American culpability: the Bush Administration and the Iranian nuclear impasse

Abstract

Drawing on the memoirs of Hassan Rowhani, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator (2003–2005) and newly elected president, this paper considers the impact of the Bush Administration's Iran policy on the internal politics of the Islamic Republic and the dynamics of its nuclear negotiation strategy. It argues that the administration had a detrimental effect on international nuclear negotiations with Iran and should be considered at least partially responsible for the current nuclear impasse. Identifying three key areas, it focuses on the administration's rejection of constructive engagement with the relatively moderate government of President Mohammad Khatami; the negative influence of the USA during Iran's nuclear negotiations with the EU3; and the administration's refusal to provide the Iranians with confidence-building incentives, or countenance unconditional nuclear talks, despite a policy change in Washington that was ostensibly multilateralist and gave the impression of directly engaging with the Iranians.

Keywords:

• Iran
• Rowhani
• Bush Administration
• geostrategic competition
• nuclear negotiations

Notes

1. A distinction should be made between the Iranian regime or Nezam and successive Iranian governments: the former is the Islamic Republic establishment dedicated to clerical rule and increasingly dominated by the office of the Supreme Leader; the latter an elected president and his cabinet.

2. A domestically produced Iranian car, based on the design of the 1960s British Hillman Hunter, and notorious for its unreliability.

3. The Iranians had limited channels of communication with the Americans, specifically over Iraq, but there is no evidence of a wider dialogue between the two sides.

4. For example, Rowhani momentarily lost his customary cool when an interviewer appeared scornful when referring to his role as Iran's chief nuclear envoy. Iranian Presidential Debate, 31 May 2013.

5. Patrikarakos relates an amusing episode when John Bolton sought a meeting with Iran's US-educated representative in the UN, Javad Zarif, to convey a message. However, Zarif could not risk a meeting with Bolton even under such salubrious circumstances (Patrikarakos 2012, p. 215).

6. The feud culminated on 3 February 2013 when the President blatantly accused the Larijani family of corruption in a televised speech in the Iranian Parliament even as Ali Larijani presided over the proceedings in his capacity as Speaker of the House.