Design governance: theorizing an urban design sub-field

Figures & data

Table 1. Motivations for state interventions in design.

Motivations	Explanation
Welfare motivations	At its most basic many design regulations simply attempt to protect the public and individuals from a host of health and safety concerns, both manmade and natural. These range from fire transmission, to structural stability, to access to light and air, to road safety, to avoiding pollution and disease, and so on.
Functional motivations	These concern the fitness for purpose and everyday efficiency with which the built environment operates, for example, encouraging the free movement of pedestrians and vehicles, the conduct of different uses and activities simultaneously, the provision of the infrastructure and amenities that make life possible, and the facilitation of the day-to-day management of buildings and space.
Economic motivations	Economic outcomes are always a key political concern and there are strong bodies of opinion that see controls of any sort as inhibitors to economic activity and to the natural operation of the market. Careful control of design is nevertheless also seen as a means to stimulate local economic growth by facilitating particular types, forms and densities of development in particular localities and as a means to deliver the economic dividend that evidence suggests well-designed developments can command (Carmona, de Magalhaes, and Edwards 2002).
Projection motivations	These relate to the desire amongst leaders to project a particular image of place, perhaps in order to encourage investment or attract particular sorts of companies and / or individuals to a city or locality, but also to establish and project a clear identity for places that users can identify with and which reflect the worldview (good or ill) and ultimately the power and legacy of those responsible.
Fairness motivations	Individuals or companies acting alone are likely to attempt to maximize their own benefit and this may be at the expense of others or of resources held in common (sometimes known as the tragedy of the commons ‒ Webster 2007). Regulation can attempt to guarantee private property rights in a manner that does not unduly impact on the rights of others or diminish resources held in common.
Protection motivations	Conservation of important historic and natural assets and environments is a key concern that has become all the more prominent in recent decades in the face of large-scale rapid change. It encompasses not only protection but also enhancement of the positive distinctive qualities of place, whether historic or contemporary.
Societal motivations	These rationales (arguably) encompass all the other categories, but more specifically include the range of liveability, improved amenity, civic pride and engagement, crime reduction, inclusiveness and health and social benefits that practitioners of urban design have long argued that a better designed public environment can bring. Such concerns amount to perhaps the most compelling set of reasons for the state to be interested in design.
Environmental motivations	Such arguments are increasingly central to urban governance agendas, and the design of the built environment has a potentially large part to play in delivering this agenda through designing for adaptability, energy reduction / efficiency, public transport, mix and intensity of use, greening and so forth (Carmona 2009b)
Aesthetic motivations	Whilst visual concerns are often the headline factors when ‘design’ is discussed, because of their somewhat intangible nature they are also amongst the most difficult to evaluate. Despite this, aesthetic concerns remain vitally important (albeit often controversial) for reasons relating to how developments integrate into their surroundings, because of the desire amongst many architects to innovate and build something ‘of today’, and as a consequence of the basic human sensibility to beauty (CABE 2010).

Figure 1. Suburban-style developments but located on Liverpool’s historic Pier Head, complete with standard parking requirements, road splays and buffer planting.

Figure 2. Form follows zoning in Japan’s cities.

Table 2. Concepts of design quality.

