The United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire: How a Certified Election Still Turned Violent

ABSTRACT

Despite the certification of Côte d’Ivoire’s 2010 presidential elections by the United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), they resulted in the most violent of Sub-Saharan Africa, in the two decades since the transition to a democratic dispensation. UNOCI and Ivorian authorities embarked on a certification process in order to infuse credibility into a system and institutions divided along religious, regional, and cultural fault lines. Instead, the four months of fighting between the two main political parties nearly plunged the country back into civil war. This paper examines why certification could not provide a credible process; it considers the roles and leverage of the broader international community, to conclude that UNOCI did not have the relevant tools or capacity at its disposal, nor were there adequate incentives to resolve the factors threatening the peacefulness of elections. By prioritizing the holding of elections, without ensuring sufficient levels of peace, security, and inclusivity in Côte d’Ivoire, certification not only failed, but enabled the flourishing of an environment inimical to free, transparent, and credible elections.

Acknowledgements

This paper stems from a joint panel presentation with Dr Marie Milward at the 2014 International Studies Association – Northeast, in Baltimore, MD. I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for providing constructive comments and insights that improved the paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

About the author

Dorina A. Bekoe is a faculty member at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, where she focuses on Africa’s peace operations, security challenges, and conflict prevention. Her most recent book is Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (USIP Press, 2012), an edited volume.

Notes

1 Freedom House, “Côte d’Ivoire.”

2 Cheeseman, “The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction.”

3 Masunungure, Defying the Winds of Change.

4 Théroux-Bénoni, “Lessons for UN Electoral Certification.”

5 The Guardian, “UN Envoy Insists Presidential Challenger.”

6 Tucker, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems”; Daxecker, “The Cost of Exposing Cheating”; Hyde and Marinov, “Information and Self-enforcing Democracy.”

7 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War”; Walter, “Designing Transitions from Civil War.”

8 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War.”

9 Snyder, From Voting to Violence; Flores and Nooruddin, “The Effect of Elections”; Brancati and Snyder, “Time to Kill.”

10 Tucker, “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems”; Daxecker, “The Cost of Exposing Cheating”; Hyde and Marinov, “Information and Self-enforcing Democracy.”

11 Langer, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” 9.

12 Chirot, “The Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire,” 71.

13 Le Pape, “Les Politiques d’Affrontement en Côte d’Ivoire 1999–2003,” 30.

14 Akindès, “Côte d’Ivoire: Socio-Political Crises,” 14

15 Chirot, “The Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire,” 66.

16 Akindès, “Côte d’Ivoire: Socio-Political Crises,”13.

17 Toungara, “Ethnicity and Political Crisis in Côte d’Ivoire,” 67.

18 BBC, “Ivory Coast’s Alassane Ouattara in Profile.”

19 Chirot, “The Debacle in Côte d’Ivoire,” 68.

20 Langer, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” 9.

21 Government of France, “Cahier du Retex: 50 Ans d’Opex en Afrique (1964–2014),” 63.

22 International Crisis Group, “What’s Needed to End the Crisis,” 3–5.

23 Ibid., 6–9.

24 Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Côte d’Ivoire, “Organization of Elections,” para. 10.

25 UNSC, Resolution 1603, para. 7.

26 Ibid.

27 United Nations, “Principles and Types of UN Electoral Assistance.”

28 Ibid., 9.

29 United Nations Development Programme, “Core Concepts.”

30 United Nations, “UN Electoral Assistance, Supervision,” 9.

31 Charbonneau, “War and Peace in Côte d’Ivoire,” 508–24.

32 Langer, “Côte d’Ivoire’s Elusive Quest for Peace,” 14.

33 UNSC, Resolution 1721, paras 7–13.

34 Piccolino, “David Against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire?” 5.

35 UNSC, Resolution 1633, para. 5.

36 Handy and Charles, “L’Accord Politique de Ouagadougou,” 657.

37 Piccolino, “David Against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire?”

38 McGovern, Making War in Côte d’Ivoire, 19.

39 UNSC, Resolution 1765, para. 6; For the OPA see: “UNSC, “Letter dated 13 March from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2007/144.

