The evolution of authoritarian rule in Algeria: linkage versus organizational power

ABSTRACT

This article draws on the Algerian regimes of Chadli Benjedid and Abdelaziz Bouteflika to critically evaluate Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way’s dimension of linkage. The paper shows that, despite the intensification of the country’s ties to the European Union (EU) from one regime to the other, the willingness and ability of Brussels to put democratizing pressure on Algiers decreased rather than increased. This development challenges Levitsky and Way’s thesis and the importance they place on linkage in relation to their other dimensions of leverage and organizational power. The article concludes that: strengthening linkage does not always result in greater EU or Western democratizing pressure; the balance of importance Levitsky and Way strike between their dimensions is open to question; and, the EU has grown less willing to press for political change in Algeria.

KEYWORDS:

• Algeria
• Levitsky and Way
• linkage
• organizational power
• Arab Spring
• Black October

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, editors and Sophie Hague for their comments and feedback.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

ORCID

J. N. C. Hill http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2948-9511

Notes

1 This article adopts Frédéric Volpi’s

notion of regime as a particular set of codified interactions between the state and the citizens – a political regimen in the old sense of the term. This means a form of governance that is relatively independent from the personalities of those in power and that can last regardless of changes in leadership. In this sense, it is possible to have situations of elite change without regime change, and of regime change without elite change (such as the democratization process orchestrated by President Chadli Benjedid in Algeria in 1989–1991).

Volpi, Revolution and Authoritarianism, 37–8.

2 The other two dimensions are leverage and organizational power.

3 The article defines democratization as the process by which a country becomes democratic. It adopts Schedler’s zero-sum threshold whereby “partial compliance with democratic norms does not add up to partial democracy.” Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” 41.

4 Werenfels, Managing Instability in Algeria, 2.

5 Tolstrup argues

that domestic elites should not be perceived as mere objects of external influence, which they in structural accounts’ like Levitsky and Way’s, but rather as gatekeepers that actively facilitate or constrain ties to external actors. By upgrading or downgrading these ties, gatekeeper elites directly affect the capacity that determines the strength of the external actor.

Tolstrup, “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization,” 718.

6 “Scope refers to the effective reach of the state’s coercive apparatus” while “cohesion refers to the level of compliance within the state apparatus.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 58 and 59 (emphasis original).

7 See: Hill, Democratisation in the Maghreb.

8 See: Tolstrup, “When Can External Actors Influence Democratization?”; Nohdia, “External Influence and Democratization”; and Hill, “Global International Relations and the Arab Spring.”

9 Way, “Resistance to Contagion.”

10 Levitsky and Way, “Elections Without Democracy.”

11 Levitsky and Way, “Why Democracy Needs a Level Playing Field.”

12 Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage”; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and Democratization”; Way and Levitsky, “The Dynamics of Autocratic Coercion after the Cold War.”

13 Levitsky and Way define the West as “the United States, the EU (and pre-2004 EU members), and Western-dominated multilateral institutions.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 43.

14 Levitsky and Way, “Linkage versus Leverage,” 382.

15 Levitsky and Way argue that democracy has five essential features:

“(1) free, fair, and competitive elections; (2) full adult suffrage; (3) broad protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association; … (4) the absence of nonelected ‘tutelary’ authorities”, and (5) “the existence of a reasonably level playing field between incumbents and opposition.”

Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5–6.

16 According to Levitsky and Way competitive authoritarian orders “are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which the incumbents’ abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 5.

17 Ibid., 23.

18 Ibid., 43.

19 Ibid., 43–4.

20 Ibid., 40–1.

21 Ibid., 41.

22 Ibid., 41. On this basis, the West will have low leverage if the target state has: either a large economy (GDP of $100 billion); is a major oil producer (1 million barrels per day); or has nuclear weapons. The West will have medium leverage if the target state: has either a mid-sized economy (GDP of $50–$100 billion); is a secondary oil producer (between 200,000 and 1 million barrels per day); is experiencing a “major-security related foreign-policy issue” of importance to the West; or has the backing of a black knight. And the West will have high leverage if the target state does not fulfil any of these criteria. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 372–3.

23 Ibid., 53.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid., 54.

28 Ibid., 53.

29 Ibid..

30 Ibid., 54.

31 Ibid., 54–67.

32 Ibid., 71.

33 The ongoing practicality and desirability of maintaining this sometime-formal requirement represents a critical moment in Algerian politics. Since independence, it has influenced and been used to justify the appointment of the country’s leaders and other senior state officials. Accordingly, it has informed and help legitimise the generational gap that exists within Algerian public life. When it finally ceases to be enforceable, therefore, the ways in which these appointments are made and explained will not only have to change but will involve the younger generations to a greater extent.

