Corruption and the effect of regime type: the case of Taiwan

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Notes

Tat Yan Kong, Department of Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, UK.

For example, it does not include actions within the private sector such as managerial malfeasance at the expense of shareholders unless those actions involved the active connivance of public agents.

For example, see Joseph S. Nye, ‘Corruption and Political Development: A Cost–Benefit Analysis’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 (1967), pp. 417–27 at p. 419; Michael Johnston, ‘The Political Consequences of Corruption: A Reassessment’, Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (1986), pp. 459–77 at p. 460; Gordon White, ‘Corruption and Market Reform in China’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1996), pp. 40–7 at p. 40; and Paul D. Hutchcroft, ‘The Politics of Privilege: Assessing the Impacts of Rents, Corruption and Clientelism on Third World Development’, Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1997), pp. 639–58 at p. 643.

For example, see Pranab Bardhan, ‘Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues’, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 3 (1997), pp. 1320–46 at p. 1321; Mushtaq Khan, ‘A Typology of Corrupt Transactions in Developing Countries’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1996), pp. 12–21 at p. 12; and Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufman, ‘Corruption and Development’, Finance and Development, Vol. 35 (1998), pp. 7–10 at p. 7.

The seminal work here is Anne O. Krueger, ‘The Political Economy of the Rent‐Seeking Society’, American Economic Review, Vol. 64, No. 3 (1974), pp. 8–14.

For example, see Paulo Mauro, ‘Corruption and Growth’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 110, No. 3 (1995), pp. 681–712; Daniel Kaufman, ‘Corruption: The Facts’, Foreign Policy, No. 107 (1997), pp. 114–31; Gray & Kaufman, ‘Corruption and Development’; Shang‐Jin Wei, ‘Corruption in economic development: beneficial grease, minor annoyance, or major obstacle?’, unpublished paper delivered at UNDP‐Transparency International Workshop, Integrity in Governance in Asia, Bangkok, 29 June–1 July 1998; and Susan Rose‐Ackerman, Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Nathaniel Leff, ‘Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1964), pp. 8–14.

For statistical results on the effects of exports and judicial institutions in curbing corruption, see Alberto Ades & Rafael Di Tella, ‘The New Economics of Corruption: A Survey and Some New Results’, Political Studies, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1997), pp. 496–515.

For example, Kaufman, ‘Corruption’.

Hutchcroft, ‘The Politics of Privilege’, pp. 641–2.

This point originates from Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 25.

Jonathan Hopkin, ‘States, Markets and Corruption: A Review of Some Recent Literature’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2002), pp. 574–90 at p. 586.

Barbara Harriss‐White & Gordon White, ‘Introduction: Liberalization and the New Corruption’, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 2 (1996), pp. 1–5.

Notably, Alice H. Amsden, Asia's New Giant: South Korea and Late‐Industrialization (Oxford University Press, 1989); and Robert Wade, Governing the Market (Princeton University Press, 1990).

Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘Patron–Client Networks and the Economic Effects of Corruption in Asia’, European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1998), pp. 15–39; Mushtaq H. Khan, ‘Rent‐seeking as a process’, in: Mushtaq H. Khan & Kwame Sundaram Jomo (eds), Rents, Rent‐Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 70–144; and Khan, ‘A Typology’, p. 19.

Khan, ‘Rent‐seeking’, pp. 91–8 and pp. 134–6; and Khan, ‘Patron–Client’, pp. 30–1.

Khan, ‘Patron‐Client’, pp. 31–2.

Bardhan, ‘Corruption and Development’, p. 1325.

Rose‐Ackerman, Corruption, pp. 114–21.

David C. Kang, ‘Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 1 (2002), pp. 177–207.

David C. Kang, ‘Transactions costs and crony capitalism in East Asia’, unpublished paper presented at the conference Asian Political Economy in an Era of Globalization, Tuck School of Business, Dartmouth College, 10–11 May 2002.

Ibid., p. 30.

For parallels, see Bruce Cumings, ‘The Abortive Abertura: South Korea in Light of Latin American Experience’, New Left Review, No. 173 (1989), pp. 5–33.

Khan, ‘Patron–Client’.

Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (University of California Press at Berkeley, 1998), p. 91.

Guillermo A. O'Donnell, ‘Tensions in the bureaucratic–authoritarian state and the question of democracy’, in: David Collier (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 285–318; and Gerardo L. Munck, Authoritarianism and Democratization: Soldiers and Workers in Argentina, 1976–1983 (Penn State Press, 1998), pp. 32–3.

