Taif and the Lebanese State: The Political Economy of a Very Sectarian Public Sector

Abstract

The political reforms adopted in the 1989 Taif Agreement created a veritable postwar paradox: a more balanced consociational power-sharing arrangement led to a bigger, more clientelist, more corrupt, less autonomous public sector, one preoccupied by predatory rentier practices along sectarian and clientelist lines. The more durable the power-sharing arrangement the less the state in Lebanon acts as a state with a measure of bureaucratic autonomy, extractive capacities, and a national agenda. This article problematizes this postwar anomaly by examining the instrumental role played by the public sector in the reproduction of the political elite’s clientelist ensemble undergirding the political economy of sectarianism.

Notes

1 Sid Noel, “Introduction,” in From Power-sharing to Democracy, edited by Sid Noel, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), ix–xiii. See also Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “The Art of the Possible: Power-sharing and Post-Civil War Democracy,” World Politics 67, no. 1 (2015): 37–71; and Stefan Wolff, “Post-Conflict State Building: The Debate on Institutional Choice,” Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 (2011): 1,777–802.

2 Brendan O’Leary, “Power-sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” in Power-sharing in Deeply Divided Places, edited by Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013): 1–64.

3 Benjamin A.T. Graham, Michael K. Miller, and Kaare W. Strøm, “Safeguarding Democracy: Powersharing and Democratic Survival,” American Political Science Review 111, no. 4 (2017); 17.

4 O’Leary, “Power-sharing in Deeply Divided Places,” 6.

5 See Jamil Mouawad and Hannes Baumann, “In Search of the Lebanese State,” Arab Studies Journal 25, no. 1 (2017): 60–64.

6 Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).

7 Sara Fregonese, “Beyond the ‘Weak State’: Hybrid Sovereignties in Beirut,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 30, no. 4 (2012): 661.

8 Michelle Obeid, “Searching for the ‘Ideal Face of the State’ in a Lebanese Border Town,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 16, no. 2 (2010): 330–46.

9 Sami Hermez, “When the State is (N)ever Present: On Cynicism and Political Mobilization in Lebanon,” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 21, no. 3 (2015): 512.

10 Jamil Mouawad and Hannes Baumann, “Wayna al-Dawla? Locating the Lebanese State in Social Theory,” Arab Studies Journal 25, no. 1 (2017): 66–90.

11 Maya Mikdashi, “Sex and Sectarianism: The Legal Architecture of Lebanese Citizenship,” Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 2 (2014): 284.

12 Mouawad and Baumann, “Wayna al-Dawla?”

13 Michael C. Hudson, “The Problem of Authoritative Power in Lebanese Politics: Why Consociationalism Failed,” in Lebanon: A History of Conflict and Consensus, edited by Nadim Shehadi and Danna Haffar Mills (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), 231.

14 Ibid., 237.

15 The Christian quota in general, but especially that of the Maronites, remains overrepresented compared to the demographic size of the total population.

16 Shafiq Jeha, Al-Dustur al-Lubnani: Tarikhuhu, Ta‘dilatuhu, Nasuhu al-Hali 1926–1991 (Beirut: Dar al-‘Elm lil-Malayin, 1991), 96.

17 John Nagle, “Between Entrenchment, Reform and Transformation: Ethnicity and Lebanon’s Consociational Democracy,” Democratization 23, no. 7 (2016): 1,144–61.

18 Now divided equitably among Christians and Muslims into (1) sovereign ones (or siyadiya), which include the ministries of Interior and Municipalities, Finance, Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, and Defence, and are considered the preserve of the Sunni, Shia (but especially Finance), Maronite, and Greek Orthodox sects; (2) first-rate services (khadamatiya) ministries, including Health, Telecommunications, Public Works and Transportation, Energy and Water, Justice, and Education and Higher Education; (3) second-rate services ministries such as Social Services, Agriculture, Labour, Economy and Trade, and Industry; (4) regular ministries, including those of Tourism, Environment, Culture, Displaced, Youth and Sports, and Information; and (5) state (dawla) ministries. See Ghada Halawi, “Tawzi‘al-Haqa’eb Beme‘yar al-Orthodoxi,” al-Akhbar, 20 July 2018.

