Bear facts and dragon boats: Rethinking the modernization of Chinese naval power

Abstract

Since the early 1990s Chinese naval modernization efforts have excited concerns of a portentous buildup and the threat of an emergent blue water capability. Such assessments under-contextualize and typically privilege quantitative measures over qualitative ones, a distorted picture of Chinese naval power. This is reminiscent of inflated estimates of the Soviet navy through the 1980s, thoroughly disproved as the collapse of the Soviet Union brought to light the myriad deficiencies of its navy. This article draws on that earlier experience to challenge exaggerated claims about China's naval capabilities and to provide a stronger foundation for evaluation of the implications of its ongoing fleet modernization programmes. After examining the direct effects of Chinese naval modernization and the implications for American security commitments in East Asia and regional power balances with Japan and Taiwan, it concludes that Chinese modernization is neither bellicose nor destabilizing. Viewed from this perspective, China is unlikely to challenge the naval status quo in the region.

Acknowledgements

An early version of this paper was circulated as part of the working paper series of the Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security. The author is grateful for the feedback received from readers of that version and from the editors and anonymous reviewers for Contemporary Security Policy. Their suggestions have made this a much stronger paper.

Notes

1. See, for example, Anthony Davis, ‘Blue-Water Ambitions: Beijing is Building up its Navy to Project Power’, Asia Week, Vol.26, No.11 (24 March 2000); Shigeo Hiramatsu, ‘China's Advances in the South China Sea: Strategies and Objectives’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol.8, No.1 (2001); Timothy Hu, ‘Country Briefing – China: Ready, Steady, Go…’, Jane's Defence Weekly (13 April 2005); Jun Zhan, ‘China Goes to the Blue Waters: The Navy, Seapower Mentality and the South China Sea’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.17, No.3 (Sept. 1994).

2. This is not to say that both lack any maritime heritage at all. Russia's ambitious drive under Peter the Great to match the navies of the other great powers of Europe and the ascendancy of China's powerful fleet in the fifteenth century mark important periods of keen interest in the development of sea power. However, in general, and certainly for several hundred years up to the mid-twentieth century, both China and Russia/Soviet Union have all but completely forsaken naval development in favour of large standing armies.

3. According to You Ji and You Xu, ‘The Soviet “small battle” theory, resting on warfare by torpedo boats, shore-based planes and submarines…played a key role in the formulation of the PLAN's strategy in its formative years’. You Ji and You Xu, ‘In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s’, Pacific Review, Vol.4, No.2 (1991), p.139. For more on the Soviet Young School, see Robert Waring Herrick, Soviet Naval Theory and Practice: Gorshkov's Inheritance (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988).

4. Zhan, p.189.

5. Tai Ming Cheung, Growth of Chinese Naval Power: Priorities, Goals, Missions, and Regional Implications (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1990), p.9.

6. See Derek da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1990).

7. Elizabeth Speed, ‘Chinese Naval Power and East Asian Security’, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, Working Paper No. 11 (Aug. 1995), p.7.

8. You and You, p.138.

9. Ibid.

10. China has decades of experience with small-scale tidal power generation stations in Fujian, Guangdong and Zhejiang sheng. US Department of Energy, ‘An Energy Overview of the People's Republic of China’, 〈www.fe.doe.gov/international/EastAsia_and_Oceania/chinover.html〉, accessed 15 April 2005. Although this is not presently an area of significant investment, the possibility that the appeal of this sustainable energy source might grow in the future should not be discounted. See Zhang Zhengming, Wang Qingyi, Zhuang Xing, Jan Hamrin and Seth Baruch, Renewable Energy Development in China: The Potential and the Challenges (Beijing: Energy Foundation, 2000), pp.38–9. Tidal power generation has inspired interest elsewhere – notably, France and Russia – with the potential for plants having an installed capacity of several gigawatts and more. T.J. Hammons, ‘Environmental Implications and Potential of International High-Voltage Connections’, Electric Power Components and Systems, Vol.29, No.11 (Nov. 2001), p.1043.