Conception of quality	Scope and limitations	Normative frameworks
Aesthetic quality	The most limited conceptualization of design, but also often the ‘headline’ consideration when architectural, urban or landscape design is debated, not least because of the preoccupation in the training of architects and other design professionals with the physical ‘vision’ as something to be created and critiqued first and foremost on an artistic / aesthetic level.	In England, the Royal Fine Art Commission (RFAC) defined six criteria for What makes a good building in order to guide its design review activities. These were: order & unity, expression (of the function of a building), integrity (in design), plan & section (an honest three-dimensional construction), detail (to delight and hold the eye), and integration (with the surroundings). Underpinning the principles is an overriding concern with the aesthetic consequences of development (Cantacuzino 1994).
Project quality	Takes a larger perspective on design encompassing the Vitruvian principles of firmness, commodity and delight (aka: soundly built, fit for purpose and attractive). This notion encompasses important aspects of functionality alongside aesthetic concerns, but whether the project is a building, bridge or piece of green infrastructure, the emphasis will tend to be on the project in isolation and therefore on an object-based assessment of quality within the boundaries of a defined site.	In 2001 and again in 2006, the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) updated the RFAC criteria, with an emphasis on ‘What makes a good project’. The broader criteria encompassed: clarity of organization (site and building planning), order, expression and representation, appropriateness of architectural ambition, integrity and honesty, architectural language (coherent and compelling, rather than arbitrary), scale, conformity and contrast, orientation prospect and aspect, detailing and materials, structure environmental services and energy use, flexibility and adaptability, sustainability, inclusive design and aesthetics (CABE 2006). Whilst the advice also outlined the importance of context and how to understand the project in its context and in relation to planning a site, the emphasis was on the complex dimensions of the project rather than the place.
Place quality	Again enlarges the plane of concern, this time beyond the project and its site to the larger ‘place’ incorporating all the complex interacting dimensions of the use, activity, resource and physical components of place. This notion encompasses how particular interventions (e.g., individual projects) interact with and impact on the whole as well as the parts of the complex contexts in which they are situated.	A wide range of normative frameworks summarize the desirable components of place. In the US, the Place Diagram of the Project for Public Spaces, for example, defined four ‘key attributes’ of successful places: sociability, access and linkages, uses and activities, and comfort and image^1; whilst the UK Government’s guidance on design and the planning system that heavily influenced English urban design policy and practice throughout the 2000s promoted a seven part agenda of: character, continuity and enclosure, quality of the public realm, ease of movement, legibility, adaptability, and diversity (Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000). Such frameworks demonstrate that the concern for place extends from the physical reality and qualities of space to the actual experience of, and practicalities inherent in, its use as a place.
Process quality	The final type, is quite different from the previous conceptualizations as it is concerned with the ‘why’, ‘how’ and ‘when’ of design as much as with the ‘what’. In other words with how the place, project or vision is shaped or created and with what purpose and by who; with why an intervention is right in the context of all the other processes of change that impact on that place; and with when change occurs and how processes facilitate or undermine that.	Design in this sense does not just refer to specific types of outcomes but instead encompasses the various processes through which the built environment is shaped (intentionally and unintentionally). Carmona (2014a) has described this as a place-shaping continuum, or as a meta-process informed by historically defined norms and practices of development that vary from place to place; set within and modified by the local contemporary political economic context; and defined by a particular set of stakeholder power relationships. Design is not a series of discrete episodes but instead a continuous integrated process; sometimes focussed on particular projects or sets of interventions that shape the physical environment for use; and sometimes on the everyday ‘processes of place’ that shape the social environment through the manner in which places are used and looked after.

¹ http://www.pps.org/reference/what_is_placemaking/

Table 3. Pierre’s ‘ideal’ modes of urban governance.

Mode	Characteristics
Managerial governance	Rather than viewing government as a conduit for resolving political conflict, the emphasis is on the efficient, cost-effective and professional delivery of public services, often by arms-length organizations of government. Arguably this model has come to dominate in the neo-liberal era and reflects an ideology that market-like mechanisms of supply and demand should dictate the relationship between consumers and producers of public services, rather than political preferences and accountability.
Corporatist governance	Gives primacy to the ideals of participatory democracy, with the discussion and settlement of policy dependant on bargaining processes between interested parties directed at achieving consensus and coordinated public / private action. In this model decision making is collective and inclusive, but also often slow, and can be limited to those organizations and individuals that are politically engaged.
Pro-growth governance	Characterized by close interaction between public and private parties with a particular view to strengthening the economy. These forms of governance are rarely participatory but instead engage political elites directly with their business counterparts with the objective of boosting growth rather than redistributing it. In this model, public / private partnership is institutionalized and the resulting organizations enjoy considerable operational discretion.
Welfare governance	Predominates in cities in which economic growth is limited and the major source of income to inhabitants flows through welfare spending leading to a particular dependency on the state and to the predominant position of the state as the key provider or enabler within the territory. Typically such regimes are hostile to the private sector as a supplier of services, whilst the main participants in delivering this governance are the government officials themselves.

Figure 3. Urban governance, a triad of fundamental characteristics.

Table 4. The problematics of design governance.