40 Ibid., para. 9.

41 Piccolino, “David Against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire?” 19.

42 UNSC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire,” S/2010/537, para. 19.

43 UNOCI, “10 Questions.”

44 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 188.

45 UNSC, “Twenty-Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” para. 3.

46 UNSC, “Twenty-Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” para. 47.

47 UNSC, “Letter Dated 9 April 2010,”paras 14–15.

48 UNSC, “Final Report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire pursuant to paragraph 11 of Security Council Resolution 1842 (2008),” par 4.

49 ICG, 2 July 2009, 9–11.

50 UNSC, “Letter dated 9 April 2010,” para. 50.

51 UNSC, “Letter Dated 7 October 2009,” paras 26–8.

52 Ibid., paras 33–4.

53 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: A Dubious Election Date, Again,” 11.

54 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Another Temporary Fix,” 7.

55 UNSC, “Letter Dated 7 October 2009,”paras 35–6.

56 UNSC, “Letter Dated 9 April 2010,” para. 5.

57 Ibid., paras 53–4.

58 UNSC, “Letter Dated 7 October 2009,” para. 37.

59 Ibid., paras 162–6.

60 US Department of State, “2010 Human Rights Report: Côte d'Ivoire.”

61 Ibid.

62 International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral,” 3.

63 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 188.

64 International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral,” 3.

65 Ibid., 4.

66 Ibid., 3–5.

67 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 189.

68 International Crisis Group, “Côte d’Ivoire: Sécuriser le Processus Electoral,” 4

69 Radio France Internationale, “Youssouf Bakayoko élu à la tête de la CEI en Côte d’Ivoire.”

70 UNSC, “Letter Dated 9 April 2010,” paras 92–3.

71 Ibid., para 8.

72 UNSC, “Twenty-Fourth Report of the Secretary-General,” para 30.

73 Ibid., paras 78, 84.

74 UNSC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” paras 10, 12–13.

75 Soudan, “Laurent Gbagbo.”

76 Hofnung, La Crise Ivoirienne, 146.

77 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: A Dubious Election Date, Again,” 11.

78 UNSC, “Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” para. 17.

79 Ibid., para. 19.

80 Ibid., para. 27.

81 UNSC, “Letter Dated 20 April 2011,” para. 4.

82 UNSC, “Letter Dated 20 April 2011,” paras 60–1, 88.

83 Ibid., paras 90, 114–15.

84 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: A Dubious Election Date, Again,” 11.

85 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 200.

86 UNSC, “Letter Dated 20 April 2011,” paras 26–9.

87 The Carter Center, “Final Report,” 65.

88 UNSC, “Twenty-Seventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” 478.

89 Straus, “It’s Sheer Horror Here.”

90 Freedom in the World 2014, “Côte d’Ivoire.”

91 Anonymous Interview with International Actor, February 2016. See also, Novosseloff, “United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI),” 717.

92 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, “4th Complementary Agreement,” Articles 4–5.

93 UNSC, “Twenty-Sixth Progress Report of the Secretary-General,” paras 32–3.

94 Anonymous Interview with International Actor, February 2016

95 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 189.

96 Anonymous Interview with International Actor, October 2014.

97 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 189.

98 Notin, Le Crocodile et le Scorpion, 188; Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Another Temporary Fix,” 7.

99 Africa Confidential, “Côte d’Ivoire: Another Temporary Fix,” 7.

100 Vampouille, “Gbagbo pourrait avoir tout le monde à l'usure”; See also, Novosseloff and Boutellis, “Côte d’Ivoire,” 686.

101 Bevan, Phone Interview, October 2014.

102 Mbeki, “What the World Got Wrong,” 1.