Cumings, ‘The Abortive Abertura’, p. 7.

Tun‐jen Cheng, ‘Democratizing the Quasi‐Leninist Regime in Taiwan’, World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1989), pp. 470–99 at pp. 477–9.

Tun‐jen Cheng, ‘Transforming Taiwan's Economic Structure in the 20th Century’, The China Quarterly, No. 165 (2001), pp. 19–36 at p. 27.

Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (M.E. Sharpe, 1986), pp. 56–64.

Wade, Governing the Market, pp. 286–9.

Hung‐chao Tai, ‘The Kuomintang and modernization in Taiwan’, in: Samuel P. Huntington & Clement Moore (eds), Authoritarian Politics in Modern Societies: The Dynamics of Established One Party Systems (Basic Books, 1970), pp. 426–7.

Joseph Bosco, ‘Taiwan factions: guanxi, patronage, and the state in local politics’, in: Murray Rubinstein (ed), The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present (M.E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 114–44 at pp. 133–7.

Ichiro Numazaki, ‘Networks of Taiwanese Big Business: A Preliminary Analysis’, Modern China, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1986), pp. 487–534.

Karl J. Fields, Enterprise and the State in South Korea and Taiwan (Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 79–86.

For example, see Y.C. Kim, ‘Political Parties and Political Development in South Korea’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 4 (1969–70), pp. 446–64.

Kyong‐Dong Kim, ‘Political Factors in the Formation of the Entrepreneurial Elite in South Korea’, Asian Survey, Vol. 16, No. 5 (1976), pp. 465–77.

Michael Ying‐mao Kau, ‘The Power Structure in Taiwan's Political Economy’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1996), pp. 287–305 at p. 302.

Byung‐Chull Koh, ‘South Korea in 1996: Internal Strains and External Challenges’, Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1–9 at p. 4.

Karl J. Fields, ‘KMT Inc.: liberalization, democratization, and the future of politics in business’, in: Edmund Terence Gomez (ed.), Political Business in East Asia (Routledge, 2002), pp. 115–54 at p. 138.

Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, ‘Political Democratization and KMT Party‐Owned Enterprises in Taiwan’, The Developing Economies, Vol. 40, No. 3 (2002), pp. 359–80 at pp. 367–72.

Shelley Rigger, Electoral Strategies and Political Institutions in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Fairbank Center Working Papers, No. 1, 1993, Taiwan Studies Workshop, Harvard University, pp. 16–21.

Yun‐han Chu, ‘The realignment of business–government relations and regime transition in Taiwan’, in: Andrew Macintyre (ed.), Government and Business in Industrializing Asia (Allen & Unwin, 1994), pp. 113–41 at p. 126.

Christian Göbel, ‘Towards a consolidated democracy? Informal and formal institutions in Taiwan's political process’, unpublished paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Conference Group on Taiwan Studies, San Francisco, 30 August–2 September 2001, p. 11.

Stephen Haggard & Tun‐jen Cheng, ‘Democracy and deficits in Taiwan: the politics of fiscal policy 1986–1996’, in: Stephan Haggard & Mathew D. McCubbins (eds), Presidents, Parliaments and Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 183–225 at pp. 201–3.

Ko‐lin Chin, Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan (M.E. Sharpe, 2003), pp. 152–6.

Göbel, ‘Towards a consolidated democracy’, p. 8, fn. 12.

For example, Xiaoke Zhang, ‘Domestic Institutions, Liberalisation Patterns, and Uneven Crises in Korea and Taiwan’, Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2002), pp. 409–42.

Stephan Haggard & Jongryn Mo, ‘The Political Economy of the Korean Financial Crisis’, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2000), pp. 197–218.

Yun‐han Chu, ‘Surviving the East Asian financial storm: the political foundation of Taiwan's economic resilience’, in: T.J. Pempel (ed.), The Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis (Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 184–202 at pp. 191–2.

Tun‐jen Cheng & Peggy Pei‐chen Chang, ‘Limits of statecraft: Taiwan's political economy under Lee Teng‐Hui’, in: W.C. Lee & T.Y. Wang (eds), Sayonara to Lee Teng‐hui: Assessing the Legacy (1987–2000) (University Press of America, forthcoming).

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Tat Yan Kong

Tat Yan Kong, Department of Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Russell Square, London WC1H 0XG, UK.