Problematic	Explanation
A fragmented responsibility and built in dissensus	In most countries the design / development arena is split in three senses, first between public and private interests, second between numerous professional specializations represented by their professional membership organizations, and third, in the responsibility for such concerns within government, across the spatial scales. The field is fragmented and can be highly contested along the sorts of ‘tyrannical’ lines already described. The inevitable result is that dissensus is built in from the start, and, even if it is not, responsibility is often so fragmented that coordinated action over place quality is difficult to achieve.
The marginalization of ‘expert’ judgement	Whilst architects, landscape architects and urban designers typically train for many years with design as the core focus of their attentions, others with little or no design training are empowered to pass judgement on their designs (Imrie and Street 2009). These include: planners, whose engagement with design is often just a small part of their training; engineers, for whom design is a more limited technical activity; developers, for whom design is a subset of the profit equation; and politicians, often with no design training at all. Conflict between expert and non-expert is perhaps inevitable in such circumstances where non-experts may have a greater impact on outcomes than the experts themselves, and where lay and expert tastes will often diverge (Hubbard 1994).
The debatable concept of ‘good design’	The notion that transferable and easily identifiable characteristics of good design in the built environment exist remains a debatable contention and some dimensions of design (e.g., aesthetics) will always be more subjective than others (e.g., density). Moreover, urban design solutions will vary from place to place and are not amenable to easy one-size-fits-all prescriptions. In such a context, informed and skilled design judgement and a careful understanding of the local development context are likely to be key to making judgements about design quality, whilst there will always be multiple possible (and acceptable) solutions to most urban design problems.
The intangible nature of design and design value	The somewhat intangible nature of design means it is poorly understood by many decision makers (and some professionals) who continue to equate design with narrow aesthetic debates or with a sense that design is a luxury that can be cut in bad times. Equally, many design objectives (and processes) are difficult to measure, and to attribute, and are therefore not amenable to centrally driven performance management approaches or targets, or to specification in policy or guidance. Similarly, the pursuit of better design in the built environment will be a long-term project requiring commitment and dedicated resources that do not naturally fit with short-term political priorities.
The appropriate limits of power	In the neo-liberal era, increasingly the state has pulled out of directly developing itself and the public policy aspirations for design that involve new development need largely to be delivered through the auspices of the private sector acting in the market and outside the direct ability of the public sector to deliver particular outcomes. The issue raises concerns regarding the appropriate limits of state power over private property rights, and whether attempts to control design (in the absence of direct delivery) amount to undue interference or the legitimate pursuit of the public interest (Case Scheer 1994). By implication this also limits the ability of communities to both hold their public representatives to account and to directly engage in such matters themselves.
Market realities and the detached state	Public design requirements may add to the costs of development, either by extending and elaborating the development process itself (e.g., requiring more detailed design proposals) or in the build-out costs of development (e.g., a higher public realm specification or greater energy efficiency). Because these costs may or may not be recoverable by developers they will impact directly on the viability of schemes in the market. Whilst public design requirements can reduce build-out costs (e.g., replacing expensive impermeable surfaces with cheaper porous ones) or generate a design premium on sales or rental values (Carmona 2009a), the detached nature of the state from these market realities will concern private development actors as they engage with public design aspirations.
How much intervention?	In policy terms, questions of over-prescription vs. under-prescription in design policy and guidance can dominate debates on the legitimacy of the public sector engaging in design; particularly when seen to impact on the ability of architects (in particular) to creatively innovate in design (Imrie and Street 2011). Equally, processes that involve too many parties in decision making and lead to lowest common denominator ‘design by committee’ as a substitute for clear vision can be equally destructive. Ultimately this is a matter for political and democratic judgement and will vary from place to place. To some degree it will also depend on the quality of that intervention and whether, as a result, it carries public support.
Balancing certainty with flexibility?	In systems where the regulation of design involves a greater degree of discretionary power, such as in the UK, criticism often revolves around the seemingly arbitrary decision making that can occur in the absence of clear policy or guidance on which to base decisions. For market actors this has a decisive impact on the certainly with which they can plan their operations. Equally, these same actors may quickly object if their flexibility to operate in a changing market is unduly impaired by (for them) the over-prescriptive imposition of public design requirements on their projects. Balancing certainty and consistency with flexibility is a key challenge in all design governance.

Figure 4. This space on the Thames riverside in Greenwich was of sufficient or ‘appropriate’ quality to get planning permission but has little social (it is fenced in), economic (it is an on-going management problem) or aesthetic value (it is crudely constructed of cheap materials).

Figure 5. Design as market failure, impermeable loop and lollipop landscapes (looking from one enclave across a fence into another).

Table 5. Reasons for caution in utilizing design governance.