11. United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) (New York: United Nations, 1983), pp.27–30.

12. As early as 1974, China fought a limited naval engagement with South Vietnam resulting in the latter's expulsion from the Paracels. More recently, China's 1995 occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratlys focused international attention on China's resolve to prevail in the six-country sovereignty dispute over the islands. On the relationship between the Spratlys and China's growing energy needs, see Paul D. Senese, ‘Chinese Acquisition of the Spratly Archipelago and Its Implications for the Future’, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol.22, No.1 (Spring 2005).

13. Zhan, p.182.

14. Ibid., p.190.

15. Ibid., p.192.

16. Cheung, p.42; Speed, pp.14–15; You and You, p.141; Zhan, p.191.

17. Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1995–96 (Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Information Group, 1995), pp.119–26.

18. Susumu Awanohara, ‘Washington's Priorities’, Far Eastern Economic Review (13 Aug. 1992), p.19.

19. Sharpe, pp.116–17.

20. A.D. Baker III, ‘Combat Fleets’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.125, No.11 (Nov. 1999), p.89.

21. The standard measure of the size of warships and submarines, ‘displacement’ refers to the amount of water in tons displaced by their hulls.

22. Chong-Pin Lin, ‘Chinese Military Modernization: Perceptions, Progress, and Prospects’, Security Studies, Vol.3, No.4 (Summer 1994), p.731.

23. You and You, pp.140, 145–6.

24. See Nayan Chanda, ‘Aiming High’, Far Eastern Economic Review (20 Oct. 1994).

25. See, for, example, J.N. Mak, ‘The Chinese Navy and the South China Sea: A Malaysian Assessment’, Pacific Review, Vol.4, No.2 (1991); You and You; Zhan.

26. ‘The Fire Next Time…’, Far Eastern Economic Review (13 Aug. 1992), p.18.

27. This is not to suggest an equivalence between the PLAN and the much more capable VMF of the 1980s. Nor should it be read as a denial of the myriad other important differences between the two navies. Rather, the point, as in all good comparative analysis, is to highlight particular similarities upon which new insights might be founded.

28. United States Office of Naval Intelligence, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), p.26.

29. John Jordan, Soviet Warships: The Soviet Surface Fleet, 1960 to the Present (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), p.410.

30. Jan Breemer, Soviet Submarines: Design, Development and Tactics (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 1989), p.168; G. Kostev and I. Kostev, Morskoi Sbornik (April 1991), cited in ‘New Historic Information on the Soviet Navy’, Warship International, Vol.28, No.3 (1991), p.296.

31. Vladimir Stefanovskiy, ‘Writings: Damage-Control Quarters’, Znamya 9 (Sept. 1990), reprinted in Warship International, Vol.28, No.3 (1991), p.291.

32. See Andrew Cockburn, The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), pp. 417–18.

33. Stefanovskiy, pp.292–3.

34. Cockburn, pp.434–8.

35. Stefanovskiy, p.296.

36. See Breemer, pp.167–71.

37. Stefanovskiy, p.292.

38. It is unclear whether the loss of the Komsomolets resulted from the technical failure of the chemical fire retardant system, the inability of the crew to properly operate it, or some combination of the two. For detailed first-hand accounts of the loss of the Komsomolets by surviving crew members, see Nikolai Cherkashin, ‘The Boat that Never Came Back’, Soviet Soldier, No.4 (1990).

39. See, for example, Awanohara, p.19.

40. Mak, p.158.

41. The PLAN's five Han-class SSNs and single Xia-class SSBN (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) are the only submarines with nuclear propulsion it has ever operated in commission.

42. See Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1993–94 (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group 1993), p.116.

43. Ibid., p.114. At the time of this writing, it remains with the fleet as a missile trials platform. Stephen Saunders (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 2004–2005 (Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group, 2004), p.116.

44. Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Lacking Depth’, Far Eastern Economic Review (4 Feb. 1993), p.11; Richard Sharpe (ed.), Jane's Fighting Ships, 1988–89 (London: Jane's Publishing Company, 1988), p.98; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p.98.

45. Lin, p.762; Sharpe (1988), p.98; Sharpe (1993), p.115. See also, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance, 2003–2004 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.153. Unconfirmed reports suggest that a second Xia launched in 1982 was lost in an accident three years later. Saunders, p.116.

46. IISS (2004), p.153; Saunders, p.120; Sharpe (1995), pp.117, 559.

47. Saunders, p.118.

48. Soviet ‘Romeo’-class SSKs, built during the period 1957–62, were a modernized version of the immediate post-Second World War Soviet ‘Whiskey’-class medium-range patrol submarines. See Sharpe (1988), pp.99, 562–3.

49. Speed, p.19.

50. IISS, The Military Balance, 1991–1992 (London: Brassey's, 1991), p.152; Sharpe (1993), p.117.

51. IISS (2004), p.153.

52. See Breemer, pp.167–71; Cockburn, p.416; Norman Polmar, The Naval Institute Guide to the Soviet Navy, 5th edn (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p.329.

53. Sharpe (1995), p.116; Speed, p.19.

54. See ‘Type 093’, 〈www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/type-93.htm〉, accessed 10 June 2004. See also Cole, p.98.

55. See Bernard D. Cole and Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities for the 21st Century’, Written Testimony for the Hearing before the US-China Security Review Commission, 17 Jan. 2002. Available at 〈www.uscc.gov/textonly/transcriptstx/txtesgod.htm〉, accessed 22 April 2005.

56. Saunders, p.117.

57. Ibid., p.120.

58. Ibid., p.118.

59. Yihong Chang and Richard Scott, ‘New Submarine Picture Presents Chinese Puzzle’, Jane's Defence Weekly (4 Aug. 2004), p.8.

60. See Richard Scott, ‘Seventy Crew Confirmed Dead in Chinese Ming-class Submarine Accident’, Jane's Defence Weekly (2 May 2003).

61. You and You, p.146.

62. Michael G. Gallagher, ‘China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea’, International Security, Vol.19, No.1 (Summer 1994), p.180.

63. Ian Storey and You Ji, ‘China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors’, Naval War College Review, Vol.57, No.1 (Winter 2004), p.81.

64. Sharpe (1995), p.564.

65. Geoffrey Till, ‘China, Its Navy and the South China Sea’, RUSI Journal (April 1996), p.49.

66. Speed, p.24.

67. Gallagher cites the example of the two Chinese-made Silkworm missiles fired by Iraq at American and British warships near the end of the 1991 Gulf War. Despite having been much touted in the West as a serious threat, one missile disintegrated in flight while the second was destroyed by the onboard defensive systems of the British ship. Gallagher, p.180.

68. You and You, p.144.

69. ‘Russian Yard Launches Latest Destroyer for China’, Jane's Defence Weekly (12 May 2004), p.6.

70. IISS (2004), p.90.

71. Paul H.B. Godwin, ‘Uncertainty, Insecurity, and China's Military Power’, Current History, Vol.96, No.611 (Sept. 1997), p.255.

72. Saunders, pp.128–9.

73. Ibid., p.133.

74. See Hu, p.28.

75. See Christopher F. Foss, ‘Twin Upgrades Extend China's Amphibious Reach’, Jane's Defence Weekly (10 Dec. 2003).

76. Speed, pp.25–6; Till, p.49.

77. Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold, ‘China's Closing Window of Opportunity’, Naval War College Review, Vol.56, No.3 (Summer 2003), p.85.

78. Speed, p.6.

79. Sharpe (1995), p.118.

80. See Hu, p.27.

81. Norman Friedman, ‘The Typhoon Saga Ends’, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol.125, No.2 (Feb. 1999), p.91.

