Wayfinding through boundaries of knowing: professional development of academic sport scientists and what we could learn from an ethos of amateurism

ABSTRACT

What should professional development of knowledge and skills of academic sport scientists look like? We address this question by first dwelling in what ‘being a professional academic’ entails. Professionals work methodically, typically specialising their knowledge and skills while strategically planning how to progress their careers, often not rocking the boat of the academic discipline they call home. To gain promotion, they expertly work within predetermined disciplinary boundaries, and are typically adjudged on objectified metrics that demonstrate a ‘track record’ in meeting professional standards, closely linked to university performance measures. Disciplinisation and performance evaluation becomes an issue, though, when rules, regulations and conventions prevent academics from exploring beyond their disciplinary walls, instead being lulled into playing the game. The amateur, in contrast, typically studies for the love of it, enthusiastically embodying their interest as a way of life, maintaining the highest standards of knowing-in-becoming. This passionate exploration is not limited by disciplinary conventions or performance metrics, but by how far they wish to roam through boundaries of knowing. They are, in other words, a wayfinder, making their way through life by corresponding with what holds their interest as they go. Never neglecting the ethos of amateurism, we contend its potential value for professional development of academic sport scientists, embracing – and perhaps even rekindling – a love of continued learning with and from those we encounter.

KEYWORDS:

• Amateurism
• professionalism
• sport science
• wayfinding
• academia
• knowledge
• skill

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 While not elaborated on further, we wish to note that the myth of objective evaluation is an operationalisation of an idealised way of conceiving performance (see, Hammond, 1996). It is not neutral, nor objective. The illusion of objectivity is detrimental because it does not instigate change or improvement. Rather, it accepts a biased view of performance to be the optimal view. But optimisation is always relative to a given definition and the rules that operationalise such definition.

2 While not dwelling on these differences here, interested readers could consult the work of Songca (2007) for a more detailed differentiation between these approaches.

3 Capturing this sentiment eloquently, Michael Foucault, cited in Plumwood (2009), stated, “endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimising what is already known”.