After diffusion: Challenges to enforcing nonproliferation and disarmament norms

ABSTRACT

This article discusses six challenges to enforcing norms regarding nuclear weapons. Three challenges reflect generic problems in international politics. These are differences in power, the collective action problem, and trade-offs with other interests. Three additional dilemmas reflect specific characteristics of the nuclear realm. First, membership in international treaties connected to the norms is not universal, raising questions about the appropriateness of enforcement against states that have not signed the treaties. Second, different implications of the norms can come into conflict with each other. In particular, there can be tensions between the requirements of nonproliferation and disarmament norms. Finally, some common options for norm enforcement become quite problematic when dealing with nuclear weapons. For example, if states respond to defections by starting their own nuclear weapons programs, this tit-for-tat response would defeat the purposes of the nonproliferation regime. Despite these challenges, nuclear norms enjoy widespread support and some enforcement is possible.

KEYWORDS:

• Nuclear weapons
• nonproliferation
• disarmament
• norms
• enforcement

Acknowledgements

The initial version of this article was prepared for a March 2014 workshop on “Nuclear Norms in Global Governance.” I thank the workshop organizers Avner Cohen and Maria Rost Rublee for inviting me. I also thank all the workshop participants, and especially Jeffrey Lewis, for helpful feedback on my initial draft. And I thank three anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on the version I submitted to Contemporary Security Policy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Jeffrey W. Knopf is a professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. He is also a senior research associate with the Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Knopf is the editor of two recent book volumes, International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation (University of Georgia Press, 2016) and Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (Stanford University Press, 2012). In addition, he is a proud past winner of the Bernard Brodie Prize, awarded by Contemporary Security Policy for his article “The Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research” published in the April 2010 issue.

ORCID

Jeffrey W. Knopf http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3827-5192

Notes

1. For an earlier effort at such an analysis focused on nonproliferation, see Roberts (2001).

2. Some analysts argue that the norm is not truly a taboo but is better characterized as a tradition of nonuse (Paul, 2009). Even if it is described as a matter of tradition rather than a taboo, however, it is still valid to say there is a norm against the use of nuclear weapons. The norm really applies to first use, as the threat to retaliate in a second strike against a nuclear attack is still widely regarded as a legitimate aspect of nuclear deterrence.

3. For a good summary of the debate, see Kroenig (2012) and Kahl (2012).

4. Two members of the U.S. Congress have cited these factors as reasons for opposing military action against North Korea (Gallego & Lieu, 2018).

5. Reiss (2009, p. xi) especially emphasizes the collective action problem as a source of “enforcement deficiencies” in the nonproliferation regime.

6. For a discussion of whether U.S. security assurances could be effective without the nuclear component, see Knopf (2012a).

7. One other country, South Sudan, has also not joined the NPT, but it is not suspected of harboring nuclear ambitions. Its non-membership reflects the fact that South Sudan only recently became independent and it is currently consumed by internal problems.

8. In contrast to norms about possession, the nonuse norm has a stronger claim to universal status. It is not linked to a particular treaty and is instead a matter of custom or practice. In addition, because many innocent individuals would presumably be killed if nuclear weapons are used, the nonuse norm is reinforced by international humanitarian law and the laws of war.

9. See for example the comments by former President George W. Bush, as cited in Squassoni (2005, p. 6).

10. For an overview of Iran’s use of Article IV and illustrative quotations, see Ford (2009, pp. 9–11).

11. Brazil and Lebanon, for example, failed to support a UN Security Council resolution in 2010 to increase sanctions on Iran. Both countries cited the right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, provided a state accepts IAEA safeguards, as a reason why they did not support further sanctions (UN Department of Public Information, 2010).

12. There might still be potential future threats due to latent nuclear capabilities among states that maintain relevant peaceful nuclear sectors. Confidence in the ability to deal with latent threats will mainly be a function of the verification and enforcement provisions that accompany a nuclear abolition effort. In addition, U.S. allies might also still perceive a value in nuclear weapons as a deterrent against conventional threats. The question then becomes whether this would be sufficient to convince states to hold out against a real chance to achieve nuclear abolition, and what alternative measures could be put in place to deter or reduce conventional threats.

13. For a good overview of the relevant cases and their lessons, see Kreps and Fuhrmann (2011).

14. As a contrary example, however, Israel’s 2007 attack on Syria’s al-Kibar reactor site does seem to have ended Syria’s nuclear ambitions for the time being.

15. Some have claimed that the invasion of Iraq convinced Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi to give up his WMD programs. But, as discussed below, Libya’s decision probably resulted more from a mix of economic sanctions and diplomatic engagement. The Iraq invasion was at most an accelerant to a decision process already underway.

16. Iraq did previously have a nuclear weapons program and had produced chemical and biological weapons. After the U.S. invasion, some soldiers were exposed to chemical agents left over from old chemical munitions that had been abandoned (Chivers, 2014).

17. Even here, sanctions were not completely successful. The Gaddafi regime held back some chemical weapons, which were only discovered later (Busch & Pilat, 2017, pp. 112–114).

18. For an argument that economic sanctions imposed on suspected proliferators have done more harm than nuclear proliferation ever did, see Mueller (2010, Chapter 10 and pp. 145–147).

19. Syria has not cooperated fully with the IAEA to provide information about a nuclear reactor site destroyed by an Israeli air strike in 2007. There have also been allegations that Syria is continuing secret work on nuclear weapons, but an independent analysis of satellite imagery has found the allegations to be implausible (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2017).

20. On cooperation among the P5+1, see Santoro (2016).

Additional information

Funding

This article has also benefited from funding from the U.S. Institute of Peace Annual Grant, Nuclear Norms in Global Governance, 160-12F.