82. Zhan, p.183.

83. See, for example, Till, p.50; Zhan, pp.182, 195.

84. Till, p.50.

85. Cole, p.172.

86. Pushpindar Singh, ‘Maldives: India in “Gendarme” Role’, Jane's Defence Weekly (3 Dec. 1988), p.1399.

87. Till, p.48.

88. You and You, pp.139–40.

89. See Wayne P. Hughs, Jr., Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp.34–9, 66–9.

90. Till, p.49.

91. Tai (1990), p.11.

92. Ibid. It should also be noted that China is not alone in its apprehension about Indian naval power – already by the late 1980s Indonesia was also voicing concern and indicated that the encroaching patrol area of Indian warships motivated its own decision to build a large naval base on Sumatra. See Ross H. Monroe, ‘The Awakening of an Asian Power’, Time (3 April 1989), p.33; G.V.C. Naidu, ‘The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.13, No.1 (June 1991), p.81.

93. Yann-Huei Song, ‘The Overall Situation in the South China Sea in the New Millennium: Before and After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol.34, No.3–4 (July–Dec. 2003), pp.230–33.

94. T.S. Gopi Rethinaraj, ‘China's Energy and Regional Security Perspectives’, Defense & Security Analysis, Vol.19, No.4 (Dec. 2003), pp.385–7.

95. This excludes, of course, the ever-present USN Seventh Fleet.

96. Jennifer M. Lind, ‘Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy’, International Security, Vol.29, No.1 (Summer 2004), pp.99–100.

97. Ibid., p.113.

98. Song, p.233.

99. Tai (1990), p.12. See also Song, p.234.

100. See Hu, p.28; Michael A. Glosny, ‘Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan’, International Security, Vol.28, No.4 (Spring 2004); Michael O'Hanlon, ‘Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan’, International Security, Vol.25, No.2 (Fall 2000). For a more pessimistic view, see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, ‘Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force’, International Security, Vol.28, No.4 (Spring 2004).

101. Responding to Goldstein and Murray's discussion of a possible submarine blockade of Taiwan, Michael O'Hanlon offers the following: ‘An attempted Chinese blockade of Taiwan is among the most daunting scenarios facing US military planners, to be sure. But US analysts need not hand the Chinese estimated capabilities – and thus a possible deterrent advantage – that their current and planned armed forces do not merit’. Michael O'Hanlon, ‘Damn the Torpedoes: Debating Possible US Navy Losses in a Taiwan Scenario’, International Security, Vol.29, No.2 (Fall 2004), p.204.

102. Robert S. Ross, ‘Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and US-China Relations’, International Security, Vol.27, No.2 (Fall 2002), pp.63–4.

103. G.V.C. Naidu, ‘The Indian Navy and Southeast Asia’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.13, No.1 (June 1991), p.77.

104. Song, p.238.

105. Ibid., p.241.

106. Advocates of Canada's abortive SSN acquisition programme of the late 1980s, for example, appealed directly to the desire to assert Canadian sovereignty in disputed Arctic waters.

107. Zhan, p.192.

108. According to Mahan, such a strategy seeks ‘to preponderate over the enemy's navy and so control the sea' with the effect that ‘the enemy's ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions’. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), p.288.

109. Storey and You, p.84.

110. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1992).

111. See Ian Bostock, ‘Australia Confirms Huge Amphibious Fleet Plans’, Jane's Defence Weekly (26 Nov. 2003).

112. See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2004: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.358.

113. According to Evan Feigenbaum, ‘since the present status quo – US protection of open sea-lanes – serves core Chinese strategic interests, Chinese decision-makers seem far more likely to hitch a free ride on American hegemony than to challenge the status quo’. Evan A. Feigenbaum, ‘China's Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics’, Survival, Vol.41, No.2 (Summer 1999), p.73. In a similar vein, Till notes that any hopes China may have of extracting oil from the South China Sea will rely heavily on Western capital and technological assistance. Till, p.47.