Mediation in Syria: initiatives, strategies, and obstacles, 2011–2016

ABSTRACT

This article investigates mediation efforts in Syria from the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 through the spring of 2016. It describes the principal initiatives, analyses differences and similarities across mediators, and identifies strategic obstacles that prevented substantive progress. Focusing on mediation initiatives undertaken by the Arab League and the United Nations, it finds that there is considerable path dependence across efforts and that most of the limited achievements, notably ceasefires in 2012 and 2016, resulted from the application of external leverage. Settlement in Syria was conditioned on overcoming significant commitment problems, aggravated by sectarian mistrust, the fractured nature of the opposition, and international disunity. The article contributes the first review of mediation in Syria that comprehends the conflict in its entirety, systematizes data for research on conflict management, and evaluates existing mediation policy in Syria with an eye to the future.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Isak Svensson, one external reviewer, and the Editor of Contemporary Security Policy for providing valuable comments. Parts of this article draw on analysis and data previously presented in my PhD dissertation, ‘International Organizations as Peacemakers: The Evolution and Effectiveness of Intergovernmental Instruments to End War’, Stockholm University, 2014, and in ‘Peacemaking in Syria: Barriers and Opportunities’, UI Brief, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, No. 1 (2015).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Magnus Lundgren is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Political Science, Stockholm University. His research interests include international organizations, civil war, and conflict resolution. He previously worked for the UN (2007–2010) and holds degrees from Stockholm University, Uppsala University, and Harvard University.

Notes

1. Syrian casualty figures are disputed, ranging from less than 200,000 to nearly half a million since the start of the war. The figure here is based on the official estimate of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, http://www.unocha.org/syria (accessed 17 May 2016).

2. Richard Gowan, ‘Kofi Annan, Syria and the Uses of Uncertainty in Mediation’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), pp.1–6; Chester A. Crocker et al., ‘Why Is Mediation So Hard? The Case of Syria’, in Mauro Galluccio (ed.), Handbook of International Negotiation (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015), pp.139–55; J. Michael Greig, ‘Intractable Syria—Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation’, Penn State Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2013), pp.48–57; Magnus Lundgren, ‘Peacemaking in Syria: Barriers and Opportunities’, UI Brief, No. 1 (2015); Tom H.J. Hill, ‘Kofi Annan’s Multilateral Strategy of Mediation and the Syrian Crisis: The Future of Peacemaking in a Multipolar World?’, International Negotiation, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2015), pp.444–78; Raymond Hinnebusch and I. William Zartman, UN Mediation in the Syrian Crisis: From Kofi Annan to Lakhdar Brahimi (New York: International Peace Institute, 2016), p.7.

3. E.g. Isak Svensson, ‘Bargaining, Bias and Peace Brokers: How Rebels Commit to Peace’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007), pp.177–94; Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, ‘Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No. 5 (2006), pp.736–56; Kyle Beardsley, ‘Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency Problems’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2008), pp.723–40.

4. ‘Report of the Head of the League of Arab States Observer Mission to Syria’, http://www.columbia.edu/~hauben/Report_of_Arab_League_Observer_Mission.pdf (accessed 17 May 2016).

5. Arab League Council Resolution 7444, http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/syria/Syria_60_AL_Council_Resolution_7444.pdf (accessed 17 May 2016).

6. Formally, Kofi Annan was appointed the Joint Envoy of the United Nations and the Arab League, but for all practical purposes, it was a UN mission. Logistical and financial support came from the UN and Annan reported to the UN Security Council.

7. Author’s interviews with UN mediation officials October and November 2013; Hill, ‘Kofi Annan’s Multilateral Strategy’ (note 2).

8. UN Security Council Resolutions 2042 and 2043.

9. Calculations of fatalities statistics based on Megan Price, Anita Gohdes, and Patrick Ball, ‘Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic’, Report commissioned by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights Data Analysis Group, 2014, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/HRDAGUpdatedReportAug2014.pdf (accessed 19 December 2014).

10. For details on Brahimi’s mediation efforts, see Hinnebusch and Zartman, UN Mediation (note 2), pp.12–6.

11. Hinnebusch and Zartman, UN Mediation (note 2), p.13.

12. Staffan de Mistura, ‘Briefing to the Security Council on the Situation in Syria’, 17 February 2015.

13. Ibid., 29 July 2015.

14. ‘UN Special Envoy’s Paper on Points of Commonalities’, March 24, 2016, http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/news_media.nsf/(httpPages)/8E6FDF778A229D66C1257F800066B7EE?OpenDocument (accessed 17 May 2016).

15. There were a number of minor mediation initiatives in Syria during the same period, including by Russia, but none of these attracted a wider interest from the opposition. Further, there were local initiatives and a range of offers of mediation that never materialized, including by Iran, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, and China. For local mediation initiatives, see Swiss Peace, Inside Syria: What Local Actors Are Doing for Peace, Report, Swiss Peace, 2016

16. Govinda Clayton and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, ‘Will We See Helping Hands? Predicting Civil War Mediation and Likely Success’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2014), pp.265–84.

17. See Hill, ‘Kofi Annan’s Multilateral Strategy’ (note 2) for further details on Annan’s usage of leverage.

18. See Andrew Kydd, ‘Which Side Are You on? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2003), pp.597–611.

19. As emphasized by Hinnebusch and Zartman, UN Mediation, p.7 (note 2): ‘From the regime’s point of view, the UN was now adding its weight to a plan devised by its Arab enemies.’

20. Hill, ‘Kofi Annan’s Multilateral Strategy’ (note 2).

21. Magnus Lundgren and Isak Svensson, ‘Leanings and Dealings: Exploring Bias and Leverage in Civil War Mediation by International Organizations’, International Negotiation, Vol 19, No. 2 (2014), pp.315–42.

22. I. William Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008).

23. Barbara F. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (1997), pp.335–64.

24. E.g., ‘President al-Assad: Syria’s War on Terrorism Is a Battle of Existence’, Syran Arab News Agency, http://sana.sy/en/?p=8592 (accessed 17 May 2016).

25. Charles R. Lister, The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

26. Aron Lund, ‘Syrian Jihadism’, UI brief, No. 13, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 2012.

27. Isak Svensson, Ending Holy Wars: Religion and Conflict Resolution in Civil Wars (Brisbane: University of Queensland Press, 2012).

28. David E. Cunningham, ‘Veto Players and Civil War Duration’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2008), pp.875–92.

29. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’ (note 23).

30. Cf. Beardsley, ‘Agreement Without Peace?’ (note 2).