Reasons for caution	Examples
There may be no market failure in the first place	Most historic towns and cities, for example, grew up organically with very little regulation dictating where and how buildings, uses and public spaces should be located, and yet formed some of the most celebrated and humane of today’s urban landscapes.
The solution may be worse than the problem	Arguing against zoning, for example, Siegan (2005) suggests that such practices increase the price of homes by limiting supply; encourage sprawl by imposing restrictions on uses, densities and height; and are exclusionary because zoning acts against the needs of disadvantaged groups by distorting the market from meeting their needs.
It may create barriers to change and innovation	Architects have long argued that processes of design control favour ‘safe’, even historicist, design solutions and undermine the creation of places resonant of their time, both aesthetically and in terms of the construction technologies that are favoured (Cuthbert 2006).
Perverse outcomes may result	Stories of unintended outcomes from overly-crude design regulations are not uncommon and famously include the creation of a generation of poor quality Publically Owned Public Spaces as a result of incentive zoning practices in New York during the first few decades following the introduction of these new rights in 1961 (Kayden, New York City Department of City Planning, and Municipal Art Society of New York 2000).
The risk of discrimination	Processes of controlling design may support the tastes and values of certain cultural groups over others and (unintentionally or not) discriminate against those with different cultural values or who simply wish to use space differently. The development of ‘McMansions’^2 in suburban North America, for example, have typically been criticized for their crass, showy and uncontextual ‘bigness’, but Lung-Amam (2013) argues that they simply reflect the different cultural norms of their owners ‒ typically affluent immigrant groups ‒ and that policies to control them reinforce elitist white middle-class perceptions of good design held by residents of longer standing (and city officials) and unduly discriminate against those with a different view.

² The practice of tearing down or significantly remodelling existing homes to build much larger homes.

Figure 6. The design governance field of action.

Figure 7. The private company Solidere not only controls the planning of downtown Beirut but was effectively given ownership of the land on behalf of the original landowners, giving it an unprecedented power to shape design and development outcomes that go far beyond normal state powers and that have profound implications for local accountability and democracy.

Figure 8. Contrasting development processes and their urban governance.

Table 6. The broad limits of design governance, four conceptual distinctions.

Conceptual distinction	Relation to the definition of design governance:
	‘The process of state-sanctioned intervention in the means and processes of designing the built environment in order to shape both processes and outcomes in a defined public interest’.
The tools and administration of design governance	The definition encompasses the full range of instruments and techniques available to those charged with the governance of design which can be referred to as the ‘tools’ of design governance. These tools, classified in a related paper (Carmona forthcoming), range from research to design review, from design policy to hands-on propositional design, and from design competitions to direct financial or other assistance in the design process. Their use encompasses the administrative infrastructures and procedures and the full range of human, financial and skills resources that are necessary to fully realize their potential. Rather than the meta-system of urban governance, it is most likely that this detailed delivery of design governance ‒ the tools that are chosen and how they are administered ‒ that will be key to shaping a positive and effective decision-making environment (Delafons 1994).
Process and product as a focus of intervention	The definition concerns the pursuit of good design process as much as it does good design outcomes, as ultimately outcomes are shaped by the processes of their creation, whilst any state intervention in design takes place within a process. It may be, for example, that the absence of design capacity within a municipal area stems from a lack of design awareness and skills amongst key stakeholders, an absence of high-level policy, or from a general lack of demand for good design. As such this should be the appropriate focus for state-led intervention and not just the direct regulation of particular design proposals (Husam Al Waer 2013).
Formal and informal tools and processes	As well as any formal tools such as zoning that are sanctioned by legislation, the definition also embraces the full range of informal or non-statutory tools and processes that can either supplement or enhance the formal ones, or which exist altogether outside of any formal system (e.g., design award schemes or educational initiatives to raise design skills). Different jurisdictions present different balances of formal and informal processes. In Germany, the system of local planning through Bebauungsplans (B-plans) results in legally binding plans that define the detailed urban form of new development (Stille 2007); by contrast, in China the processes of large-scale urban design that have developed since the country’s rapid urbanization of the 1990s operate in an entirely non-statutory manner, feeding ideas into the layers of statutory planning above and below but unencumbered by their strictures (Tang 2014). In the UK, the picture is mixed. Whilst regulation of design happens within the legislative frameworks for spatial planning and the adoption of highways, the exercise of design review, either nationally or locally, takes place almost entirely within the informal realm and at the discretion of local authorities.
Direct and indirect modes of design	Design governance will encompass both direct and indirect forms of urban design. Thus whilst much intervention will focus on shaping the decision-making environment within which better quality design outcomes are articulated, encouraged and regulated (e.g., the preparation of design guidance), and are therefore indirect processes detached from actually designing projects, other tools will deal with projects and sites directly (Tiesdell and Allmendinger 2005). The commissioning of exemplar projects, establishing design parameters for sites through site-specific design codes, or even the preparation and adoption of masterplans are all forms of direct design that the state might engage in (although most remain second rather than first-order design processes in the terms already discussed).

Figure 9. The distinctive forms of New York’s buildings and streets have been shaped by its zoning practices since 1916.

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