ABSTRACT
This article examines the benefits and pitfalls of international policing in Haiti over the past quarter century. It shows the importance of the political foundations for joint policing arrangements. Haiti's experience illustrates that international personnel can provide useful stopgap policing services when the interests of national and international partners converge around public order crises. However, the Haitian case also shows how weak political commitment on one or both sides can lead to vague mandates, poor cooperation in the field, weak police accountability, and stalled domestic reforms. These problems have undermined the performance of international personnel and the Haitian National Police, eroding public trust in both. Ultimately, international intervention has failed to yield a capable, trusted, and apolitical Haitian police force or a notably stronger rule of law. Haiti thus offers a cautionary tale for international policing.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 Dánica Coto and Joshua Goodman, “‘We need help’: Haiti’s interim leader requests US troops,” Associated Press, July 10, 2021.
3 Michael Wilner and Jacqueline Charles, “U.S. is recruiting France, Canada in plan to shore up security in Haiti,” McClatchy DC Bureau, Dec. 17, 2021.
5 See, e.g., Rubenstein 2010.
23 See Pingeot Citation2021, pp. 6-11; Baranyi Citation2019, pp. 14–15 (noting that quasi-military policing can reinforce problematic domestic practices).
33 See Report of the Secretary-General on Central African Republic, UN Doc. S/2021/146 (Feb. 16, 2021), ¶¶ 47-48, 78.
35 After initially resisting a foreign “invasion” of Haiti, Aristide issued his support. See Malone Citation1998, p. 108; Albright Citation2003, p. 159.
37 The UN Security Council authorized the intervention after the Haitian junta’s abuses led to a humanitarian crisis and exodus of Haitian “boat people” toward the United States. See Farer Citation1998, pp. 15-16.
40 Lt. Gen. John J. Sheehan, Hearings and markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress, 2nd session (Sept. 27, 1994).
43 The force included over 4,000 ex-soldiers from the Haitian Armed Forces (FADH) recruited by the United States. It suffered from irregular pay and lacked support from Aristide, who saw the ex-soldiers, in David Malone’s words, as “warmed-over FADH thugs.” Malone Citation1998, p. 123.
46 See Report of the Secretary-General on the Question Concerning Haiti, UN Doc. S/1995/46 (Jan. 17, 2005), ¶¶ 85-86.
47 UNSC Res. 975 (Jan. 30, 1995), ¶¶ 6, 9.
49 The Washington Office on Latin America, Policing Haiti: Preliminary Assessment of the New Security Force (Sept. 1995), p. 1.
51 Report of the Secretary-General (Apr. 13, 1995), ¶ 45. See also Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, U.N. Doc. S/1995/614 (July 24, 1995), ¶ 8.
52 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Haiti, U.N. Doc. S/1995/992 (Nov. 6, 1995), ¶ 14.
55 Ibid. The force of 5,000 included roughly 1,500 military veterans with brief U.S. training to allay Aristide’s apparent concern that HNP cadets would forge CIA contacts.
56 Stromsen and Trincellito Citation2002, p. 10; Maguire et al 1996, p. 65.
58 See Stromsen and Trincellito Citation2002, pp. 2, 7 (noting that the police had no clear supervising authority until a Haitian director-general was appointed in 1996, and most senior HNP roles were unfilled).
61 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti, UN Doc. S/1996/813 (Oct. 1, 1996), ¶¶ 25, 29, 35.
63 James Traub, “Making Sense of the Mission,” New York Times, Apr. 11, 2004. See also Girard Citation2005, p. 176.
64 Traub, “Making Sense”; Schuberth Citation2015, pp. 180-81.
66 Girard Citation2005, p. 185 (quoting Aristide: “You [policemen] do not need to wait for that zenglendo [criminal] to appear before a judge, you can prevent that murderer from taking action”).
68 Aristide alleged that U.S. forces had kidnapped him and compelled him to leave—a charge U.S. officials denied. “Aristide says U.S. deposed him in ‘coup d’etat,’” CNN, Mar. 1, 2004.
69 Annex to the letter dated 29 February 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Haiti to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2004/163 (Feb. 29, 2004).
70 UNSC Res. 1529 (Feb. 29, 2004); William M. Reilly, “UN Quickly Approves Haiti Force,” UPI, Mar. 1, 2004.
71 Kofi A. Annan, “In Haiti for the Long Haul,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 16, 2004.
72 UNSC Res. 1542 (Apr. 30, 2004), ¶ 7. Although Haiti’s interim president had authorized intervention, the Security Council gave MINUSTAH Chapter VII authority in these areas, perhaps to hedge against the risk that Haitian authorities would withdraw consent.
74 Kevin Sullivan, “Haiti’s U.S.-Backed Government Survives on Foreign Troops, Aid,” Washington Post, June 1, 2004 (quoting police chief Jean Ronald Baptiste).
77 United Nations, Press Conference on Haiti (January 29, 2007).
78 See, e.g., International Crisis Group Citation2005, pp. ii, 14-15.
80 Deborah Sontag and Lydia Polgreen, “Storm-Battered Haiti’s Endless Crises Deepen,” New York Times, Oct. 16, 2004.
81 Donais Citation2011, p. 99 (noting that more than 800 Haitians died in episodic violence in late 2004 and early 2005).
84 Sontag and Polgreen, “Storm-Battered”; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, UN Doc. S/2005/631 (Oct. 6, 2005), ¶ 43.
