China's anti-secession law and the risk of war in the Taiwan Strait

Abstract

The product of a ten-year debate, China's Anti-Secession Law assures Taiwan and the world that peaceful independence is a myth. The law explains that China is building military superiority to prevent Taiwan's de jure independence. This threat is matched by peace inducements, mainly economic integration, to increase the cost of independence. The ASL channels hard and soft approaches into one legal framework. Yet to this author, the ASL is fundamentally not a piece of law but a statement of Hu Jintao's new thinking. It enriches China's Taiwan policy of maintaining peace through the threat of war, the final line of defence against de jure Taiwanese independence. This article explains how the status quo is used against independence and how deliberate ambiguity has enlarged Beijing's space of manoeuvring with both Taipei and Washington. Beijing does not want war, but it must insist on its likelihood. The absence of a reunification timetable in the ASL shows that Beijing is not in a hurry to resolve the Taiwan issue. Beijing also has encouraged Washington to play a more active role in coordinating the cross-Strait interaction. The likelihood of war can best be reduced by building ambiguity into the cross-Strait relationship to avoid pressure for drastic action.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Zheng Yongnian, John Wong and Loon Mann Ha in the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore for their help in writing this article in March 2005, and Professor Shen Dingli for his editorial assistance. I also thank the four anonymous referees of the journal for their insightful comments.

Notes

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2. Wen Wei Po [a Beijing funded newspaper in Hong Kong], 15 March 2005. Also see You Ji, ‘China's New National Defence Strategy, Naval Transformation and the Taiwan Conflict’, Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 15 (2005).

3. Passed by the National People's Congress. The NPC is China's parliament that rubber-stamps legislation submitted to it by the CCP and the State Council. On 14 March 2005, 99 per cent of the deputies to the Congress voted for the ASL.

4. Hu said on 4 March 2005 that ‘one-China is not just our position, it is also documented in Taiwan's existing regulations’. Clearly this refers to the ROC Constitution. This was the first time a CCP leader indirectly acknowledged the validity of the constitution. People's Daily (Beijing), 5 March 2005.

5. Wen's talk with British Chinese in London on 9 May 2004. Phoenix TV, 10 May 2004. This TV broadcaster in Hong Kong is largely Beijing sponsored with coverage of the mainland and key Asian and Western countries.

6. Law drafting by all state agencies should be channelled into Li's office for review, his talk to East Asian Institute, Singapore, 21 July 2004. Yet Li hinted that the drafting process could begin quickly if the Party so decided.

7. The PLA Daily, 30 July 2004. And Wang Mei, ‘Studying the questions of legal warfare’, The Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.7 (2004), p.66.

8. This was a key point of Li Jiaquan's series of articles on the reunification law in Wen Wei Po in November 2004. Li is a leading Taiwan specialist in Beijing. It is interesting to note that as late as November 2004, he still used reunification law to entitle his articles.

9. Senior Colonel Fan Gaoyue, ‘On the three warfares’, Huanqiu shibao, Issue 940, 4 March 2005, p.10.

10. Jiang Zemin and now Hu Jintao lead the Central Small Leadership Group on Taiwan Affairs because they are CMC chair. In fact all previous chairs of the Group since the 1980s were military figures: Ye Jianying, Xu Xiangqian and Yang Shangkuan, except for a brief period in which Deng Yingchao, widow of Zhou Enlai, was made the head for highlighting Beijing's the united work with Taiwan in the early 1980s. But she was largely ceremonial.

11. For the domestic and international roots of China's post-Mao nationalism, see, Yongnian Zheng, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), and Lei Guang, ‘Realpolitik Nationalism: International Sources of Chinese Nationalism’, Modern China, Vol.31, No.4 (Oct. 2005), pp.487–514.

12. You Ji, ‘Nationalism, Defence Culture and The PLA’, in Wang Shaoguang and Leong Liew (eds), The Chinese Nationalism London: Routledge, 2004).

13. Edward Friedman, ‘Chinese Nationalism, Taiwan Autonomy and the Prospects of a Larger War’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.6, No.14 (1997), p.9.

14. Michael Swaine, ‘Tough Love for Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.83, No.2 (March/April 2004). The large scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in April 2005 testified to this ‘people's power’. The Taiwan issue can arouse stronger popular response.

15. On 14 July 2005 Major General Zhu Chenghu remarked that the PLA would use nuclear weapons against a US attack on the mainland due to a Taiwan war. His comment reflects the mentality of most PLA soldiers. Even though a nuclear attack is definitely suicidal, under some circumstances, drastic actions become only rational and politically correct.

16. For instance, one dominant school of thought in the PLA projects a war of non-engagement: medium and long range precision missile attack, information warfare to paralyze Taiwan's military assets and selective sea blockade. Senior Colonel Yang Jinshan, ‘The form of joint campaigns in the future warfare’, The Journal of PLA National Defence University, No.1 (2004), p.31. Without amphibious invasion of Taiwan proper the PLA may not face failure, as the goal of war is not occupation of Taiwan or defeat of its armed forces but to force it to retreat from de jure independence. Chen Min, ‘Brief thought on the navy's model of strategic operation’, Military Art, No.11 (2002), pp.56–8.

