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Abstract
The positive role of the European Union (EU) in the democratization process in post-communist countries has been amply documented. The pre-accession conditionality was to a large extent the tool used to enhance adoption of norms, and implementation of policy. In this context, it is less clear what happens after countries join the EU and conditionality is no longer an option. This article seeks to provide an answer by analysing how the EU can influence democratic governance after accession of a new member state. In particular, it focuses on the reactions of EU actors in two institutional conflicts (the 2007 and 2012 presidential impeachment referendums) in Romania. The main findings indicate how EU leverage on domestic politics remains possible, though the effectiveness of involvement, monitoring and evaluation of respect for democratic principles depends on a complex interaction of international and domestic actors.
Notes on contributors
Sergiu Gherghina is Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Goethe University Frankfurt. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Leiden University. His research interests lie in party politics in Central and Eastern Europe, legislative and voting behavior, and democratization. His book on political parties and electoral volatility in post-communist Europe was published by Routledge in 2014.
Sorina Soare is a Lecturer of Comparative Politics at the University of Florence She holds a PhD in Political Science from the Université Libre de Bruxelles and has previously studied Political Science at the University of Bucharest. She was a Wiener Anspach Postdoctoral Fellow at St Antony’s College.
Notes
1 Schimmelfennig, “Strategic Calculation”; Schimmelfennig, “How Substantial is Substance?”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Grabbe, The EU's Transformative Power.
2 Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap.”
3 Grabbe, “European Union Conditionality,” 250.
4 Grabbe, “Europeanisation Goes East,” 307.
5 Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig, “Europeanisation Before and After.”
6 Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics.”
7 Börzel and Risse, “Conceptualising the Domestic Impact”; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality.”
8 Trauner, “Post-Accession Compliance,” 3.
9 Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable?,” 21.
10 Levitz and Pop-Eleches, “Why no Backsliding?”
11 Gherghina and Miscoiu, “The Failure of Cohabitation”; Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?”
12 While this article focuses exclusively on the EU players, other relevant institutions, such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Venice Commission, expressed opinions that could be the topic of further research.
13 Bennett and Checkel, “Process Tracing,” 7.
14 Bunce and Wolchik, “International Diffusion”; Gateva, “Post-Accession Conditionality.”
15 In terms of the internal validity of our case study, the strong similarities identified in our narrative () allow us to control the possibility that anything other than our independent variable caused the changes in the outcomes of the dependent variable.
16 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?”
17 Carrera, Guild, and Hernanz, “The Triangular Relationship,” 7.
18 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?”
19 The preventive mechanisms were added by the Treaty of Nice and small amendments were included in the Treaty of Lisbon.
20 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?”
21 Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching Up?”; Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?”
22 Carrera, Guild, and Hernanz, “The Triangular Relationship,” 13.
23 Müller, “Should Brussels Intervene.”
24 Sadurski, Constitutionalism; Van Hüllen and Börzel, “The EU's Governance.”
25 Epstein and Sedelmeier, “Beyond Conditionality”; Sedelmeier, “After Conditionality.”
26 Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable?”
27 Levitz and Pop-Eleches, “Why no Backsliding?”
28 Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching Up?”
29 Müller, “Should Brussels Intervene”; Scheppele, “What Can the European Union Do?”
30 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality”; Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality”; Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching Up?”
31 Sedelmeier, “After Conditionality.”
32 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, The Europeanization.
33 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality”; Sedelmeier, “After Conditionality.”
34 Levitz and Pop-Eleches, “Why no Backsliding?”; Sedelmeier, “Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable?”; Spendzharova and Vachudova, “Catching Up?”
35 Sedelmeier, “After Conditionality”.
36 Gherghina and Miscoiu, “The Failure of Cohabitation.”
37 The 1994 suspension procedure concerned President Iliescu.
38 The PDL was formed in December 2007 after the PD merged with a splinter from the PNL.
39 Popescu, “Propunerile de suspendare.”
40 His participation at the European People's Party (EPP) meeting in Helsinki in 2011 (PDL is a member of the EPP) or at the PDL summer school were used as proof of partisanship.
41 Popescu, “Propunerile de suspendare.”
42 Iancu, “Romania under EU Influence.”
43 Blokker, “Illiberal Constitutional Tendencies.”
44 PM Ferenc Gyurcsany, the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Party, won the 2006 parliamentary elections in Hungary but faced a wave of street protests following a scandal in which he was recorded admitting his lies during the campaign.
45 Gandul 2007.
46 Fratila, “Joseph Daul.”
47 Andrei, “Cum s-a jucat.”
48 Gandul, “UE preocupata.”
49 Biro, “Mark Gray.”
50 Fratila, “Oficialii europeni.”
51 Blokker, “Illiberal Constitutional Tendencies.”
52 Euractiv, “Romanian President.”
53 Van Hüllen and Börzel, “The EU's Governance,” 21.
54 Sedelmeier, “Anchoring Democracy from Above?,” 113–114.
55 Pridham, “Romania and EU Membership.”
56 Gateva, “Post-Accession Conditionality,” 16.
57 Soare, “The Romanian Party Europeanisation.”
58 Gateva, “Post-Accession Conditionality,” 18–19.
59 Trauner, “Post-Accession Compliance”; Gateva, “Post-Accession Conditionality.”
60 CVM Report, 2012, 3.
61 Van Hüllen and Börzel, “The EU's Governance,” 21.