The martial origins of democracy: a global study of military conscription and suffrage extensions since the Napoleonic wars

Figures & data

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Extensions of male franchise
Extension (male)	0.03	0.17	0	1
Conscriptiont−1	0.87	0.34	0	1
Wart−1	0.14	0.35	0	1
ln(GDP per capita)t−1	7.65	0.53	6.43	9.03
Urbanizationt−1	15.20	8.60	2.10	47.57
Economic growtht−1	1.91	4.89	−22.43	26.11
Family farmst−1	20.72	13.56	1	60
Resource dependencet−1	1.97	4.65	0	41.56
Timet−1	45.03	31.12	0	151
Previous extensions	1.98	1.14	0	4
Extensions of female franchise
Extension (female)	0.02	0.15	0	1
Conscriptiont−1	0.87	0.34	0	1
Wart−1	0.16	0.37	0	1
ln(GDP per capita)t−1	7.82	0.61	6.43	10.34
Urbanizationt−1	15.52	8.64	2.10	62.61
Economic growtht−1	1.87	6.48	−24.92	47.86
Family farmst−1	24.40	16.74	1	90
Resource dependencet−1	3.46	10.71	0	100
Timet−1	57.88	40.48	0	161
Previous extensions	0.22	0.44	0	2
Transitions to democracy
Democracy	0.02	0.16	0	1
Conscriptiont−1	0.65	0.48	0	1
War endt−1	0.02	0.15	0	1
ln(GDP per capita)t−1	7.57	0.77	5.83	10.34
Urbanizationt−1	19.50	15.21	1.27	102.16
Economic growtht−1	1.69	6.63	−61.49	66.49
Family farmst−1	33.06	20.26	0	84
Resource dependencet−1	6.47	12.68	0	100
Timet−1	58.29	53.03	1	205
Previous democracy	3.34	8.77	0	84
Transitions to autocracy
Autocracy	0.02	0.13	0	1
Conscriptiont−1	0.64	0.48	0	1
ln(GDP per capita)t−1	8.55	0.88	6.04	10.34
Urbanizationt−1	25.22	14.53	1.73	90.48
Economic growtht−1	2.24	4.77	−23.00	65.90
Family farmst−1	49.05	25.02	0	98
Resource dependencet−1	2.35	5.01	0	90.44
Timet−1	39.91	40.47	1	206
Previous authoritarianism	63.61	55.96	0	192
Coups
Coup	0.01	0.11	0	1
Conscriptiont−1	0.65	0.48	0	1
ln(GDP per capita)t−1	8.56	0.88	6.04	10.34
Urbanizationt−1	25.33	14.58	1.73	90.48
Economic growtht−1	2.24	4.76	−23.00	65.90
Family farmst−1	49.23	25.06	0	98
Resource dependencet−1	2.38	5.04	0	90.44
Timet−1	42.56	36.51	0	157
Previous coups	0.23	0.64	0	4

Table 2. Franchise extensions, men.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscriptiont−1	−0.29 (0.35)	−0.74** (0.36)	0.33 (1.19)
Wart−1		−0.97** (0.46)	−0.13 (0.98)
Conscriptiont−1 × wart−1		2.38*** (0.53)	2.00** (0.96)
GDP per capita (logged)t−1			1.07* (0.56)
Urbanizationt−1			0.02 (0.02)
Economic growtht−1			−0.07 (0.05)
Family farmst−1			−0.02 (0.02)
Resource dependencet−1			0.04* (0.02)
Time	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.04)	−0.02 (0.05)
Time^2	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Time^3	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Previous extensions	−0.34** (0.15)	−0.34** (0.15)	−0.45* (0.24)
Observations	1371	1366	837

Note: Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Dependent variable: franchise extensions for males (0, 1). *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Figure 1. Predicted likelihood of an extension of male suffrage in a given year.

Table 3. Franchise extensions, women.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscriptiont−1	−1.03*** (0.32)	−1.18*** (0.32)	−0.52 (0.47)
Wart−1		−1.01 (1.36)	−0.38 (1.46)
Conscriptiont−1 × wart−1		1.36 (1.44)	0.29 (1.51)
GDP per capita (logged)t−1			−1.02** (0.42)
Urbanizationt−1			0.08*** (0.03)
Economic growtht−1			0.02 (0.03)
Family farmst−1			0.05*** (0.01)
Resource dependencet−1			0.01 (0.01)
Time	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.03 (0.03)	−0.09*** (0.03)
Time^2	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
Time^3	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00*** (0.00)
Previous extensions	0.53 (0.41)	0.53 (0.42)	−0.05 (0.57)
Observations	2506	2500	1540

Note: Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Dependent variable: franchise extensions for females (0, 1). *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 4. Transitions to democracy.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscriptiont−1	0.08 (0.22)	0.11 (0.24)	0.11 (0.24)
Wart−1		0.82 (1.07)	1.02 (1.10)
Conscriptiont−1 × wart−1		0.13 (1.17)	−0.01 (1.26)
GDP per capita (logged)t−1			0.51** (0.22)
Urbanizationt−1			−0.00 (0.01)
Economic growtht−1			−0.03* (0.02)
Family farmst−1			0.00 (0.01)
Resource dependencet−1			−0.06*** (0.02)
Time	−0.03** (0.01)	−0.03** (0.02)	−0.04*** (0.02)
Time^2	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Time^3	−0.00* (0.00)	−0.00* (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)
Previous transitions	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Observations	6317	6123	3875

Note: Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Dependent variable: democracy (0, 1). *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.

Table 5. Transitions to authoritarianism, coups.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscriptiont−1	0.02 (0.25)	0.02 (0.30)	−0.14 (0.45)	0.26 (0.37)
GDP per capita (logged)t−1		−0.90*** (0.27)		−0.85*** (0.31)
Urbanizationt−1		−0.01 (0.02)		−0.02 (0.02)
Economic growtht−1		−0.06** (0.03)		−0.02 (0.02)
Family farmst−1		−0.02** (0.01)		−0.02* (0.01)
Resource dependencet−1		0.00 (0.02)		0.00 (0.02)
Time	−0.05 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.07)	0.00 (0.07)
Time^2	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Time^3	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Previous transitions/coups	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.27** (0.12)	0.51*** (0.17)
Observations	4056	3132	3353	3081

Note: Entries are logit coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered on countries, in parentheses. Dependent variable: autocracy (0, 1) (models 1–2), coups (0, 1) (models 3–4). *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.