17. Yan Xuetong, ‘Reasoning for containing Taiwan independence through use of force’, zhanlue yu guanli, No.3 (2004), p.1. According to Huang Jiashu, a leading Taiwan specialist in Beijing (affiliated with the People's University), the constitutional reform in Taiwan is actually drawing the roadmap for de jure independence. A war may be just around the corner. Cross the Strait, China Central TV (CCTV) (Beijing), 14 September 2004.

18. Wang Daohan was mayor of Shanghai before retirement. He was a key adviser of Jiang over Taiwan affairs (with a special reporting right to Jiang). Koo had deep relations with the top leaders of both camps in Taipei. He was chair of Taipei's Foundation for Mainland Affairs. Both of them died in 2005. On this one-China definition, see Su Chi, Brinkmanship: From Two-States-Theory to One-Country-on-Each-Side (Taipei: Bookzone, 2004). Prior to the Wang-Koo talks secret envoys from Beijing and Taipei met in Hong Kong. In 1992 they agreed to a one-China accord: there is one China but each party applies its own definition about it. It is unclear what messages from Taipei were conveyed to Jiang at the time but the positive tone of these meetings may have instilled in him an optimistic sense regarding reunification. I thank one anonymous referee for bringing this point to my attention.

19. Beidaihe is a summer resort about 200 km from Beijing. Starting from the 1950s top CCP leaders convened meetings there to review the situation of the first half of the year and worked out plans for the work of the second half of the year. In 2003 such a practice was terminated by Hu who regarded these meetings ase occasions of business plus pleasure.

20. Talks with Professor Chu Shulong of Beijing Institute of Contemporary International Relations in a workshop on Taiwan at Canberra on 8 May 1996. He is now professor in Qinghua University.

21. Major General Peng Guangqian, Deng Xiaoping's Strategic Thought (Beijing: the PLA Academy of Military Science Press 1994), p.109.

22. Words of Chu Shulong, 1996.

23. For more on this point, see You Ji, ‘Making Sense of the War Games in the Taiwan Strait’, Journal of Contemporary China, Vol.6, No.15 (July 1997), pp.287–306.

24. Peng Rixuan, ‘A Review of PLA Modernisation’, The Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.5 (2000), p.9.

25. General Qian Guoliang, ‘Comprehensively implement the guideline of headquarters construction’, The Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.6 (2000), p.4.

26. Qian Qichen's speech to the Central School of the CCP in February 2003, from an oral source in Beijing in January 2004.

27. According to Richard Baum, the CCP considered compromise on several issues with Taiwan, such as agreeing to Taiwan's observer status in the World Health Organization. His seminar at National University of Singapore on 17 September 2004.

28. For instance, in his speech to the national conference of ambassadors in September 2004 Hu stated that the primary task of China's diplomacy was to protect the nation's sovereignty and security, a visible departure from the previous emphasis on diplomatic support to domestic development. People's Daily, (Beijing) 30 August 2004. On 12 March 2005 Hu told PLA deputies to the NPC meeting that protecting national sovereignty was the PLA's number one mission. Xinhua News Agency, 12 March 2006.

29. Kang Shijian, ‘Jiang Zemin's fundamental guidance for PLA modernization’, The Military Art, No.9 (2003), pp.14–15.

30. Maj. Gen. Yang Jianding, ‘To resolve the key problems in military transformation’, The Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.7 (2004), p.18.

31. Xinhua News Agency, 26 July 2004.

32. The PLA Daily, 30 September 2004.

33. Emerson Niou, ‘Understanding Taiwan Independence and its Policy Implication’, Asian Survey, Vol.44, No.4 (2004), p.558.

34. CTI TV (Asia) (Taipei), 15 August 2004; and China Times (Taipei), 16 August 2004.

35. Huang's talk to Cross-the-Strait, CCTV-4, 12 March 2005.

36. For instance, news briefing of Li Weiyi, spokesman of TAO, Xinhua News Agency, 10 March 2005.

37. Xinhua News Agency, 16 March 2006. Major General Wang used to be the top PLA researcher on the US military at the PLA Academy of Military Science. He was brought back to the post of first vice director of TAO from retirement. It is widely believed that this unique appointment was meant to enhance the military participation in Beijing's Taiwan affairs leadership at the administrative level.

38. This has been explicitly expressed by Xu Shiquan, former director of the Taiwan Research Institute, Phoenix TV, 8 March 2005. A similar view was also conveyed by Su Chi, former minister of the mainland affairs in Taiwan, China Times, 8 March 2005.

