from electoral mobilization, to mass protests for institutional reform, to endeavours to reshape relations between voters and parties. Available now across classes and cleavages to an atypical extent, the spread and scope of such tactics begs a reassessment of space and options for voice in specific illiberal orders. The progress of these efforts informs our understanding of participation and contestation in persistently, but differently, hybrid Malaysia and Singapore, with implications for our understanding of regime types more broadly.

Keywords:

• Malaysia
• Singapore
• electoral authoritarianism
• mobilization

Acknowledgement

My thanks to Eva Hanson and Kevin Hewison for organizing the pair of workshops on “Challenging Inequalities: Contestation and Regime Change in East and Southeast Asia” with which this article originated, and to them, the other workshop participants, Aurel Croissant, and the journal's reviewers for their incisive and helpful feedback.

Notes on contributor

Meredith L. Weiss is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University at Albany, State University of New York. Her most recent publications include Student Activism in Malaysia: Crucible, Mirror, Sideshow (Cornell SEAP/NUS Press, 2011), Electoral Dynamics in Malaysia: Findings from the Grassroots (editor, ISEAS/SIRD, 2013), and Global Homophobia: States, Movements, and the Politics of Oppression (co-editor, University of Illinois Press, 2013).

Notes

1. Dahl, Polyarchy, 1.

2. Ibid., 5–8.

3. Only these two states have endured from among seven “multiparty, electoral, but undemocratic regimes” worldwide in the 1960s–1970s. Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” 23.

4. Ibid., 24.

5. Levitsky and Way, “Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” 53–4.

6. Schmitter and Karl, “What Democracy Is,” 76.

7. Case, “Southeast Asia's Hybrid Regimes.”

8. I am not the first to note a link between economic decline and authoritarian collapse, but most of that literature is fairly agnostic as to mechanisms (for example, Przeworksi and Limongi, “Political Regimes,” 62). My approach is in line with that of Lust (“Why Now”), in proposing the concatenation of micro- and meso-level changes, but where regime hybridity tempers strategies on both sides; I attribute, too, greater causal power to extra-electoral politics than most works on electoral authoritarian regime maintenance or change (for example, Levitsky and Way, “Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”).

9. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 42–3.

10. Ibid., 109–10.

11. George, “Consolidating Authoritarian Rule,” 133.

12. Jones and Brown, “Singapore and the Myth.”

13. Carlson and Turner, “Public Support,” 226–7.

14. See the IDEA Voter Turnout Website: www.idea.int/vt.

15. For instance, the Singapore state coaxes more active citizenship (Lee, “Politics of Civil Society,” 107) and former Prime Minister Mahathir pillories Malay lassitude in The Malay Dilemma (1970).

16. For example, Slater, Ordering Power, Lijphartian consociational readings, and various encomia to (or screeds against) Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad, in particular. A full discussion of the origins of these states' specific hybrid forms, and why elements of the “leviathan” Slater proposes have outlasted the threats that inspired it, is beyond the scope of this discussion.

17. A key thread in Malaysia is illiberal, demanding exclusive Malay-Muslim privileges. However, its staunchest proponents on the ballot in 2013 were defeated, whereas paladins of a more liberal order prospered, implying relative support.

18. Fetzer, “Election Strategy,” 140–2. Polling day must be between 9 and 55 days after nomination day, but hovers at the low end of that range.

19. For instance, Mutalib, “Constitutional-Electoral Reforms”; Rodan, “Preserving the One-Party State.”

20. Ganesan, “Singapore in 2009,” 254.

21. Lee, “Politics of Civil Society,” 105.

22. Garry Rodan offers a particularly useful typology of modes of participation, defining state-sponsored and autonomous modes, at the individual and collective levels, to capture the full scope of state–society relations. Rodan, “Southeast Asian Activism,” 24–6.

23. For a visual mapping of issues, see “Singapore GE2011 Tracker,” http://ge.swarm.is/.

24. Gomez, “Citizen Journalism”; Time, May 6, 2011.

25. Mahtani, “In Singapore”; she references the site http://sgpartyti.me.

26. See Au's blog, Yawning Bread: http://yawningbread.wordpress.com/2013/11/27/agc-versus-me-the-2013-round/.

27. Lee, “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong.”

28. Statistics Singapore, “Key Household Income Trends,” 12; OECD, Divided We Stand, 22.

29. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG, accessed March 29, 2014.