19 On the latter, see Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Oil: Assessing and Mitigating the Risks of Corruption in Lebanon’s Emerging Offshore Petroleum Sector (Beirut: The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, 2015).

20 Bassel F. Salloukh and Renko A. Verheij, “Transforming Power-sharing: From Corporate to Hybrid Consociation in Postwar Lebanon,” Middle East Law and Governance 9, no. 2 (2017): 147–73.

21 Leenders, Spoils of Truce, 238 and 231, respectively.

22 Bassel F. Salloukh, Rabie Barakat, Jinan S. Al-Habbal, Lara W. Khattab, and Shoghig Mikaelian, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (London: Pluto Press, 2015).

23 Leenders, Spoils of Truce, 225, 232.

24 Ghassan Dibeh, “The Political Economy of Postwar Reconstruction in Lebanon” (United Nations University-World Institute for Development Economics Research, Research Paper No. 2005/44, July 2005), http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/rps/rps2005/rp2005-44.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018); and Toufic K. Gaspard, A Political Economy of Lebanon, 1948–2002: The Limits of Laissez-faire (Leiden: Brill, 2004).

25 Ghassan Dibeh, “Min al-Haymana ila al-Shumuliya al-Taifiya,” al-Akhbar, 16 April 2018.

26 For example, Stephan Rosiny, “A Quarter Century of ‘Transitory Power-Sharing’: Lebanon’s Unfulfilled Taif Agreement of 1989 Revisited,” Civil Wars 17, no. 4 (2015): 485–502; and ‘Isam Sulayman, Al-Jumhuriya al-Thaniya Bayn al-Nusus wa-l-Mumarasa (Beirut: n.p., 1998).

27 Of course, the exception is Leenders, Spoils of Truce. See also Hannes Baumann, Citizen Hariri: Lebanon’s Neoliberal Reconstruction (London: Hurst and Company, 2016).

28 The World Bank, “Lebanon—Promoting Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity: Systematic Country Diagnostic,” 13 Feb. 2015, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/951911467995104328/Lebanon-Promoting-poverty-reduction-and-shared-prosperity-systematic-country-diagnostic (accessed 1 May 2018).

29 Mouawad and Baumann, “Wayna al-Dawla?” 69; Caroline Akoum, “Al-Qita‘al-Am fi Lubnan: Magharat al-Batala al-Muqana‘a wa-l-Muhasasa al-Siyasiya,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, 29 Sept. 2017.

30 Rola Rizk Azour places the number of public-sector employees in 2011 at 142,371: 101,890 security and military personnel, 27,327 teachers in primary and secondary education, and 15,554 in the state bureaucracy. However, Azour only focuses on central government employees, to the exclusion of employees in the municipalities, SOEs, and other government agencies, such as the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). Rola Rizk Azour, “Personnel Cost in the Central Government: An Analytical Review of the Past Decade” (May 2013, Institut Des Finances Basil Fuleihan), www.institutdesfinances.gov.lb/english/loadFile.aspx?pageid=6515&phname=PDF (accessed 1 May 2018).

31 Akoum, “Al-Qita‘al-Am fi Lubnan.” See also The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 60.

32 Hicham Abou Jaoude, “Labour Market and Employment Policy in Lebanon” (The European Training Foundation Working Paper, 2015, 7), http://www.etf.europa.eu/web.nsf/pages/Employment_policies_Lebanon (accessed 1 May 2018).

33 Eva Abi-Haydar, “Band Waqf al-Tawzif fi al-Dawla Thahaba ma‘al-Rih,” al-Joumhouria, 8 Sept. 2017.

34 Leenders, Spoils of Truce, 225–30; Mouawad and Baumann, “Wayna al-Dawla?”

35 Akoum, “Al-Qita‘al-Am fi Lubnan.”

36 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 42, italic omitted.