86 Interview with Mark Kroeker, via telephone, April 13, 2016.
88 Reed Lindsay, “Now, We Nave a New Enemy,” Toronto Star, June 5, 2005 (quoting Brazilian Commander Carlos Chagas).
90 See, e.g., Joseph Guyler Delva, “Thousands march in Haitian slums, praise UN troops,” Reuters, Mar. 4, 2005.
95 Arrangement on the monitoring, restructuring and reforming of the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, public order and public safety in Haiti (Feb. 22, 2006).
96 Ibid., arts. 2.3, 3.3.
97 “L’Accord Latortue/Valdès pourrait être reconsidéré,” Le Nouveliste, Mar. 7, 2006.
98 “La HNP est mise sous tutelle,” Le Nouveliste, Mar. 6, 2006 (translation from French by the author).
100 Email correspondence with Richard Warren, former acting MINUSTAH police commissioner, April 23, 2016.
109 Kathie Klarreich, “Food Riots Lead to Haitian Meltdown,” TIME, Apr. 14, 2008.
110 Warren email correspondence.
113 Warren email correspondence. See also UNSC Res. 1608 (June 22, 2005), ¶ 8 (setting out MINUSTAH’s Chapter VII mandate to “vet and certify new and existing HNP for service”).
114 This raised Haiti to roughly 97 police per 100,000 residents, still very low relative to regional neighbors such as the Bahamas (721), Jamaica (439), Mexico (376), and the United States (233). Data from the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Criminal Justice System: Police Personnel, 2009.
119 Marc Lacey, “U.S. Troops Patrol Haiti, Filling a Void,” New York Times, Jan. 20, 2010.
120 Lacey, “U.S. Troops.”
122 “Haiti: UN peacekeepers help to arrest 30 criminals on the run since quake,” UN News Centre, June 18, 2010.
123 “UN Police in Haiti arrest fugitives suspected of rapes inside camps for displaced,” UN News Centre, July 23, 2010.
124 Deborah Sontag and Walt Bogdanich, “Escape Attempt Led to Killings of Unarmed Inmates,” New York Times, May 22, 2010.
128 Sontag and Bogdanich, “Escape Attempt.” After the scandal erupted, the U.S. Senate conditioned reconstruction aid on accountability. Haitian leaders agreed to a joint commission of UN and Haitian appointees, which issued a damning report leading to rare convictions of eight HNP officers.
129 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon eventually acknowledged UN responsibility in 2016, but though a cautious statement denounced by UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Philip Alston as a “half-apology” and “disgrace.” See Freedman and Lemay-Hébert Citation2020; Ed Pilkington and Ben Quinn, “UN admits for first time that peacekeepers brought cholera to Haiti,” The Guardian, Dec. 1, 2016.
130 Ivan Watson, “Anti-U.N. protests erupt in Haitian Capital,” CNN, Nov. 16, 2010.
131 Louis Charbonneau, “Haiti’s Preval to UN: We need bulldozers, not tanks,” Reuters, Apr. 6, 2011.
133 See Snyder Citation2017, p. 2; Lemay-Hébert Citation2014, p. 205; Gordon and Young Citation2017. Highly publicized complaints that UN personnel fathered and abandoned children in Haiti added to public frustration over time. See Lee and Bartels Citation2020, pp. 180-82.
135 Grant Gordon and Lauren Young, “Haitian Perspectives on MINUSTAH before the Mandate Renewal” (Oct. 12, 2011), p. 2.
136 “Haiti: Riots against UN’s MINUSTAH in Port-au-Prince,” Reuters, Sept. 15, 2011.
139 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services Citation2016, p. 20.
140 Schuberth Citation2015, p. 181; Piché Citation2017, pp. 300-02. In one notable case, an angry Haitian legislator told a UN officer at gunpoint to stay out Haiti’s affairs after an anti-gang operation netted two of the legislator’s employees. Ibid., p. 302.
141 See, e.g., Kim Ives, “Haiti: Washington’s Front-Man, Michel Martelly, and Its Police Force, MINUSTAH, Have To Go,” Haïti Liberté, Apr. 22, 2015.
142 UN OIOS 2016, ¶¶ 66-75.
143 Data from the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (2007) and MINUSTAH (2015).
144 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc. S/2017/223 (Mar. 16, 2017), ¶ 25.
146 UNSC Resolution 2350 (April 13, 2017), ¶¶ 5-11.
148 Jake Johnston, “A U.N.-Backed Police Force Carried Out A Massacre in Haiti. The Killings Have Been Almost Entirely Ignored,” The Intercept, Jan. 10, 2018.
149 Human Rights Watch, “Haiti: Events of 2019,” in World Report 2020.
150 Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and Observatoire Haïtien des crimes contre l’humanité Citation2021.
151 See Andres Martinez Casares and Joseph Guyler Delva, “Haitian army set to make controversial return after two decades,” Reuters, Sept. 18, 2017. See also Baranyi Citation2019, pp. 12-15.
152 Jacqueline Charles, “Haiti has an army and a police force. How did they end up shooting at each other?” Miami Herald, Mar. 2, 2020 (quoting UN veteran William O’Neill).
153 See Ciorciari Citation2020, pp. 744-46. Importantly, this approach does carry the risk of reinforcing problematic paramilitary policing practices in fragile states. See ibid. pp. 746-47.
156 See Bret Stephens, “To Help Haiti, Stop Trying to Save It,” New York Times, July 13, 2021.
Additional information
Funding
This work was supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Notes on contributors
John D. Ciorciari
John D. Ciorciari is an associate professor and director of the International Policy Center and Weiser Diplomacy Center at the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan. He is the author of Sovereignty Sharing in Fragile States (Stanford University Press, 2021).
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