Group organization, elections and urban political mobilization in the developing world

Figures & data

Figure 1. Urban social disorder by region, monthly, 1960–2014.

Figure 2. Results, Models 1.5 and 1.6, Table 1.

Table 1. Elections, timing and urban disturbances.

	(1.1)	(1.2)	(1.3)	(1.4)	(1.5)	(1.6)	(1.7)	(1.8)
	All Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs	All Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs
Election	0.45***	0.41***	0.58***	0.45***	0.41***	0.58***	0.05***	0.01***
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m-1)				0.03	0.04	−0.05	0.00	−0.00
				(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.23)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m-2)				0.13	0.20**	−0.32	0.02*	−0.01
				(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m-3)				−0.01	0.02	−0.10	0.00	−0.00
				(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m+1)				0.19**	0.11	0.39**	0.01	0.01**
				(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m+2)				0.07	0.07	0.04	0.00	0.00
				(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.19)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Election (m+3)				−0.05	−0.01	−0.22	0.00	−0.00
				(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.24)	(0.01)	(0.00)
Polity	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.02	−0.01*	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Polity*Polity	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.00***	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coup	2.09***	2.18***	1.60***	2.09***	2.18***	1.60***	0.51***	0.09***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Conflict	0.19	0.26	−0.13	0.18	0.26	−0.13	0.05**	−0.00
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,220	55,220	55,220	55,220	55,220
AIC	37,131.72	32,109.86	10,351.69	37,014.69	31,995.04	10,342.54

Models 1.7 and 1.8 estimated by seemingly unrelated regression.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All models with city and year fixed effects, controls for city population, GDP/capita, recessions.

Analysis years 1960–2011.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table 2. Democracy, elections and urban disturbances.

	(2.1)	(2.2)	(2.3)	(2.4)	(2.5)	(2.6)	(2.7)	(2.8)
	All Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs	All Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs	Org Evs	Unorg Evs
Election	0.47***	0.42***	0.59***	0.67***	0.75***	0.10	0.11***	0.00
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.33)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Polity	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.02	−0.01**	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Polity*Polity				−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.01***	−0.00***	−0.00***
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Election*Polity	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	0.00	0.01	−0.02	0.00	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Election*Polity*Polity				−0.01*	−0.01***	0.01*	−0.00***	0.00*
				(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Coup	2.13***	2.22***	1.64***	2.10***	2.18***	1.61***	0.51***	0.08***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.17)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Conflict	0.24	0.31*	−0.08	0.19	0.26	−0.14	0.05**	−0.00
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Observations	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,392	55,392
AIC	37,226.55	32,175.26	10,391.18	37,130.13	32,107.36	10,349.21

Models 2.7 and 2.8 estimated by seemingly unrelated regression.

Robust standard errors in parentheses.

All models with city and year fixed effects, controls for city population, GDP/capita, recessions.

Analysis years 1960–2011.

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Figure 3. Results, Models 2.5 and 2.6, Table 2.