37 Borrowing from Rex Brynen, A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000).

38 Namely, the Director General of General Security (from Maronite to Shia), Director General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates (from Maronite or Greek Catholic to Sunni), and the Director General of State Security (from Shia to Greek Catholic). The Director General of the Presidency is a Maronite post except under the presidency of Emile Lahoud (1998–2007), when it was occupied by a Sunni.

39 “Waza’ef al-Fi’a al-Oula fi al-Dawla: 157 Wazifa Yahtakeruha Zu‘ama’ al-Tawa’ef,” The Monthly, 11 July 2017, http://monthlymagazine.com/ar-article-desc_4419_ (accessed 1 May 2018).

40 A figure expected to rise under Michel Aoun’s presidency (2016– ) given the FPM’s determination to control most Christian public-sector appointments.

41 “Waza’ef al-Fi’a al-Oula fi al-Dawla.”

42 For a theoretical analysis of this overlapping postwar elite, see Fawwaz Traboulsi, Al-Tabaqat al-Ijtima‘iya fi Lubnan: Ithbat Wujood (Beirut: Heinrich Böll Stftung, 2014); Baumann, Citizen Hariri; and Salloukh, Barakat, al-Habbal, Khattab, and Mikaelian, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon.

43 As, for example, in the rumored attempt by the FPM to use the FPM-affiliated head of the Central Inspection Board, George Attiyé, to neutralize the prerogatives of the Director General of Tenders, Jean al-‘Aliyé, who refused to sanction a tender pertaining to the procurement of new electricity-producing power barges that involved only one valid bidder. In this case, political support to al-‘Aliyé by Amal, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Forces, and the Marada enabled him to resist Attiyé’s intimidating tactics and hence the attempt to pass what was perceived as a suspicious bid. Muhamad Wehbé, “Ghazwat George Attiyé: Muhawalat al-Saytara ‘Ala Idarat al-Munaqasat,” al-Akhbar, 18 May 2018.

44 This paragraph is based on interviews with a former Minister of Labour, members of UN agencies, and individuals who interact regularly with these ministries but who wish to remain anonymous. Beirut, May–June 2018. It is meant to give a snapshot rather than a comprehensive account of sectarian representation in the public sector.

45 Rabie Barakat, “Harakat Amal: Dawlat Lubnan al-‘Amiqa,” al-Safir, 26 Oct. 2016.

46 Baumann, Citizen Hariri, 147.

47 Aram Nerguizian, “Between Sectarianism and Military Development: The Paradox of the Lebanese Armed Forces,” in Salloukh, Barakat, al-Habbal, Khattab, and Mikaelian, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon, 108–35.

48 Faraj Obagi, “Maza Yajri fi al-Jami‘a al-Lubnaniya,” al-Nahar, 10 July 2017.

49 Hadil Fawwaz, “Al-Tawazun al-Taifi Yu‘arqel Tawzif 106 min Hurras al-Ahraj,” al-Akhbar, 3 Oct. 2017.

50 Radwan Mortada, “Al-Taifiya Qabla al-Kafa’a fi al-Shurta,” al-Akhbar, 3 Feb. 2011.

51 Interview with an anonymous source working at a UN agency, Beirut, 19 May 2018.

52 “Al-Masihiyon La Yankhariton fi al-Dawla,” Lebanese Forces website, 31 July 2014, https://www.lebanese-forces.com/2014/07/31/isf-christians-numbers/ (accessed 1 May 2018).

53 Baumann, Citizen Hariri, 146.

54 Ibid., 147.

55 “Al-Madares al-Rasmiya: Ustaz Wahed likul 3 Talamiz,” The Monthly, 10 Jan. 2018, http://monthlymagazine.com/ar-article-desc_4560_ (accessed 1 May 2018).

56 Nabil ‘Abdo, “Al-Lanizamiya: ‘Awdat al-‘Amal ila Madih,” al-Akhbar, 30 April 2018.

57 Elie al-Firzli, “OGERO Taghraq bi-l-Fasad,” al-Akhbar, 31 May 2018.

58 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 47.

