Gunboats and butter: The two percent guideline and NATO burden shifting in the maritime domain

Figures & data

Figure 1. Average non-US NATO Members’ Total Tonnage to GDP Ratio.

Figure 2. Average non-US NATO Members’ Total Tonnage and GDP.

Table 1. Wales Pledge and Naval Power.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Tonnage to GDP	Tonnage to GDP	Total Tonnage	Log Total Tonnage
Wales Pledge	−.04***	−.031**	−36951.02**	−.183**
	(.015)	(.011)	(14916.912)	(.07)
Competition	−10.29***	8.965	6127911.4	34.231
	(2.879)	(7.184)	(4515344.5)	(33.166)
Coastline	.034**
	(.015)
Non-NATO land border	.02*
	(.011)
Urban Population	.001	−.014***	249.858	−.056**
	(.003)	(.003)	(1632.898)	(.024)
Trade Openness	.058	.059	5202.838	.84
	(.046)	(.039)	(27127.213)	(.592)
PEC	−.033	−.031	19849.903	−.297
	(.043)	(.065)	(30312.893)	(.288)
GDP	−.068**	−.257	−211015.14	.433
	(.028)	(.349)	(143343.68)	(1.234)
GDP Per capita	−.202***	−.206	149318.7	−.943
	(.078)	(.342)	(110386.61)	(1.272)
Years in NATO	.006**	.01***	5656.51*	.046**
	(.002)	(.002)	(3284.757)	(.017)
Threat	−.473**	−.46***	−442701.28*	−3.363**
	(.207)	(.146)	(214760.52)	(1.344)
Russian’s Naval Power	−.135	−.098	−179831.15*	−.765
	(.088)	(.123)	(103874.5)	(.661)
Alliance Naval Power	−.228***	−.073	−142344.14	−1.485*
	(.062)	(.09)	(86701.679)	(.75)
Constant	9.098***	9.704***	6462813.1*	59.786***
	(2.134)	(2.784)	(3404056.6)	(18.53)
Observations	240	240	240	240
R-squared	.412	.554	.07	.16
Country FE	NO	YES	YES	YES

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country.

*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1.

Table 2. Robustness Tests.

	(5)	(6)	(7)
	ECM	Dynamic Pooled Mean Group	Arellano-Bond
Dependent Variable, 1-year lag	−.28***	−.366*	.69***
	(.062)	(.19)	(.05)
Dependent Variable, 2-year lag			.01
			(.055)
Δ Wales Pledge	−.082***	−.051**
	(.02)	(.025)
Wales Pledge, 1-year lag	−.082***	−.366***
	(.024)	(.19)
Wales Pledge			−.017**
		(.011)	(.007)
Observations	235	235	193
Country FE	Yes	Yes	No

Note: To save space, we do not report results for control variables.

Table 3. Robustness Test, Difference-in-Differences Specification.

	(8)	(9)	(10)
	All states in the system	U.S. allies	U.S. allies the imposed sanctions and non-NATO EU members
Average treatment effect	−13775**	−53600**	−24797**
	(6576)	(17636)	(11056)
Parallel-trends test	Prob > F = 0.77	Prob > F = 0.27	Prob > F = 0.26
Granger causality test	Prob > F = 0.684	Prob > F = 0.52	Prob > F = 0.42
Observations	1,488	319	330
Country FE	YES	YES	YES

Note: To save space, we do not report results for control variables.

Data availability statement

Replications materials available at https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/J0ZXWV

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