30. See Cherian George's blog post, http://www.airconditionednation.com/2011/05/15/ge2011-aftermath.

31. Rodan, “Civil Society,” 172.

32. Singapore has the greatest degree of electoral disproportionality in the region, averaging around 22% since 1968; Malaysia ranks a far-off second. Croissant, “Electoral Politics,” 329.

33. Tinker, “Malayan Elections,” 264–6, 280–1.

34. Lee, “Steadily Amplified,” 8–10.

35. Weiss, “Consociational Model.”

36. See Weiss, “Malaysia's 13th General Elections.”

37. Economic Planning Unit, “Addressing Persistent,” 58.

38. Gomez, Saravanamuttu, and Maznah, “Malaysia's New Economic Policy,” 10.

39. See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. The CIA (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html) ranks Singapore (47.8) and Thailand (53.6) even worse, offering newer (December 2012) data for Singapore; the World Bank assigns Thailand a Gini of 40.0 for that same year, which trend data on both websites suggest is correct.

40. Lee, “Is Inequality in Malaysia Really Going Down?”

41. For instance, Lee, “Quo Vadis,” 47.

42. Ahmad, ‘Political Dimensions.”

43. See Rathina Pandi, “Blogging and Political Mobilization.”

44. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture.

45. For example, Chan, “Parliamentary Politicians.”

46. For example, Chandra, Protector?

47. Loh Kok Wah, “Engaging the 2004 General Election,” 117.

48. Slater, Ordering Power.

49. Tan, “Who's Afraid.”

50. Lee, “Civil Society,” 109–10.

51. Malaysia's population is 67.4% bumiputera, 24.6% Chinese, 7.3% Indians, and 0.7% “other,” although actual proportions vary by state, especially in East Malaysia: in Sabah, Kadazan/Dusun comprise 24.5% of the population; in Sarawak, Iban are 30.3%. Political patterns differ in Sabah and Sarawak, with both state-specific and national parties, rampant “money politics,” and a less stable party system.

52. Simon Kemp, blog post: http://wearesocial.net/blog/2012/01/social-digital-mobile-singapore/.

53. Simon Kemp, blog post: http://wearesocial.net/blog/2012/01/social-digital-mobile-malaysia/.

54. George, Contentious Journalism, 4.

55. Habermas, “Public Sphere,” 49.

56. Weiss, “New Media.”

57. Crowd-counts for the largest, in April 2012, range from 20,000 by the Home Minister (New Straits Times, April 28, 2012) to Bersih's own (unrealistic) 250,000 estimate (http://www.bersih.org/?p=4920).

58. Saravanamuttu, “Political Impact.”

59. Rahim, Latiffah, and Ali, “Citizenship Norms,” 387.

60. Merdeka Center, “National Youth Survey 2008.”

61. Rahim, Latiffah, and Ali, “Citizenship Norms,” 388.

62. Among citizens, 74.1% Chinese, 13.4% Malay, 9.2% Indian, and 3.3% “Others” (up from 1.4% in 2000), http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/popn/c2010acr.pdf.

63. Per the census, apart from Singapore, the most common places of birth among citizens and permanent residents are Malaysia (10.2%), China/Hong Kong/Macau (4.6%), India/Pakistan/Bangladesh/Sri Lanka (3.3%), and Indonesia (1.4%).

64. Fetzer, “Election Strategy,” 147–8.

65. Ibid., 150–1.

66. Ibid., 758–9.

67. Fetzer, “Election Strategy,” 136.

68. Ortmann, “Singapore,” 37–41; Weiss, “Diversity, Rights, and Rigidity.”

69. See the organizers' Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/events/138310433012844/.

70. Kesavapany, “Reflections.”

71. Lee, “Constitutional Implications,” 35–38.

72. Singapore Elections Department, http://www.eld.gov.sg/.

73. Case, “Southeast Asia's Hybrid Regimes,” 217.

74. Ibid., 224–5.

75. Mauzy, “Challenge to Democracy,” 67.

76. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, 42–3.

77. Ibid., 104–5.