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ABSTRACT
Argentina’s post-crisis political economy was viewed as part of the emergence of a post-neoliberal governance and the rise of New Left governments in Latin America in the past decade that marked a renewal of state activism in economy and poverty reduction. Using the concept of ‘new developmentalism’ described by Bresser-Pereira, this article offers a more nuanced approach to post-neoliberalism in Argentina. It argues that the post-neoliberal project or neo-developmentalism in Argentina does not mark a distinct departure from neoliberalism. Instead, it embodies a hybrid and complex process that maintains the core elements of economic liberalism. This article aims to contribute to the debates on post-neoliberalism and the New Left in Latin America.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Hilal Gezmiş is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at Erciyes University. She earned her PhD in Politics at the University of Sheffield. Her main research areas include post-neoliberalism, developmentalism, comparative political economy, and the political economy of Argentina and Turkey. Her recent work has appeared in International Relations/Uluslararası İlişkiler.
Notes
1 Although the IFIs played a role in diffusing the neoliberal agenda in the region, the reforms were not imposed externally and neoliberalism was not uniform in each country. Even in the most orthodox cases such as Argentina, neoliberal reforms included heterodox experiments (Green Citation1996).
2 Despite the centralised governance of the Menem period, implementation of neoliberal reforms was embedded in complex negotiations with different elements of society. In terms of the business sector, although he followed a strategy that sought to gain the support of strong liberal-oriented sectors with global ties, he aimed to prevent resistance from those who opposed neoliberal reforms due to their inability to compete in a global economy. For instance, large steel and oil firms constituted an important element of the Menemist alliance. Menem gained their support by prioritizing their interests over foreign firms during privatisation of state enterprises. For automobile, electronics and petrochemical producers, import tariffs offered state protection (Viguera Citation1998, Etchemendy Citation2005). In politically sensitive areas such as public utilities, neoliberal reforms were also hybrid in nature (Murillo and Martínez-Gallardo Citation2007).
3 In December, there were almost no foreign exchange settlements with the Central Bank, although Resolution 269/2001 of the Ministry of Economy made it mandatory for all operations. Resolution 13/2002, promulgated in the Official Gazette on January 14, modified the deadlines contained in the previous one (Página/Citation12, Citation17 February Citation2002).
4 Author interview with former Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
5 Nominal lending interest rates were reduced from 40.7 per cent in 2002 to 14 per cent in 2007 (ECLAC Citation2011:100).
6 The debt ratio to GDP fell from 115.9 per cent in 2003 to 44.4 per cent in 2007 and 35.4 per cent in 2012 (Mecon Citation2013a).
7 Author interview with Enrique Deibe, former Secretary of Employment, Ministry of Labour, Employment and Social Security, 22 November 2011.
8 In 2004, the Central Bank accumulated 19,646 million USD reserves and reserve accumulation reached 46,176 million USD in 2007 (Ministry of Economy and Production Citation2007a:86, Citation2007b:104).
9 Author interview with Sebastián Katz, Chief Director of Economic Investigations, Central Bank of Argentina, October 2011, Buenos Aires.
10 Author interview with former Minister of Economy of Argentina Felisa Miceli, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
11 In 2010, the Central Bank accumulated only a fiscal surplus of 1.7 per cent whilst it had a fiscal deficit of 0.2 per cent in 2012 and 0.9 per cent in 2013 (Mecon Citation2011, Citation2013a).
12 In 2013, the ratio of public spending in social services to the GDP was 27.6 per cent (Mecon Citation2015b).
13 Author interview with Gabriel Martínez, Director de Evaluación Presupuestria Oficina Nacional de Presupuestos, Ministry of Economy and Public Finance of Argentina, 1 December 2011, Buenos Aires.
14 In March 2002, the Duhalde government implemented a soybean tax of 10 per cent and a crude oil tax of 20 per cent. In early 2004, the Kirchner government increased export duties on crude oil from 20 to 25 per cent. In the same year, the government announced a surcharge on exports of crude oil, with taxes increasing to 45 per cent when prices rose above 45 USD. In 2004, the Kirchner government also taxed exports of natural gas at 20 per cent (Dellatorre, Página/Citation12, Citation5 August Citation2004, WTO Citation2007:110).
15 Author Interview with Diego Coatz, Economist, UIA, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
16 Author interview with former Minister of Economy of Argentina Felisa Miceli, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
17 The Resolution 256/2000 was extended by the Cristina Kirchner government in 2011 (WTO Citation2013).
18 This investment regime was extended in 2008 (Law 26.360) and in 2011 (Law 26.728) (WTO Citation2013).
19 Although the total amount of the benefit was 1.2 billion pesos, the SMEs’ share was 200 million pesos.
20 In 2010, the Cristina Kirchner government created the Bicentennial Productive Financing Programme to sustain industrial growth amidst the global crisis, providing loans with fixed interest rate of 9.99 per cent. In 2012, after the decision to strengthen the role of the Central Bank in stimulating investment, the Bank created the Credit Line for Productive Investment (Communication A5319) to acquire capital goods at fixed interest rates (Mecon Citation2013b: 9–10).
21 Author interview with former Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
22 The case of the soy complex was different. Kirchner built an implicit coalition with soy exporters without clearly challenging their interests (Rivera-Quiñones Citation2014).
23 Author interview with former Minister of Economy of Argentina Felisa Miceli, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
24 Información Legislativa y Documental, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Presidencia de la Nación, República Argentina, available from http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/100000-104999/100591/norma.htm.
25 Author interview with former Minister of Economy Roberto Lavagna, November 2011, Buenos Aires.
26 Información Legislativa y Documental, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Presidencia de la Nación, República Argentina, available from http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/195000-199999/196894/norma.htm.
27 Información Legislativa y Documental, Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Presidencia de la Nación, República Argentina, available from http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/215000-219999/217314/norma.htm.