Varieties of defection strategies from multinational military coalitions: Insights from operation Iraqi freedom

ABSTRACT

How do states defect from multinational military coalitions? The question deserves considerable academic scrutiny, as states increasingly rely on coalitions to prosecute military missions. Yet to the extent that coalition defection has been explored, the extant literature tends to see defection as a binary undertaking – states are either in or out. In practice, however, defection is an act of risk minimization in a manner that forces other coalition partners to fill resulting operational gaps. A coalition can therefore appear stable due to a constant number of flags associated with the mission, but in practice be much less coherent and capable. After defining defection as a non-routine abrogation of operational responsibility at other coalition partners’ expense, significantly prior to mission conclusion, this article explores several states’ participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the various manners by which they defected from that coalition. It concludes with implications for future scholarship.

KEYWORDS:

• Military coalitions
• military operations
• Iraq
• Spain
• defection
• Republic of Korea

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Theo Farrell, Thomas Rid, Zach Wolfraim, Olivier Schmitt, Jim Townsend, Mark Jones, Daniel Roh, Mike Williams, Heather Williams, Karolina Maclachlan, Nate Lucas, Mary Beth Nikitin, Catherine Theohary, Andy Feickert, and Frank Hoffman for all their patience, support, and constructive feedback. Some of this material contained in this article can be found in the author’s forthcoming book, How and Why States Defect from Multilateral Military Coalitions (Palgrave, forthcoming). All views presented within this paper are solely those of the author and are in no way representative of the United States Government or the Congressional Research Service.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest has been reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Kathleen J. McInnis currently serves as an international security analyst for the Congressional Research Service, writing on US defense policy and strategy issues. Prior to that, she was a research consultant at Chatham House in London, working on NATO and transatlantic security matters. McInnis has commented on international affairs on television, radio, and print. She has appeared on CNN, Sky News, BBC, Al Jazeera English, and Voice of America. Her articles have featured in publications including The Atlantic Monthly, Defense One, Foreignpolicy.com, The Washington Quarterly, Defense News, War on the Rocks, and The Washington Times, and was a contributing author to several Chatham House and CSIS studies. She was awarded her MSc in international relations from the London School of Economics in 2002, and completed her PhD in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. Her book on coalitions, How and Why States Defect from Contemporary Military Coalitions is forthcoming with Palgrave Macmillan.

Notes

1 Of the eight initial mission objectives for OIF, only one implied any degree of state building or post-conflict reconstruction: “Help Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its territorial integrity” (Spring, 2003).

2 The actual number of coalition participants is classified. The figure was compiled by the author using publicly-available reporting.