When actions speak louder than words: examining collective political protests in Central Asia

Abstract

What explains the dynamics of contentious collective political action in post-Soviet Central Asia? How do post-Soviet Central Asian citizens negotiate the tensions between partaking in and abstaining from elite-challenging collective protests? By analysing cross-national attitudes in two Central Asian states, this article (1) systematically analyses the variation in collective protests by testing rival macro-, meso-, and micro-level theories; (2) reintroduces a conceptual and empirical distinction between low-risk and high-risk collective protests; and (3) examines the conditions under which individuals participate in two distinct types of elite-challenging collective actions. Three conclusions are reached. First, the evidence suggests that nuanced consideration of multi-level theoretical perspectives is necessary to explain contingencies of elite-challenging actions. Second, economic grievances and resource mobilization emerge as leading factors driving both low-risk and high-risk protests. Third, Islamic religiosity and social networking robustly predict participation in high-risk collective action.

Keywords:

• contentious politics
• collective action
• Kazakhstan
• the Kyrgyz Republic
• Central Asia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributor

Dilshod Achilov is an assistant professor of political science at East Tennessee State University. His research focuses on the dynamics of contentious politics, civil society, comparative democratization, and politics in the Islamic world. His works on this topic have appeared in Journal of Civil Society, Problems of Post Communism, Asia Policy, and other international peer reviewed journals.

Notes

1. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti, Making Democracy Work; Putnam, Bowling Alone.

2. Shaykhutdinov, “Accommodation of Islamic Religious Practices.”

3. Schenkkan, “Kazakhstan.”

4. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, Dynamics of Contention, 5.

5. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 2; Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 4.

6. Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, “The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour,” 1.

7. See, for instance, Welzel, Inglehart, and Deutsch, “Social Capital, Voluntary Associations.”

8. Vairel, “Protesting in Authoritarian Situations.”

9. Shaykhutdinov and Achilov, “Islam, Islamism and Collective Action in Central Asia.”

10. BBC, “Kazakh Oil Strike.”

11. Human Rights Watch, Kazakhstan: Allow Peaceful Protests; Human Rights Watch, “World Report 2012: Kazakhstan.”

12. Lillis, “Kazakhstan: Almaty Police Arrest Anti-Devaluation Protesters.”

13. The public outrage was particularly pronounced as the National Bank chairman had previously denied any possibility of currency devaluation.

14. Al-Shibeeb, “Lace Underwear Ban Irks Kazakh Women.”

15. Abdurasulov, “What Is Driving Kyrgyzstan's Protest Culture?”

16. Ryabkov, “The North–South Cleavage and Political Support in Kyrgyzstan.”

17. Hanks, “Crisis in Kyrgyzstan.”

18. Saralayeva, “Hundreds Storm Office of Canadian Centerra Mine in Kyrgyzstan, 55 Wounded in Clashes.”

19. Ibid.

20. In conceptualizing the level of risk in collective protests, I draw from McAdam's (“Recruitment to High-Risk Activism”) prominent study on Freedom Summer events.

21. McAdam, “Recruitment to High-Risk Activism,” 67.

22. The WVS database does not clearly specify the boycott type utilized in the survey. My framing focuses on the political dimension of boycotting. Although the rate of boycotts is extremely rare, a few examples exist. In Kazakhstan, for instance, the opposition called for boycotting the national elections in 2011. Similarly, Kyrgyz activists in Osh boycotted the parliamentary elections following Ruziyev's arrest in 2005.

23. Goldstone and Tilly, “Treat (and Opportunity),” 128.

24. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.

25. Achilov and Shaykhutdinov, “State Regulation of Religion and Radicalism in the Post-Communist Muslim Republics”; Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, 10–11.

26. Foweraker and Landman, Citizenship Rights and Social Movements; Rootes, Environmental Protest in Western Europe; Tarrow, Power in Movement; Shaykhutdinov, “Accommodation of Islamic Religious Practices and Democracy in the Post-Communist Muslim Republics.”

27. Brockett, “The Structure of Political Opportunities and Peasant Mobilization in Central America”; Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel; Kitschelt, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protests.”

28. Gurr, “A Causal Model of Civil Strife’; Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

29. Goodwin, No Other Way Out.

30. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena.”

31. Although data limitation inhibits testing for possible effects of regional diffusion in this study, modular diffusion is an important factor to be considered in future research.

32. Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions,” 287.

33. Radnitz, Wheatley, and Zurcher, “The Origins of Social Capital.”

34. McCarthy and Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.”

35. Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena.”

36. Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, “The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour.”

37. Passy and Giugni, “Life-Spheres, Networks, and Sustained Participation in Social Movements.”

38. Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy; McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty.

39. Radnitz, Weapons of the Wealthy, 21; Radnitz substantiates “subversive clientelism” by illustrating how independent elites in Kyrgyzstan extend “investments” or donations targeted to fix infrastructure or fund construction projects in communities or by supporting public demonstrations.

40. McGlinchey, Chaos, Violence, Dynasty.

41. Ibid., 38.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Campbell, “Social Networks and Political Participation”; Dalton, Van Sickle, and Weldon, “The Individual–Institutional Nexus of Protest Behaviour.”

45. Hyman and Wright, Education's Lasting Influence on Values; Kohn, Class and Conformity; Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”; McCloskey and Brill, Dimensions of Tolerance.

46. Hall, Rodeghier, and Useem, “Effects of Education on Attitude to Protest,” 565.

47. Campbell, “Social Networks and Political Participation,” 37.

48. Ibid., 36.

49. Breuer, Landman, and Farquhar, “Social Media and Protest Mobilization.”

50. Ibid.

51. Shaykhutdinov and Bragg, “Do Grievances Matter in Ethnic Conflict?”

52. Putnam and Campbell, American Grace.

53. Ibid.

54. Campbell, “Social Networks and Political Participation,” 39.

55. Jamal and Tessler, “Attitudes in the Arab World.”

56. Bratton, “Briefing.”

57. Rose, “How Muslims View Democracy.”

58. Hofmann, “Islam and Democracy.”

59. Norris and Inglehart, Sacred and Secular; Esposito and Mogahed, Who Speaks for Islam?; Achilov, “Social Capital, Islam, and the Arab Spring in the Middle East.”

60. Bennett, “Civic Life Online,” 2.

61. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare the mean scores of LRCP and HRCP for both countries (n=3000).

62. For robustness, I analysed the same model with two additional internet variables: reading news from (1) email and (2) a mobile phone. The findings revealed indistinguishable results and thus, have been omitted.

63. It is important to emphasize that it is personal religiosity – and not support for Islamist political ambitions – which appears to have an effect on collective protests.

64. Passy and Monsch, “Do Social Networks Really Matter in Contentious Politics?”

65. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State, 159.