34 Stone, The Agony of Algeria, 64.

35 Evans and Phillips, Algeria, 105–6.

36 Volpi, “Algeria Versus the Arab Spring,” 107.

37 Parks, “Algeria and the Arab Uprisings,” 101.

38 Levitsky and Way designate a regime as stable authoritarian if it’s “governments or their chosen successors remain in power for at least three presidential or parliamentary terms following the establishment of competitive authoritarian rule.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 368–9.

39 The collapse of the global price of oil in 1986 had a devasting impact on Algeria’s export and foreign currency earnings, and ability to service its external loans. Over the following two years, its debt service ratio jumped from 68% of GDP to 86% forcing the government to accept International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-By assistance in 1989, and World Bank Economic Reform Support and Financial Sector Adjustment loans in 1989 and 1991 respectively. Lowi, Oil Wealth and the Poverty of Politics, 114; World Bank, “Algeria – Structural Adjustment Loan,” 1.

40 In addition to joining the Non-Aligned Movement and hosting its 1973 summit, Algeria provided Eldridge Cleaver, an early leader of the Black Panther Party, with asylum. Sauvant, “From Economic to Socio-cultural Emancipation,” 55; Malley, Call from Algeria, 3.

41 For example, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, the last prime minister appointed by Benjedid, studied at the École nationale des ports et chaussées de Paris.

42 Indeed, by 1990 around 614,000 of Algerian nationals were based in France alone. Mezdour, “The Algerian Immigrant Community in Europe,” 241.

43 Sakr, Satellite Realms, 11.

44 World Bank, “Algeria”; Hodd, “Algeria,” 37; Aïssaoui, Algeria, 131.

45 Aïssaoui, Algeria, 175 and 176.

46 The Military Balance, “The Middle East and North Africa,” 104 & 117 & 124.

47 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 60–1.

48 IMF, “Algeria,” 17.

49 EIA, “Algeria,” 1.

50 EIA, “Algeria: Country Analysis Briefs,” 2–3.

51 IIE, “International Students in France.”

52 EUI, “Algeria,” 1.

53 World Bank, “Algeria.”

54 The LADDH joined the network upon its creation on 1 January 1997. EuroMed, “Our Members.”

55 World Bank, “Algeria.”

56 The conversion of cubic metres to cubic feet was made by the author. Aïssaoui, Algeria, 139; EIA, “Algeria,” 9.

57 In the National Assembly election of May 2017,

the ruling FLN and RND won a combined 261 seats … An unpublished European Union (EU) assessment of the polls, acquired by the Algerian newspaper Liberté, noted serious deficiencies in the electoral process, including a general lack of access to voter lists and opaque vote-counting processes. Opposition parties and other observers alleged widespread electoral fraud, and media outlets carried videos taken by voters that appeared to depict ballot-box stuffing and other irregularities. Vote buying was also reported.

In the 2014 presidential election, Bouteflika stood and won as the FLN candidate. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Algeria.”

58 As Levitsky and Way note, “regimes are vulnerable to internal crises triggered by splits within the governing coalition, which result in opposition takeovers of the legislature or strong electoral challenges from erstwhile regime insiders.” Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 65.

59 The Military Balance, “Chapter Seven,” 370 & 394 & 405.

60 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 61.

61 Meliani, Aghrout, and Ammari, “Economic Reforms and Foreign Direct Investment in Algeria,” 94.

62 U.S. Department of State, “2013 Investment Climate Statement — Algeria.”

63 Oxford Business Group, “The Report,” 28.

64 Le Sueur, Between Terror and Democracy, 106.

65 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 374. Nearly all aspects of Algeria’s oil and gas industries continue to be dominated by the state owned and operated company, Sonatrach.

66 Levitsky and Way use this criterion to designate medium leverage. It can be used here, however, to reinforce the case for low leverage. Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 372.

67 Le Sueur, Between Terror and Democracy, 85.

68 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 53 (emphasis added).

69 SIPRI, “Military Expenditure by Country as Percentage of Government Expenditure.”

70 Ibid.

71 Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism, 70 (emphasis original).

72 RFI, Algérie.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

J. N. C. Hill

J. N. C. Hill is Professor of International Relations and Director of the Institute of Middle Eastern Studies at King’s College London. He has published widely on authoritarian resilience and regime development in the Maghreb. He is a member of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies’ (BRISMES) Council, and the editorial advisory boards of The Middle East Journal, The Journal of North African Studies and Libyan Studies.