Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and ‘Post-Conflict’ Reconstruction in Afghanistan

Abstract

This article focuses on the role of international aid donors in Afghanistan since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in 2001. Specifically, it explores the scope and utility of peace conditionalities as an instrument for peace consolidation in the context of a fragile war-to-peace transition. Geo-strategic and institutional concerns have generally led to an unconditional approach to assistance by international actors. It is argued that large inflows of unconditional aid risk re-creating the structural conditions that led to the outbreak of conflict. Aid conditionalities need to be re-conceptualized as aid-for-peace bargains rather than as bribes for security. Some forms of conditionality are necessary in order to rebuild the social contract in Afghanistan. This finding has wider relevance for aid donors and they should reconsider orthodox development models in ‘fragile state’ settings. Rather than seeing conditionalities and ownership as two ends of a policy spectrum, the former may be a necessary instrument for achieving the latter.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This article is based on research conducted between August and December 2005, which involved interviewing 70 key informants including Afghan government officials, civil society actors, aid workers, diplomats, military personnel and academics. We are grateful to DFID and to ESRC (Transformation of War Economies, Res. 223250071) for supporting this work.

Notes

1. James K. Boyce, ‘Unpacking Aid’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.2, 2002, pp.239–46.

2. Boyce, ‘Development Assistance, Conditionality and War Economies’, in K. Ballentine and H. Nitzsche (eds), Profiting from Peace: Managing the Resource Dimensions of Civil War, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005, pp.287–316 (291).

3. We have therefore adopted a broad definition of the term which subsumes three sub-types identified by Boyce (ibid.): (1) conditionality for conflict prevention, (2) conditionality for conflict resolution (3) conditionality for post-war peacebuilding.

4. Debbie Warrener and Carolin Loehr, Working Effectively in Fragile States: Current Thinking in the UK, Synthesis Paper 7, Overseas Development Institute, February 2005, www.odi.org.uk/RAPID/Projects/R0219/docs/Synth_7_fragile.pdf, p.5.

5. Nick Cullather, ‘Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State’, Journal of American History, Vol.89, No.2, 2002; Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, West Hartford, CT: Kumarian, 1998; Boyce (see n.1 above).

6. Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Peace-Building and State-Building in Afghanistan: Constructing Sovereignty for Whose Security?’ Third World Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1, 2006, pp.175–85.

7. Astri Suhrke, ‘The Limits of State-building: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan’, Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego, 21–24 March 2006.

8. Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

9. Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper with Jonathan Goodhand, War Economies in a Regional Context: Challenges for Transformation, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.6.

10. Michael Barnett and Christian Zuercher ‘The Peacebuilder's Contract. How External State-building Reinforces Weak Statehood’, discussion draft for Research Partnership on Post-war State-Building.

11. Marina S. Ottaway, ‘Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5, 2002, pp.1001–24.

12. Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, ‘State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5, 2002, pp.753–76.

13. James K. Boyce, Aid Conditionality and War Economies, working paper No.70, Amherst, MA: Political Economic Research Unit, University of Massachusetts, 2003, p.5.

14. Antonio Giustozzi, Good State vs. ‘Bad’ Warlords? A Critique of State-Building Strategies in Afghanistan, working paper No.1, London: Crisis States Programme, London School of Economics, 2004.

15. Broadly, the jihadis derive their legitimacy from Islam and their role in expelling the Soviet forces, the traditionalists from their historic association with the king and their tribal alliances, and the modernizers from their ties to the international community.

16. Of the 31 members of the 2004 cabinet slightly over half (17) had been educated or lived or worked in the United States and 23 had academic degrees in secular or technical subjects. Suhrke (see n.7 above), p.8.

17. International Crisis Group (ICG), Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role, Asia Report No. 107, Kabul/Brussels: ICG, 30 Nov. 2005, p.3.

18. Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace, London: Zed Books, 2004, p.13.

19. Given Afghanistan's history, Brahimi was understandably concerned that heavy-handed intervention would have the effect of undermining domestic legitimacy, whilst large influxes of expatriates and aid would increase the economic and political stakes and the level of contestation.

20. Suhrke (see n.7 above).

21. Marina S. Ottaway and Anatol Lieven, Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality, Policy Brief No. 12, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), 12 Jan. 2002.

22. An estimated 3,000–5,000 militiamen are in the indirect employ of the United States in counter-insurgency operations in the southeast. Individual commanders are reportedly offered up to US$10,000 per month for the use of their militias.

23. For discussion of the PRTs see Robert M. Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 2005; Save the Children, UK, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan, London: Save the Children, UK, 2004; Mark Sedra, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team Debate’ Datalink, No.126, Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2005.

24. Interview with western diplomat, Kabul, 1 Nov. 2005.

25. Ibid.

26. The British success must be qualified, as Akhunzada was rotated rather than sacked, having been appointed to a seat in the upper house of parliament. In the end, the removal of Akhunzada from Helmand represented a tactical move by Karzai to placate a key donor rather than a shift in his strategic approach to crack down on corruption, criminality and inefficiency in the government.

27. The five pillars of the G8 lead donor framework and the donors assigned to oversee them are as follows: military reform (US), police reform (Germany), judicial reform (Italy), counter-narcotics (UK), and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (Japan).

28. Sedra (see n.23 above).

29. Ibid.

30. World Bank, Afghanistan: Managing Public Finances for Development – Improving Public Finance Management in the Security Sector, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2005, p.42. Note that these figures do not take into full account counter-narcotics expenditures.

31. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghan National Development Strategy – Summary Report, Kabul: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006, p.56.

32. The Taliban's success in centralizing the means of coercion imbued it with a high level of political legitimacy early in its rule.

33. Interview with western diplomat, Kabul, 13 Nov. 2005.

34. Barnett R. Rubin, ‘Lineages of the State in Afghanistan’, Asian Survey, Vol.28, No.11, Nov. 1988, pp.1188–209 (1189).

35. Mark Sedra and Peter Middlebrook, Beyond Bonn: Revisioning the International Compact for Afghanistan, Silver City, NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, 2005.

36. Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder, ‘Strengthening Sub-National Administration in Afghanistan: Technical Reform or Start-Building’ Public Administration and Development, Vol.25, 2005, pp.39–48.

37. The Karzai administration justified its selection of the single non-transferable voting system (SNTV) on several grounds. First, there was widespread scepticism about political parties, given the role they played before and during the war. Second, it was felt that SNTV would prevent large regional or ethnic parties from entering and controlling parliament. Third, votes could be counted more easily and it would be easier to convey results. Critics of this decision argued that Karzai adopted SNTV in order to prevent the emergence of widespread, organized opposition to his rule. ICG (see n.17 above), p.6.

38. International Crisis Group (ICG), Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing No.39, Kabul/Brussels: ICG, 2 June 2005, p.13.

39. Andrew Wilder, A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Elections, Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2005.

40. Rubin (see n.6 above), p.184.

41. Suhrke (see n.7 above), p.24.

42. Ibid.

43. Electoral Law, Art.15, No.3.

44. Rachel Morarjee, ‘Karzai Faces Uphill Battle to Tame Afghan Parliament’, Agence France-Presse, 14 Sept. 2006.

45. Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), Afghanistan Rights Body Warns of Warlords' Success in Elections, 18 Oct. 2005. In an AREU report on the elections one interviewee estimated that the newly elected National Assembly would include 40 commanders still associated with armed groups, 24 members who belong to criminal gangs, 17 drug traffickers, and 19 members who face serious allegations of war crimes and human rights violations, cited in Wilder (see n.39 above) p.14.

46. Sedra and Middlebrook (see n.35 above).

47. Astri Suhrke and Julia Buckmaster, Aid, Growth and Peace: A Comparative Analysis, working paper 13, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI), 2005, p.13.

48. Wilder (see n.39 above), p.29. Interestingly elections were not seen to be an overriding priority for Afghans.

49. Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada and Abby Stoddard, Through the Fog of Peace Building: Evaluating the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, New York: Center on International Cooperation, July 2003, p.12.

50. Ibid.

51. Rubin (see n.6 above), p.182.

52. James K. Boyce, ‘Conclusions and Policy Implications’, in Boyce (ed.), Peace and the Public Purse (forthcoming 2006), p.13.

53. Anne Carlin, Rush to Reengagement in Afghanistan: The IFIs' Post-Conflict Agenda, With a Focus on the National Solidarity Program, Washington, DC: Bank Information Center, Dec. 2003, p.4.

54. Services have been parcelled out to NGOs in performance-based partnerships with the Ministry of Health, which retains a residual service delivery role only in districts where no-one else wants to work. Johnson and Leslie (see n.18 above), p.187.

55. Suhrke (see n.7 above), p.10.

56. As Suhrke et al. note in ‘the Ministry of Finance and MRRD the minister with a small staff of mostly foreign consultants was located in a compound separate from the rank and file of the department…. It seems safe to assume that the isolated rank and file of civil servants were marginal to the functioning of the ministry and were, mostly, ‘drinking tea’, ibid., p.10.

57. Regional power brokers have been known to encourage the poppy cultivation so that they can subsequently attract donor compensation for eradication programmes. For the poor, eradication increases debt and eliminates wage labour opportunities.

58. David Mansfield and Adam Pain, Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan?, AREU Briefing Paper, Kabul: AREU, Sep. 2005.

59. Barnett and Zuercher (see n.10).

60. Boyce (see n.13) p.13

61. Interview with an Afghan Deputy Minister, Kabul, 30 Nov. 2005.

62. Interview with an international adviser to the Afghan government, Kabul, 14 Nov. 2005.

63. ICG (see n.39 above); Human Rights Watch, Blood Stained Hands: Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan's Legacy of Impunity, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005.

64. Johnson and Leslie (see n.18 above), p.200.

65. Rubin (see n.6 above), p.185.

66. Rubin, Afghanistan's Uncertain Transition from Turmoil to Normalcy, CSR Paper No. 12, Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations, March 2006, p. 1.

67. Interview with donor official, Kabul, 30 Nov. 2005.

68. Suhrke (see n.7 above).

69. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States’, International Security, Vol.28, No.4, Spring 2004, pp.5–43.

70. Rubin (see n.6 above), p.175.

71. James K. Boyce, Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality After Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper 351, London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), 2002, p.23.

72. Christopher Clapham, ‘The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5, 2002, pp.775–96, p.793.

73. Boyce (see n.52 above), p.19.

74. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, ‘An Agenda for State-Building in the 21^st Century’, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol.30, No.1, 2006, pp.101–23.

75. Paris (see n.8 above).

76. Boyce (see n.52 above), p.21.