Voting and winning: perceptions of electoral integrity in consolidating democracies

Figures & data

Table 1. Summary of survey waves.

Election	1st Wave	2nd Wave	Polling day
2018 General Election in Bosnia-Herzegovina	01/10/2018 – 06/10/2018	08/10/2018 – 30/10/2018	07/10/2018
2020 Parliamentary Election in Croatia	21/06/2020 – 04/07/2020	06/07/2020 – 19/07/2020	05/07/2020
2020 Parliamentary Election in Serbia	07/06/2020 – 20/06/2020	22/06/2020 – 05/07/2020	21/06/2020

Table 2. Descriptives of all variables.

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Change in electoral trust	1.39	5.22	−23	27
Satisfaction with election outcome	5.72	3.49	0	10
Government supporter	0.33	0.47	0	1
Political interest	5.34	3.11	0	10
Socialism	3.72	0.60	1	5
Nationalism	2.79	0.75	1	5
News exposure	11.88	4.00	0	20
Voter	0.77	0.42	0	1
Gender	0.49	0.50	0	1
Age	44.27	14.03	18	93
Income	5.35	2.61	1	10
Unemployed	0.16	0.37	0	1
Ethnic minority	0.12	0.33	0	1
Lower education	0.34	0.47	0	1
Middle education	0.51	0.50	0	1
Higher education	0.16	0.36	0	1
Electoral trust before the election	13.85	5.92	0	32
Bosnia-Herzegovina	0.25	0.43	0	1
Croatia	0.42	0.49	0	1
Serbia	0.33	0.47	0	1
Time after election	3.60	5.25	1	54

Figure 1. Electoral trust in the pre- and post-electoral wave.

Figure 2. Change in electoral trust.

Table 3. Overview of the evolution of electoral perception beliefs.

	Pre-electoral wave	Post-electoral wave	Difference
Votes are counted fairly	1.63	1.79	0.16	***
Opposition candidates are prevented from running	1.45	1.40	−0.05	*
TV news favours the governing party	2.89	2.63	−0.26	***
Voters are bribed	2.54	2.34	−0.21	***
Election officials are fair	1.53	1.61	0.07	**
Rich people buy elections	2.68	2.36	−0.32	***
Voters are threatened with violence	1.70	1.61	−0.09	***
Voters are offered a genuine choice in the election	1.54	1.79	0.25	***

Note: The above numbers are averages of respondents’ answers on a 0–4 Likert scale, whereby 0 = completely disagree, and 4 = completely agree; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Figure 3. Marginal effects of the main explanatory variables change in electoral trust. Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the results of Model 3, Table 4; all other variables are kept at their mean value; the grey area represents the 95% confidence interval.

Table 4. Analyses of change in electoral trust.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3
	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.	B	S.E.	Sig.
Voter	1.16	0.32	***	1.15	0.32	***	1.18	0.31	***
Satisfaction with election outcome	0.52	0.05	***	0.52	0.05	***	0.52	0.05	***
Government supporter	0.63	0.33	†	0.58	0.33	†	0.57	0.33	†
Political interest				−0.10	0.04	*	−0.10	0.04	*
Socialism				0.53	0.23	*	0.55	0.24	*
Nationalism				0.20	0.17		0.24	0.17
News exposure				0.02	0.03		0.01	0.03
Gender							−0.10	0.24
Age							0.01	0.01
Income							0.05	0.05
Unemployed							0.40	0.33
Ethnic minority							−0.49	0.37
Lower education (ref. cat.)
Middle education							0.24	0.28
Higher education							0.32	0.29
Electoral trust before the election	−0.51	0.03	***	−0.50	0.03	***	−0.50	0.03	***
Bosnia-Herzegovina (ref. cat.)
Croatia	1.56	0.33	***	1.65	0.33	***	1.56	0.33	***
Serbia	−0.44	0.30		−0.45	0.30		−0.53	0.31	†
Time after election	0.00	0.01		0.00	0.02		0.00	0.02
Intercept	4.60	0.40	***	2.27	1.10	*	1.33	1.20
n	2285			2285			2285
Adj. R²	26.79%			25.18%			28.00%

Note: OLS regression; †<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Figure 4. Marginal effects of the control variables on change in electoral trust. Note: Predicted probabilities are based on the results of Model 3, Table 4; all other variables are kept at their mean value; the grey area represents the 95% confidence interval.