59 Azour, “Personnel Cost in the Central Government,” 4.

60 International Monetary Fund, “Lebanon 2016 Article IV Consultation,” January 2017, Table 2a, 33, https://www.imf.org/∼/media/Files/Publications/CR/2017/cr1719.ashx (accessed 1 May 2018). See also Central Administration of Statistics, Lebanese National Accounts: 2016, 6, http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/National%20Accounts/CAS_Lebanon_National_Accounts_2016_Comments_and_tables.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018).

61 Mounir Rached, “Fiscal Performance and the Debt Outlook,” Executive Magazine, 3 Jan. 2018, http://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/fiscal-performance-and-the-debt-outlook (accessed 1 May 2018).

62 “Taqrir Bank Audi ‘An al-Iqtisad al-Lubnani fi al-Fasl al-Thaleth min ‘Am 2001,” al-Nahar, 9 Nov. 2017.

63 Hussein Tarraf, “Muwazanat 2018: ‘Endama Tasruquna al-Dawla,” al-Akhbar, 29 March 2018.

64 Osama Habib, “Salameh Rejects Devaluation of Pound,” Daily Star, 29 March 2018.

65 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 23.

66 Average figures of net job creation between 2004 and 2007; ibid., 24.

67 Azour, “Personnel Cost in the Central Government,” 4.

68 Leenders, Spoils of Truce, 232. The Central Administration of Statistics puts the rate at 12.9 percent of the actual labor force (15 years and above) in “Labor Force and Economic Activity Rates,” 204, http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/PDFs/Labor%20force%20and%20economic%20activity%20rates-2004.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018).

69 Central Administration of Statistics, Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey: 2009, 74, http://www.cas.gov.lb/images/Mics3/CAS_MICS3_survey_2009.pdf (accessed 1 May 2018).

70 Akoum, “Al-Qita‘al-Am fi Lubnan.”

71 The World Bank, “Republic of Lebanon—Good Jobs Needed: The Role of Macro, Investment, Education, Labor and Social Protection Policies,” 2012, 15, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/13217 (accessed 1 May 2018).

72 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 47.

73 Tarraf, “Muwazanat 2018.”

74 “Cost of Retirees = 15% of Treasury Revenues,” The Monthly, 28 May 2018, http://monthlymagazine.com/article-desc_4716_cost-of-retirees-15-of-treasury-revenues (accessed 1 May 2018).

75 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 48.

76 See Maaloumat: Dawlat al-Tawa’ef . . . wa-l-Ri’asa (Beirut: Arab Documentation Center, January 2008), 16–17, 30, 68, 76, and 90; “Waza’ef al-Fi’a al-Oula fi al-Dawla.”

77 For details, see Salloukh, Barakat, al-Habbal, Khattab, and Mikaelian, The Politics of Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon, ch. 5, on which this section is partly based.

78 Baumann, Citizen Hariri, 83.

79 Faten al-Hajj, “Silsilat al-Rawateb: Taqsit hata 2014,” al-Akhbar, 14 Aug. 2012.

80 Imad al-Zoughby, “Idrab al-Tansiq Yantahi kama Bada’a . . . Bi-l-Iltizam,” al-Safir, 29 Nov. 2012.

81 Osama Habib, “Bankers: Raising Taxes Would Wreak Havoc,” The Daily Star, 11 April 2014.

82 Elie al-Firzli, “Berri: al-Khutawat al-Niyabiya Istijaba li Paris 3,” al-Safir, 14 April 2014.

83 Ghazi Wazni, “Al-Silsila: Tada‘iyat wa Haqa’eq,” al-Safir, 14 May 2014; Faten al-Hajj, “Taqrir al-Silsila wa-l-Dara’eb,” al-Akhbar, 6 May 2014.