39. NUC was established by the KMT in 1991. At the time the mainstream faction in the Party was composed of mainlanders who clung to the idea of unification. After Lee Tenghui consolidated his power, the Council gradually ceased to function. Since the DPP came to power in 2000, it has never had a single meeting.

40. Robert Sutter, ‘The Taiwan Crisis of 1995–1996 and US Domestic Politics’, in Greg Austin (ed.), Missile Diplomacy and Taiwan's Future, Canberra Paper, No.122, (1997).

41. Words quoted from James Schlesinger and others: Toward Strategic Understanding Between America and China, Report of the National Committee on US-China Relations, China Policy Series No.13 (December 1996), p.2 and used by Secretary Powell when he was interviewed by the CCTV in Beijing in October 2004.

42. Beijing has a history of compromising on territorial dealings when it confronted acute domestic challenges and rising external pressure. See for instance, M. Taylor Fravel, ‘Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes’, International Security, Vol.30, No.2 (Fall 2005), pp.46–83.

43. Deng's talk with Lee. Current affairs dialogue, Phoenix TV, 18 September 2004. Lee, a Nobel winner, is pro-DPP and twice helped Chen Shibian to get elected.

44. Wu Xiuyong, ‘Balanced development is a key content of Jiang Zemin's national defence theory’, Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.12 (1999), p.12.

45. Jin Yinian, ‘Reunification and China's sustainable development’, Journal of the PLA National Defence University, No.11 (2000), p.25.

46. An article in Wen Wei Po on 15 July 2005 cited Jiang as saying that the Taiwan issue should be resolved in 20 years. On 26 July 2004 CCTV-9 staged a talk show with the theme of Wen Wei Po's article.

47. Lowell Dittmer, ‘Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity’, Asian Survey, Vol.44, No.4 (July/August 2004), pp.475–83.

48. Sisy's News, China Television (Taipei), 16 February 2006.

49. Chalmers Johnson, ‘The Real China Threat’, Asia Times, 19 March 2005.

50. Strait Times, 2 October 2004.

51. Huang Jiashu, Cross the Strait, CCTV-4, 12 March 2005. The Bian–Soong meeting refers to the surprise meeting between Chen and James Soong, chair of the People First Party, in February 2005. They signed a 10-point agreement that emphasized the continued relevance of the ROC Constitution. Shortly after the meeting Chen announced that during his term in office there was no way Taiwan independence could be realised.

52. News briefing of the TAO spokesman, Xinhua New Agency, 25 February 2005.

53. The mainland contribution to Taiwan's economic growth was a record 68 per cent in 2003. Chief economist of Morgan Stanley Stephen Roach's speech to the Boao Forum for Asia: Hainan, 25 April 2004.

54. Liao Pen-yen of the Taiwan Solidarity Party believed that the KMT's China visit undercut the people's power accumulated from Taiwan's anti-ASL effort. Speaking Your Minds, TVBS Asia (Taipei), 10 April 2005.

55. Yan Xuetong's speech to News Focus Today, CCTV-9, April 2004. In 2005 Taiwan achieved US$ 32 billion surplus with the mainland as compared with its total surplus of only over US$ 7 billion. People's Daily, 7 March 2006.

56. ‘Green-hat’ businessmen refers to Taiwan's pro-DPP businessmen doing business in the mainland. For instance, the Chi Mei Corporation was identified, forcing Hsu to resign and his key aides to make an announcement sweet to the ears of Beijing.

57. The talk of Huang Renwei (deputy director of Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences and a key adviser to Wang Daohan on US and Taiwan affairs) Cross the Strait, CCTV-4, 16 August 2004.

58. DDP elder Shen Fu-hsiung's talk in Sisy's News, CTV, 9 April 2004.

59. See Li Jiaqun's article series on national reunification law, Wen Wei Po, November 2004.

60. The issue of an interim agreement has been widely discussed in Beijing whose attitudes have changed from negative to positive in recent years. At this stage it is speculative to think that Beijing would use it for policy-making but it has seen its value against de jure independence. For the agreement, see Kenneth Lieberthal, ‘Preventing a War Over Taiwan’, Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, No.2 (March/April 2005).

61. See for instance, Robert Sutter, ‘In the Wake of Taiwan's 2004 Elections/Referenda: Rethinking US Policy Options’, Issues and Studies, Vol.40, No.3/4 (2004), pp.371–80.

62. After the DPP ended the NUC, Beijing repeatedly reminded Washington to honour its pledge to China that it would take action against Taipei if it moves against the status quo. Liu Jianchao, spokesman of Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made the statement in his news briefing on 28 February 2006, Xinhua News Agency, 28 February 2006.

63. For instance, Article Two in the PRC Constitution stipulates that Taiwan is part of the PRC. Will Beijing go that far to revise the constitution, if confederate China becomes a possibility? Some Chinese scholars have raised this question. Qiu Zhenhai, ‘After the ASL, will Beijing consider constitutional revision?’, Lianhe Zaobao (United News), (Singapore), 21 March 2005.