ABSTRACT
Since the U.S. led invasions of Iraq in 2003, outstanding issues between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal Government of Iraq (GoI) have gone through various phases and taken different forms with critical milestones characterizing and shaping an uneasy relationship. This article argues that focusing on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)’s changing de facto powers and prerogatives vis-à-vis the federal government is central to understanding the process of state-building in the KRI. The empirical findings of the article illustrate how the KRI’s relationship with the federal Iraq fluctuates depending on the entity’s desire to maintain its political independence, and more importantly, on the level of external support for its status. It further argues not only that the alignment between the KRI and the international community has not led to greater engagement between Erbil and Baghdad, but also when the KRI’s alignment with external community is limited or ceases to exist, the balance of power changes in favour of Baghdad.
Acknowledgments
The authors express their gratitude for the valuable feedback provided by the participants at the “2003-2023: A Twenty-Year Reflection of the Iraqi Invasion, Occupation, and Resulting Occupation” workshop, organized by Dylan O’Driscoll and Irene Costantini. Additionally, we extend our thanks to the two anonymous reviewers and the journal editors for their valuable and constructive feedback.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Correction Statement
This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.
Notes
1 Palani, “A New Era in Baghdad-Erbil Relations”.
2 Stansfield and Anderson, “Kurds in Iraq”; Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State”; Gunter, “Arab–Kurdish Relations”; Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State; Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement in Iraq.
3 Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement; Harvey and Stansfield, “Theorizing Unrecognized States”.
4 Kursani, “Reconsidering the Contested State”.
5 Harvey and Stansfield, “Theorizing Unrecognized States”; Caspersen, Unrecognized States; Florea, “De Facto States in International Politics”; Pegg, Twenty Years of De Facto State Studies.
6 Broers et al., “Introduction”.
7 Caspersen, “Making Peace With De Facto States,” 13; Pegg and Kolstø, “Somaliland,” 193.
8 Pegg, “International Society and the De Facto State,” 26.
9 Berg and Kursani, “De Facto States,” 1.
10 Palani, Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood, 10.
11 Berg and Kursani, De Facto States.
12 Visoka, “Towards a Critical Agenda on State Recognition”.
13 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 106.
14 Caspersen, “Making Peace With De Facto States,” 14.
15 Blakkisrud and Kolstø, “Dynamics of De Facto Statehood,” 282.
16 Palani, “Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood”.
17 Harvey and Stansfield, “Theorizing Unrecognized States”; Caspersen, Unrecognized States; Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement”; Gunter, “Unrecognized De Facto States”; Soguk, “With/out a State”; Richards and Smith, “Playing in the Sandbox”; O’Driscoll and Baser, “Independence Referendums”.
18 Caspersen, Unrecognized States.
19 Soguk, “With/out a State,” 959.
20 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 51.
21 Biersteker and Weber, State Sovereignty.
22 Kosienkowski and Rudincová, “Client De Facto States”.
23 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 48.
24 Ibid., 51.
25 Kolstø, “Biting the Hand That Feeds Them?”.
26 Berg and Vits, “Quest for Survival,” 1.
27 Ibid., 5.
28 Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” 734.
29 Voller, The Kurdish Liberation, 75.
30 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State.
31 Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament; Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan; Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood”.
32 Voller, The Kurdish Liberation, 83.
33 Peshmerga represents the military forces of the KRI, while asayesh denotes the internal security apparatus. Despite being government forces, they remain divided along party lines.
34 Caspersen, Unrecognized States, 81.
35 Stansfield, Iraqi Kurdistan.
36 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 412.
37 Ibid., 411.
38 Romano, “Sub-state Actors”.
39 Stansfield, “Kurdistan Rising,” 4.
40 Mills, “Under the Mountains,” 41.
41 Ibid., 17.
42 Stansfield, “The Unravelling of the Post-First World War State System?,” 273.
43 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 412.
44 Ibid., 411.
45 In 2005, Kurdish NGOs held an unofficial independence referendum alongside the Iraqi parliamentary elections. Unlike the 2017 referendum, the 2005 vote was free from internal disputes. With an overwhelming 98.8% support, the referendum bolstered Kurdish autonomy and served as a significant political tool during negotiations with Iraqi authorities and the U.S.
46 Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State.
47 Natali, “The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo,” 147; Aziz, “The Economic System(s),” 108.
48 Invest in Group, “Determined to Grow”.
49 IOM, “Demographic Survey”.
50 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 411.
51 Ibid., 412.
52 Nader et al. “Regional Implications of an Independent Kurdistan,” 42.
53 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 412.
54 Voller, The Kurdish Liberation Movement, 103.
55 Kurdistan Parliament https://www.parliament.krd/english/parliament-activities/legislation/.
56 Abdulrahman, “Guide: Iraq's Kurdish Media”.
57 Sowell, “Iraq’s Second Sunni Insurgency”.
58 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 413.
59 EKurd Daily, “Kurdistan’s Barzani: Article 140 of Iraqi Constitution”.
60 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 413.
61 BBC, “Iraq Kurdistan Independence Referendum Planned”.
62 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 2275.
63 Macdiarmid, “Masoud Barzani”; Chulov and Johnson, “Barzani on the Kurdish Referendum”.
64 KRG, “Statement from Kurdistan Regional Government”.
65 Department of Foreign Relations, “Minister Bakir and Representative Abdul Rahman”; Rudaw, “PM Barzani”.
66 Jamal, “Iraq's Former PM Abadi Criticizes Dawa Party”.
67 Palani et al., “The Development of Kurdistan’s De Facto Statehood,” 2280–2281.
68 Knights, “The Kurdish Referendum”; Lake, “Tillerson Letters Show U.S. Nearly Averted Kurdish Referendum”; Al Jazeera, “US Urges Kurds to Call Off Independence Vote”.
69 Nauert, “Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s Planned Referendum”.
70 UK Parliament, “Kurdish Aspirations and the Interests of the UK Inquiry”.
71 N. A., “Nechirvan Barzani Calls for a New Phase”.
72 Palani, “A New Era in Baghdad-Erbil Relations”.
73 UNAMI, “Freedom of Expression in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq”.
74 Palani, “A New Era in Baghdad-Erbil Relations”.
75 Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office (@IraqiPMO). 2021. “Our relationship with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq during this government has been the best since 2003, and we take pride in this relationship. There have been few tensions, and we have made many efforts. Thanks to God, through dialogue and building elements of trust, we have succeeded in crossing this tense relationship in the best possible way.” Twitter, December 30, 2021, 2:41 pm https://twitter.com/IraqiPMO/status/1476548949364420612.
76 Florea, “De Facto States”.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Kamaran Palani
Kamaran Palani is a Lecturer in International Relations at Salahaddin University-Erbil. He received his PhD in 2021 from Leiden University in the Netherlands and completed his MA in Politics and International Relations (Global Security) at Keele University in the UK in 2014. His research interests revolve around statehood and sovereignty, peace and conflict, and Iraqi politics.
Shivan Fazil
Shivan Fazil is a researcher with the Middle East and North Africa Program at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. His work mainly focuses on drivers of conflict, peacebuilding and governance in Iraq. Fazil holds an MSc in Middle Eastern politics from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.