84 See the coverage in al-Safir, 2 Oct. 2014.

85 Faten al-Hajj, “Intikhabat Rabitat al-Asatiza al-Thanawiyin: Nihayat Hay’at al-Tansiq al-Naqabiya Kama Na‘rifuha,” al-Akhbar, 26 Jan. 2015. The FPM captured two seats; Hezbollah, two; Amal, three; Marada Movement, one; Future Movement, three; PSP, two; SSNP, one; Lebanese Popular Congress, one; and the Islamic Action Front, one.

86 Eva Abi Haydar, “Khoury lil-Joumhouria: Khamsat Asbab li-Irtifa‘al-‘Ajz fi Mizaniyat 2018,” al-Joumhouria, 21 Feb. 2018.

87 Faten al-Hajj, “Ay Dara’eb? Ay Silsila? Ay Ijra’at?” al-Safir, 18 March 2017; “Muwazafu al-Qita‘al-‘Am: 38%–144% Ziyadat Rawateb,” The Monthly, 15 Nov. 2017, http://monthlymagazine.com/ar-article-desc_4505_ (accessed 1 May 2018).

88 Viviane ‘Aqiqi, “Majles al-Nuwwab Yuqer al-Dara’eb Mujadadan: Al-Silsila Lam Tu‘alaq wa al-Masaref Takhsar Ma‘rakatuha,” al-Akhbar, 10 Oct. 2017.

89 Rached, “Fiscal Performance and the Debt Outlook.”

90 Ghassan Dibeh, “Al-Taqashuf Mara Okhra aw Mara Akhira,” al-Akhbar, 30 July 2018.

91 ‘Aqiqi, “Majles al-Nuwwab Yuqer al-Dara’eb Mujadadan.”

92 Ibrahim al-Amin, “Basil wal-Intikhabat wa Huquq al-Masihiyin: Al-Haqiqa bel Maqlub,” al-Akhbar, 30 April 2018.

93 The argument was made by FPM leader Gebran Bassil in a closed meeting during his 2018 electoral campaign in which he labelled Berri a “thug.” The video of the meeting was first aired by New TV on 28 Jan. 2018.

94 Simon Sam‘an, “Al-Shughur fi Idarat al-Dawla: Hal Yushakel Azma am Fursa li-Tashih al-Tawazun?” 20 Feb. 2017, https://www.lebanese-forces.com/2017/02/20/vacancy-in-the-state-departments-simon-semaan/ (accessed 1 June 2018).

95 “Ba‘d al-Tahmish wa-l-Taghyib w-al-Iqasa’: Al-Dawla Tastanjed bi-Masihiyiha,” al-Joumhouria, 23 Sept. 2014.

96 Dibeh, “Min al-Haymana ila al-Shumuliya al-Taifiya.”

97 Hermez, “When the State is (N)ever Present,” 520.

98 Ibid., 519.

99 See the Labanese Forces’ leader Samir Geagea’s comments reproduced in al-Nahar, 3 Feb. 2018, and Hezbollah secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah’s comments reproduced in al-Akhbar, 22 March 2018.

100 The World Bank, “Lebanon,” 13.

101 “Hariri Yahrub: Ay Hukuma Tu‘alej al-Azma al-Iqtisadiya wa Tutabe‘ma‘Suriya?” al-Akhbar, 21 Aug. 2018.

102 “Interior Ministry Releases Numbers of Votes for New MPs,” Daily Star, 9 May 2018.

103 International Monetary Fund, “Lebanon: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2018 Article IV Mission,” 12 Feb. 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/02/12/ms021218-lebanon-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2018-article-iv-mission (accessed 1 June 2018); Tarraf, “Muwazanat 2018.”

104 Dibeh, “Min al-Haymana ila al-Shumuliya al-Taifiya.”

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Bassel F. Salloukh

Bassel F. Salloukh is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Lebanese American University, Beirut. His current research examines post-conflict power-sharing arrangements, the challenge of reassembling the political orders and societies of post-uprising Arab states, and the geopolitics of the Middle East after the popular uprisings.